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CITIGROUP:  A CASE STUDY IN MANAGERIAL AND
REGULATORY FAILURES
ARTHUR E. WILMARTH, JR.*
“I don’t think [Citigroup is] too big to manage or govern at all . . .
[W]hen you look at the results of what happened, you have to say it was
a great success.”  
Sanford “Sandy” Weill, chairman of Citigroup, 1998-20061
“Our job is to set a tone at the top to incent people to do the right thing
and to set up safety nets to catch people who make mistakes or do the
wrong thing and correct those as quickly as possible.  And it is working. 
It is working.”  
Charles O. “Chuck” Prince III, CEO of Citigroup, 2003-20072
“People know I was concerned about the markets.  Clearly, there were
things wrong.  But I don’t know of anyone who foresaw a perfect storm,
and that’s what we’ve had here.”  
Robert Rubin, chairman of Citigroup’s executive committee, 1999-
20093
“I do not think we did enough as [regulators] with the authority we had
to help contain the risks that ultimately emerged in [Citigroup].” 
Timothy Geithner, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, 2003-2009; Secretary of the Treasury, 2009-20134
* Professor of Law and Executive Director of the Center for Law, Economics & Finance,
George Washington University Law School.  I wish to thank GW Law School and Dean Greg
Maggs for a summer research grant that supported my work on this Article.  I am indebted to Eric
Klein, a member of GW Law’s Class of 2015, and Germaine Leahy, Head of Reference in the
Jacob Burns Law Library, for their superb research assistance.  I am also grateful for helpful
comments provided by Anat Admati, Peter Conti-Brown, Anna Gelpern, Robert Hockett, Robert
Jenkins, James Kwak, Saule Omarova, and participants in conferences at the Indiana University
Robert H. McKinney School of Law and the University of Ottawa Faculty of Law and a joint
program hosted by the Section on European Law and the Section on Financial Institutions and
Consumer Financial Services of the Association of American Law Schools.  Unless otherwise
indicated, this Article includes developments through October 31, 2013.
1. Timothy L. O’Brien & Julie Creswell, Laughing All the Way from the Bank, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 11, 2005, § 3, at 31 (quoting Mr. Weill, and noting that Mr. Weill served as CEO of Citigroup
from 1998 to 2003).
2. Eric Dash & Julie Creswell, Citigroup Pays for a Rush to Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23,
2008, at A1 (quoting a statement by Mr. Prince in 2006).
3. Nelson D. Schwartz & Eric Dash, Where Was The Wise Man?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27,
2008, § BU, at 1 (quoting Mr. Rubin), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/27/business/
27rubin.html?pagewanted=all, archived at http://perma.cc/ARZ3-CUC7.
4. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT:
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INTRODUCTION
Citigroup has served as the poster child for the elusive promises and manifold
pitfalls of universal banking.  When Citicorp merged with Travelers to form
Citigroup in 1998, supporters of the merger hailed Citigroup as the first modern
American “universal bank”—i.e., the first U.S. banking organization since 1933
that could offer comprehensive banking, securities and insurance services to its
customers.5  Citigroup’s leaders asserted that the new financial conglomerate
would offer unparalleled convenience to its customers through “one-stop
shopping” for a broad range of banking, securities, and insurance services.6  They
also claimed that Citigroup would have a superior ability to withstand financial
shocks due to its broadly diversified activities.7  Supporters of the Travelers-
Citicorp merger further argued that U.S. banks needed universal banking powers
in order to compete with European and Asian banks that already possessed “the
ability to offer an array of banking and insurance products under one corporate
umbrella.”8  Travelers’ chairman Sandy Weill declared, “We are creating the
model financial institution of the future. . . .  In a world that’s changing very
rapidly, we will be able to withstand the storms.”9 
By 2009, those bold predictions of Citigroup’s success had turned to ashes.10 
 Citigroup’s high-risk, high-growth strategy proved to be disastrous.11  As a result
FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC
CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 303 (2011) [hereinafter FCIC REPORT] (quoting testimony of Mr.
Geithner on May 6, 2010), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-
FCIC.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/XVK2-L8FG.
5. Yvette D. Kantrow & Liz Moyer, Citi, Travelers: A Global Leader Takes Shape, AM.
BANKER, Apr. 7, 1998, at 1, available at http://www.americanbanker.com/175/citi-travelers-a-
global-leader-takes-shape-1041890-1.html, archived at http://perma.cc/U3PW-WDK2; Michael
Siconolfi, Big Umbrella: Travelers and Citicorp Agree to Join Forces in $83 Billion Merger, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 7, 1998, at A1.
6. Steven Lipin & Stephen E. Frank, The Big Umbrella: Travelers/Citicorp Merger—One-
Stop Shopping Is the Reason for Deal, WALL ST. J., Apr. 7, 1998, at C14.
7. Siconolfi, supra note 5 (reporting that Citicorp CEO John Reed and Travelers CEO Sandy
Weill “are betting that the broad services of the huge new firm could weather any future market
swoons”).    
8. Timothy L. O’Brien & Joseph B. Treaster, A $70 Billion Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1998,
at A1.
9. Kantrow & Moyer, supra note 5 (quoting Mr. Weill).
10. Bradley Keoun, Citigroup Board Says Pandit Deserved Bonus for 2009 ‘Progress,’
BLOOMBERG.COM, Mar. 1, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=
aKWvUvCwZng0, archived at http://perma.cc/L8JT-VGDG (reporting that Citigroup incurred a
net loss of $27.7 billion during 2008 and a further net loss of $1.6 billion during 2009).
11. Brian Collins & Terry Peters, Citi Takes Huge Hit, NAT’L MORTGAGE NEWS, Jan. 21,
2008, at 1 (reporting that Citigroup incurred a net loss of $9.8 billion during the fourth quarter of
2007).
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of that strategy, the bank recorded more than $130 billion of write-downs on its
loans and investments from the second half of 2007 through the end of 2009.12 
In order to prevent Citigroup’s failure, the federal government injected $45
billion of new capital into the bank and provided the bank with $500 billion of
additional help in the form of asset guarantees, debt guarantees, and liquidity
assistance.13  The federal government provided more financial assistance to
Citigroup than to any other bank during the financial crisis.14  
This Article describes Citigroup’s rapid growth and sudden collapse during
the decade following its creation.  As explained below, Citigroup’s managers and
regulators repeatedly failed to prevent or respond effectively to legal violations,
conflicts of interest, excessive risk-taking, and inadequate risk controls within the
bank’s complex, sprawling operations.  Those repeated failures reflected a
broader mindset—both on Wall Street and in Washington—that placed great faith
in the ability of financial institutions and markets to discipline themselves while
disdaining government regulation as misguided and counterproductive.
Citigroup was an arbitrage vehicle at its inception, because its founders
(assisted by friendly government officials) exploited a statutory loophole to place
great pressure on Congress to repeal the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 and authorize
universal banking.15   Citigroup’s key corporate predecessors—Citicorp and
Salomon Brothers—had high-risk cultures, and both institutions flirted with
failure during the decade preceding Citigroup’s formation.16  From 2000 to 2004,
Citigroup was embroiled in a series of high-profile scandals, including tainted
transactions with Enron and WorldCom, biased research advice, corrupt
allocations of shares in initial public offerings (IPOs), predatory subprime
lending, and market manipulation in foreign bond markets.17  In 2005, Citigroup’s
bank regulators—the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) and the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)—imposed a moratorium on further large
acquisitions until Citigroup improved its corporate compliance and risk
management procedures.18  That temporary moratorium appears to have been the
only meaningful constraint imposed by regulators before Citigroup collapsed at
the end of 2008.19
12. See infra Part II. 
13. See infra Part II.B.
14. See infra Part II.B; YALMAN ONARAN, ZOMBIE BANKS: HOW BROKEN BANKS AND
DEBTOR NATIONS ARE CRIPPLING THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 83-87, 92-93 (1st ed. 2011) (explaining
that Citigroup and Bank of America received the largest amounts of financial assistance from the
federal government).
15. See infra Part I.A.
16. See infra Part I.A.
17. See infra Part I.B. 
18. Citigroup Inc., Federal Reserve System (Mar. 16, 2005) (order), at 11 [hereinafter FRB
Citigroup-FAB Order] (imposing moratorium as a condition to FRB’s approval of Citigroup’s
acquisition of First American Bank in March, 2005), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
boarddocs/press/orders/2005/20050316/attachment.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/N2RZ-YBLV.
19. See infra Parts I.B.5; III.B.1.
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Citigroup pursued an expansion strategy premised on internal “organic
growth” until the FRB and OCC lifted their moratorium on large acquisitions in
2006.20  Citigroup then made a series of rapid-fire purchases of foreign and
domestic financial firms.21  Citigroup also pursued a wide range of high-risk
activities, including leveraged corporate lending, packaging toxic subprime loans
into residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) and collateralized debt
obligations (CDOs), as well as dumping risky assets into off-balance-sheet
conduits for which Citigroup had contractual and reputational exposures.22  By
the summer of 2007, Citigroup faced crippling losses from its aggressive risk-
taking, and it was forced to accept multiple bailouts from the federal government
to avoid failure.23   
Post-mortem evaluations of Citigroup’s near-collapse revealed that neither
the bank’s senior executives nor its regulators recognized the systemic risks
embedded in the bank’s far-flung operations.24  Those findings strongly indicate
that Citigroup was not only “too big to fail” (TBTF), but also too big and too
complex to manage or regulate effectively.  Citigroup’s history raises deeply
troubling questions about the ability of bank executives and regulators to
supervise and control today’s megabanks.25
I.  CITIGROUP’S FORMATION AND TROUBLED HISTORY THROUGH 2004
A.  Citigroup Was Created as an Arbitrage Play on Congress
Advocates of universal banking applauded the formation of Citigroup in 1998
as a bold maneuver to force Congress to repeal Sections 20 and 32 of the Glass-
Steagall Act of 1933,26 and to modify Section 4 of the Bank Holding Company
Act of 1956 (BHC Act).27  The Glass-Steagall and BHC Acts imposed substantial
restrictions on the ability of banking organizations to engage in securities and
insurance activities.28  Big banks and their supporters had pushed bills to repeal
20. See infra Parts II.A; III.B.1.
21. See infra Part III.B.1.
22. See infra Part II.A.
23. See infra Part II.B. 
24. See infra Part III.
25. See infra Part III.
26. Pub. L. 73-66, 48 Stat.162 (1933).
27. 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (2012).
28. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry,
1975-2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 219-20,
225-27 [hereinafter Wilmarth, Transformation] (at 215, describing Sections 20 and 32 of the
Banking Act of 1933, popularly known as the “Glass-Steagall Act,” which prohibited banks from
affiliating with securities firms; at 226-227, describing Section 4 of the BHC Act, which barred
banks from affiliating with insurance underwriters and insurance agents; at 219-20, explaining that
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) repealed the foregoing anti-affiliation provisions of the
Glass-Steagall Act and the BHC Act).     
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the Glass-Steagall Act and amend the BHC Act since the early 1980s, but
political divisions among large and small banks, securities broker-dealers,
insurance underwriters, and insurance agents prevented the passage of such
legislation.29
In the late 1990s, securities firms and insurance underwriters abandoned their
longstanding opposition against efforts to repeal the Glass-Steagall Act and
modify the BHC Act, and they joined forces with the big banks.30  However,
insurance agents and community banks continued to block passage of the
legislation.31  In the context of this continued stalemate, the Travelers-Citicorp
merger was an audacious move that placed “tremendous pressure on Congress”
to authorize universal banking.32  The legality of the merger was premised on a
temporary exemption in the BHC Act, which allowed newly formed bank holding
companies to retain nonconforming assets for up to five years after their
creation.33  However, as a banking lawyer noted, “[t]he exemption was intended
to provide an orderly mechanism for disposing of impermissible activities, not
29. Sandra Suarez & Robin Kolodny, Paving the Road to “Too Big to Fail”: Business
Interests and the Politics of Financial Deregulation in the U.S. (June 15, 2010) (describing
unsuccessful efforts to pass legislation to repeal the Glass-Steagall Act during the 1980s and
1990s), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1625289; Charles C.Y. Wang & Yi David Wang,
Explaining the Glass-Steagall Act’s Long Life, and Rapid Eventual Demise 26-34 (Dec. 8, 2010)
(same), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1722373.
30. Suarez & Kolodny, supra note 29, at 29-33.
31. Id. (explaining that (i) by 1997, large banks had made significant inroads into the
securities and insurance businesses by obtaining favorable rulings from the FRB and the OCC that
exploited loopholes in the Glass-Steagall Act and other banking statutes; and (ii) after failing to
overturn those rulings in the courts, securities firms and insurance underwriters decided to support
universal banking legislation in order to secure reciprocal rights to enter the banking business, but
community banks and insurance agents continued to oppose such legislation); Kathleen Day,
Reinventing the Bank: With Depression-Era Law About to Be Rewritten, the Future Remains
Unclear, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 1999, at H1 (same); Daniel J. Parks & Lori Nitschke, Banking:
Financial Services Overhaul Sees Home Stretch at Last, 57 CQ WKLY. 1645, June 10, 1999 (same). 
In addition, jurisdictional squabbles between the FRB and the Treasury Department over which
agency (FRB or OCC) should exercise primary control over the proposed new financial
conglomerates created another obstacle to passage in the late 1990s.  Daniel J. Parks, Banking:
Senate Passes Banking Overhaul Bill Vulnerable to a Clinton Veto; House Version Divides
Committees, 57 CQ WKLY. 1081, May 8, 1999. 
32. Richard W. Stevenson, Financial Services Heavyweights Try Do-It-Yourself
Deregulation, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1998, at A1 (quoting Peter Wallison), available at http://www.
nytimes.com/1998/04/07/business/shaping-colossus-regulators-financial-services-heavyweights-try-
it-yourself.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm, archived at http://perma.cc/U2ND-UUCZ; see also
Edward J. Kane, Implications of Superhero Metaphors for the Issue of Banking Powers, 23 J.
BANKING & FIN. 663, 666 (1999) (contending that Citigroup’s leaders “boldly gambled that they
[could] dragoon Congress . . . into legalizing their transformation”).
33. See Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 28, at 221 (discussing Section 4(a)(2) of the
BHC Act).
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warehousing them in hopes the law would change so you could keep them.”34
In addition to the fact that the Travelers-Citicorp merger “challenge[d] both
the statutory letter and regulatory spirit” of existing law,35 the merger was
extraordinary because of the advance clearance it received from regulatory and
political leaders.36  As I pointed out in a previous article, “Citicorp’s and
Travelers’ chairmen consulted with, and received positive signals from FRB
chairman Alan Greenspan, Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin, and President
Clinton before the merger was publicly announced.”37  Greenspan, Rubin, and
Clinton thereby indicated their approval for the companies’ decision to confront
Congress with a Hobson’s choice: “either [to] end these [Glass-Steagall and BHC
Act] restrictions, scuttle the [Citigroup] deal[,] or force the merged company to
cut back on what it offers the customer.”38  As one congressman observed,
Citicorp and Travelers were “essentially playing an expensive game of chicken
with Congress,” but they did so with the full support of top federal officials.39
The creation of Citigroup is widely viewed as a key factor that persuaded
Congress to adopt the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA)40 in November 1999.41 
GLBA repealed the anti-affiliation provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act and the
BHC Act and authorized banks, securities firms, and insurance companies to join
together by forming financial holding companies—thereby ratifying Citigroup’s
universal banking model.42  Citigroup played a leading role in the financial
industry’s lobbying on behalf of GLBA, and then-Chairman Sandy Weill helped
to arrange the final political compromise that secured GLBA’s passage.43 
34. Barbara A. Rehm, Megamerger Plan Hinges on Congress, AM. BANKER, Apr. 7, 1998,
at 1 (quoting an unnamed “banking lawyer”). 
35. Kane, supra note 32, at 666-67.  The FRB approved the merger based on the exemption
in Section 4(a)(2) of the BHC Act, and the D.C. Circuit upheld the FRB’s decision.  Indep. Cmty.
Bankers of Am. v. Bd. of Governors, 195 F.3d 28, 31-32 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding that the
merger’s “literal compliance” with Section 4(a)(2) overcame any argument that the merger violated
the “purposes” of the BHC Act). 
36. Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 28, at 306.
37. Id.
38. O’Brien & Treaster, supra note 8, at A1; Daniel Kadlec et al., Bank on Change, TIME,
Nov. 8, 1999, at 50; Rehm, supra note 34 (Based on his discussions with regulators, Citicorp
chairman John Reed stated that “there are all indications that (the merger) will be looked at
favorably.”).
39. Dean Anason, Advocates, Skeptics Face Off on Megadeals, AM. BANKER, Apr. 30, 1998,
at 2 (quoting Rep. Maurice D. Hinchey (D-NY)).
40. 113 Stat. 1338 (Nov. 12, 1999). 
41. Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 28, at 219-21; Kadlec et al., supra note 38; see also
Daniel J. Parks, Banking: United at Last, Financial Industry Pressures Hill to Clear Overhaul, 57
CQ WKLY. 2373, Oct. 9, 1999 (“The need for legislation was highlighted by the recent merger of
the Travelers Group and Citicorp into the Citigroup financial conglomerate. . . . Citigroup must sell
off its insurance activities within the next few years unless Congress approves an overhaul.”).  
42. Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 28, at 219-21, 306-07.
43. Id. at 306-07 (citing news reports stating that “Senator Phil Gramm [R-TX] called on
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Citigroup also hired former Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin as its new co-
chairman during the final congressional deliberations over GLBA, thereby
gaining “a highly visible public endorsement” for the repeal of the Glass-Steagall
Act.44   
Thus, Citigroup can reasonably be identified as the poster child for GLBA’s
new universal banking model.  Indeed, advocates for GLBA essentially repeated
the same arguments that supporters had presented in favor of Citicorp’s merger
with Travelers: namely, that universal banks (i) would provide “one-stop
shopping” convenience, lower costs, and more credit for businesses and
consumers, (ii) would be more profitable, more diversified and better able to
withstand economic and financial shocks, and (iii) would ensure that U.S.
financial institutions could compete on equal terms with large foreign universal
banks from the U.K., Europe and Japan.45   
Consumer groups largely dismissed claims that large universal banks would
provide customers with greater convenience and lower-cost services.46  GLBA’s
Citigroup co-chairman Sandy Weill to help broker a last-minute compromise between Republican
congressional leaders and the Clinton administration, thereby ensuring [GLBA’s] passage”); Jake
Lewis, Monster Banks: The Political and Economic Costs of Banking Consolidation,
MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, Jan./Feb. 2005, at 31, 33 (stating that John Reed of Citicorp and Sandy
Weill of Travelers were “[a]t the forefront” of lobbying efforts for GLBA); Daniel J. Parks,
Banking: Financial Services Overhaul Bill Clears After Final Skirmishing Over Community
Reinvestment, 57 CQ WKLY. 2654, Nov. 6, 1999 (reporting that “key events in this year’s overhaul
efforts coincided with heavy political contributions by Citigroup”). 
44. Michael Hirsh, In Bob We Trust, NAT’L J., Jan. 19, 2013, at 12, 18; see also Parks
“United at last,” supra note 41 (reporting that Citigroup hired Rubin as its new co-chairman on Oct.
26, 1999); Lewis, supra note 43, at 32 (stating that Rubin “enthusiastically promoted the [GLBA]
legislation” as Treasury Secretary); Robert Scheer, Privacy Issue Bubbles Beneath the Photo Op,
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1999, at B9 (stating that “Rubin has become co-chairman of Citigroup, a
conglomeration between Citibank and Travelers Insurance that immediately benefits from [GLBA],
which was strongly backed by Rubin and his Treasury Department and for which he lobbied in the
months following his resignation.”); Secretaries of the Treasury, U.S. Dep’t Treas.,
http://www.treasury.gov/about/history/Pages/edu_history_secretary_index.aspx archived at http://
perma.cc/DG9A-YHLW (noting that Rubin served as Treasury Secretary from Jan. 10, 1995 to July
2, 1999). 
45. S. REP. NO. 106-44, at 4-6 (1999); 145 CONG. REC. S13,783-84 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1999)
(remarks of Sen. Gramm); 145 CONG. REC. S13,880-81 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1999) (remarks of Sen.
Schumer); James R. Barth et al., The Repeal of Glass-Steagall and the Advent of Broad Banking,
J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES, Spring 2000, at 191, 198-99; Joao Santos, Commercial Banks in the
Securities Business: A Review, 14 J. FIN. SERVS. RESEARCH 35, 37-41 (1998); Day, supra note 31;
Lori Nitschke, Banking: GOP Touts ‘One-Stop Shopping’ as Key Benefit of Overhaul Bill, 56 CQ
WKLY. 728, Mar. 21, 1998; see also supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text (describing similar
arguments advanced in support of Citicorp’s merger with Travelers). 
46. Day, supra note 31 (noting that consumer advocates did not believe such claims,
particularly as larger banks typically charged higher service fees to consumers); Nitschke, supra
note 45; see also Lewis, supra note 43, at 33 (“Proponents of financial modernization had the
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opponents argued that financial conglomerates were likely to produce financial
risks and speculative excesses similar to those that occurred when large U.S.
banks operated securities affiliates in the 1920s.47  Opponents also contended that
GLBA would promote greater consolidation within the financial services industry
and extend the federal safety net to embrace the securities and insurance sectors,
thereby aggravating the TBTF problem.48   Some critics warned that GLBA might
create the conditions for a financial crisis similar to the Great Depression.49 
In addition to general concerns about the potential risks of universal banking,
there were more specific reasons to doubt whether Citigroup could fulfill its
founders’ bullish projections.  Two of Citigroup’s key predecessor
organizations—Citibank and Salomon Brothers—had aggressive risk-taking
cultures, and both organizations had narrowly avoided collapses in the past.50 
Citibank suffered heavy losses in the early 1930s after its disastrous forays into
the securities markets under its hard-driving and controversial chairman, Charles
“Sunshine Charley” Mitchell.51  Citibank was forced to accept a large bailout
from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation in 1933 to replenish its depleted
capital.52  From the 1970s to the early 1990s, Citibank again pursued speculative
business strategies under the leadership of Walter Wriston and John Reed.53 
Citibank almost failed in the early 1990s due to massive losses from its loans to
chutzpah to attempt to sell the legislation as a boon to consumers. . . . Through the years of hearings
[on the bills that led to GLBA], no one ever produced the consumers who were supposedly
yearning for one-stop money shops.”).
47. For arguments presented by GLBA’s critics, see, e.g., 145 CONG. REC. S13,871-74 (daily
ed. Nov. 4, 1999) (remarks of Sen. Wellstone); id. S13,896-97 (remarks of Sen. Dorgan); 145
CONG. REC. H11,530-31, 11,542 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1999) (remarks of Rep. Dingell); Kadlec, supra
note 38 (describing views of bank analyst Lawrence Cohn and Ralph Nader); see also Wilmarth,
Transformation, supra note 28, at 444-76 (warning of GLBA’s risks, and stating that “the growth
of large financial holding companies is likely to increase the risks of contagion within and among
those conglomerates, thereby creating a more fragile financial system and intensifying pressures
for TBTF bailouts during financial disruptions”).
48. Id.
49. Id. 
50. See infra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
51. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Did Universal Banks Play a Significant Role in the U.S.
Economy’s Boom-and-Bust Cycle of 1921-33? A Preliminary Assessment, 4 CURRENT DEV. IN
MONETARY & FIN. LAW 559, 575-80 (IMF, 2005) [hereinafter Wilmarth, Universal Banks],
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=838267; Binyamin Appelbaum, Citi’s Long History of
Overreach, Then Rescue, WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 2009, at D01, available at http://articles.
washingtonpost.com/2009-03-11/business/36891255_1_vikram-pandit-citigroup-american-banks,
archived at http://perma.cc/CQY8-28VA.  
52. Wilmarth, Universal Banks, supra note 51, at 602-04, 607-11; Martin Hutchinson, Citi
at 200: With age, Foolishness, GLOBE & MAIL (Canada), June 12, 2012, at B12, available at
https://secure.globeadvisor.com/servlet/ArticleNews/story/gam/20120612/GIBREAKVIEWSCI
TIGROUP0612ATL, archived at http://perma.cc/V92S-XTKY.
53. Appelbaum, supra note 51.
2014] CITIGROUP:  A CASE STUDY 77
developing countries, highly leveraged corporations, commercial real estate
developers, and subprime consumers.54  The bank survived after receiving
extensive forbearance from federal regulators, a highly favorable interest rate
policy engineered by FRB chairman Alan Greenspan, and a large investment
from Saudi Prince Al-Waleed bin Talal.55
Salomon Brothers had an even more aggressive and legendary risk-taking
culture.56  Salomon nearly failed in 1991 after paying a $290 million penalty for
illegally rigging Treasury bond auctions, and the bank was forced to turn to
Warren Buffett for help. 57  Later, Salomon suffered large losses from speculative
trading in mortgage-backed securities during 1994.58  After incurring additional
trading losses, Salomon agreed to sell itself to Travelers in 1997, a year before
Travelers acquired Citicorp.59  Sandy Weill’s top lieutenant at Travelers, Jamie
Dimon, tried to force Salomon to cut back on its risk-taking.60  With Weill’s
approval, Dimon shut down Salomon’s fixed-income arbitrage trading unit after
that unit suffered heavy trading losses during the Russian debt default crisis in
1998.61  However, Weill fired Dimon in late 1998, and Salomon’s aggressive
culture soon reasserted itself within the new Citigroup.62 
B.  A Series of Illuminating (But Largely Ignored) Lessons:  Scandals at
Citigroup from 2000 to 2004
Soon after its formation, Citigroup became embroiled in a series of scandals
involving Enron, WorldCom, tainted research advice, predatory consumer
lending, European trading abuses, and violations of Japanese private-banking
54. Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 28, at 304-05, 313-15, 401; CHARLES GASPARINO,
THE SELLOUT:  HOW THREE DECADES OF WALL STREET GREED AND GOVERNMENT
MISMANAGEMENT DESTROYED THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 49-50 (2009); ONARAN, supra
note 14, at 83; Appelbaum, supra note 51; Anthony Bianco, What Wriston Wrought, BUS. WK.,
Feb. 7, 2005, at 36; Hutchinson, supra note 52; Andy Kessler, The End of Citi’s Financial
Supermarket, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 2009, at A11.
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., GASPARINO, supra note 54, at 13-22, 28-37, 69-76, 83-84; FRANK PARTNOY,
INFECTIOUS GREED: HOW DECEIT AND RISK CORRUPTED THE FINANCIAL MARKETS 12-15, 84-111
(2003).
57. GASPARINO, supra note 54, at 83-84; PARTNOY, supra note 56, at 107-11.
58. RICHARD BOOKSTABER, A DEMON OF OUR OWN DESIGN: MARKETS, HEDGE FUNDS, AND
THE PERILS OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION 52-76 (2007); GASPARINO, supra note 54, at 136-40. 
59. BOOKSTABER, supra note 58, at 52-76; GASPARINO, supra note 54, at 136-40.
60. BOOKSTABER, supra note 58, at 77-88, 91-93, 97-101, 125-34; GASPARINO, supra note
54, at 140-46.
61. BOOKSTABER, supra note 58, at 77-88, 91-93, 97-101, 125-34; GASPARINO, supra note
54, at 140-46.
62. BOOKSTABER, supra note 58, at 77-88, 91-93, 97-101, 125-34; GASPARINO, supra note
54, at 140-46.
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rules.63  Those scandals seriously damaged Citigroup’s reputation and stock
market price.64  In view of the gravity of Citigroup’s offenses, the regulatory
responses were clearly inadequate.  Agencies imposed corporate sanctions on
Citigroup, but no top-level executives were punished.65  The responses of
Citigroup’s management were equally ineffective.  A widely-publicized campaign
to transform Citigroup’s culture proved to have little impact on the organization’s
actual behavior.66
1.  Citigroup’s Involvement with Enron and WorldCom.—Citigroup suffered
extensive financial and reputational harm from aiding and abetting the fraudulent
schemes of Enron and WorldCom.67  Citigroup engineered three types of
fraudulent transactions for Enron.  First, Citigroup entered into prepaid
commodity swaps (“prepays”) that enabled Enron to obtain nearly $4 billion of
disguised loans while reporting the proceeds of those transactions as cash flow
from operating activities. 68  As a practical matter, “prepays enabled Enron to
inflate its reported cash flow and to disguise its actual debt obligations.”69 
Second, Citigroup arranged “Project Nahanni” and other “minority interest
transactions,” which provided additional disguised loans to Enron while allowing
Enron to report the financing transactions as cash flow from “merchant
investment” activities.70  Third, Citigroup helped Enron to structure “Project
Bacchus” and other fictitious “sales” of assets to special-purpose entities (SPEs)
controlled by Enron.71  Citigroup financed those asset “sales” by providing de
63. Ryan Chittum, 200 Years of Citi, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Mar. 9, 2012),
http://www.cjr.org/the_audit/an_alternate_history_of_citigr.php?page=all, archived at
http://perma.cc/ANR9-Y724.  
64. Bruce Mizrach & Susan Zhang Weerts, Does the Stock Market Punish Corporate
Malfeasance: A Case Study of Citigroup, 3 CORP. OWNERSHIP & CONTROL No. 4 (Summer 2006),
at 151; Peter Lee, What Citigroup Needs to do Next, EUROMONEY, July 1, 2005, at 64.
65. See Chittum, supra note 63 (summarizing Citigroup’s misdeeds and corresponding
regulatory responses, which did not include any penalties against Citigroup’s management).
66. Mitchell Pacelle, Moving the Market: Citigroup Works on Its Reputation, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 17, 2005, at C3 (describing Citigroup’s implementation of ethics and code-of-conduct training
program in 2005); see infra Part II.A (discussing Citigroup’s continued pursuit of high risk
strategies after 2005).
67. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Conflicts of Interest and Corporate Governance Failures at
Universal Banks During the Stock Market Boom of the 1990s: The Cases of Enron and WorldCom
4, 10, 24-25, 29, 42-44 (Geo. Wash. Univ. Law Sch. Pub. L. & Leg Theory, Working Paper No.
234, 2007) [hereinafter Wilmarth, Conflicts of Interest], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
952486.
68. Id. at 12; see also In re Citigroup, SEC Admin. Proc. No. 3-11192 (July 28, 2003), at 15-
21 [hereinafter SEC Citigroup-Enron Order], available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-
48230.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/443K-CCDA.  Citigroup also arranged similarly fraudulent
prepays for Dynegy, another Texas energy company.  Id. at 21-27.
69. Wilmarth, Conflicts of Interest, supra note 67, at 12. 
70. Id. at 12-13; SEC Citigroup-Enron Order, supra note 68, at 9-13.
71. Wilmarth, Conflicts of Interest, supra note 67, at 13-14; SEC Citigroup-Enron Order,
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facto loans to the SPEs, and Enron fraudulently reported the “sales” as operating
earnings (while guaranteeing that the SPEs would repay their loans to
Citigroup).72
Citigroup’s officers recognized the fraudulent nature of the complex
structured transactions that the bank arranged for Enron.73  For example,
Citibank’s Capital Markets Approval Committee acknowledged that a prepay
requested by Enron was “effectively a loan, [but] the form of the transaction
would allow [Enron] to reflect it as ‘liabilities from price risk management
activity’ on their [sic] balance sheet and also provide a favourable [sic] impact on
reported cash flow from operations.”74  Citigroup’s managers similarly described
Project Nahanni as “year-end window dressing” and “an insurance policy for
[year-end] balancing.”75  Another Citigroup officer explained that “Enron’s
motivation [in Project Bacchus] now appears to be writing up the asset in
question from a basis of about $100MM to as high as $250MM, thereby creating
earnings.”76   
David Bushnell, Citigroup’s head of global risk management, objected to a
transaction that was designed to refinance Project Nahanni because “[t]he GAAP
accounting is aggressive and a franchise risk to us if there is publicity.”77 
However, Citigroup went forward with the transaction because it wanted to
maintain its lucrative relationship with Enron.78  Citigroup received almost $200
million in fees from Enron and ranked Enron as “one of the highest revenue
clients within Citigroup.”79  After Project Bacchus was completed, a Citigroup
officer remarked, “Sounds like we made a lot of exceptions to our standard
policies.  I am sure we have gone out of our way to let them know that we are
bending over backwards for them . . . let’s remember to collect this iou when it
really counts.”80
Citigroup paid more than $100 million of civil penalties to settle allegations
of securities law violations filed by the Securities and Exchange Commission
supra note 68, at 13-15.
72. Wilmarth, Conflicts of Interest, supra note 67, at 13-14; SEC Citigroup-Enron Order,
supra note 68, at 13-15.
73. See infra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
74. Wilmarth, Conflicts of Interest, supra note 67, at 17-18 (quoting the Enron bankruptcy
examiner’s Third Report, which quoted the Citibank Committee’s minutes of June 22, 1999).
75. Id. at 19 (quoting the Enron bankruptcy examiner’s Third Report, which quoted from an
undated “Citigroup Exposure Spreadsheet” and an email from James Reilly dated July 24, 2001).
76. Id. (quoting the Enron bankruptcy examiner’s Third Report, which quoted emails from
James Reilly dated Nov. 28 and Dec. 6, 2000).
77. Id. (quoting the Enron bankruptcy examiner’s Third Report, which quoted an internal
memorandum prepared by David Bushnell).
78. Id. at 20-21. 
79. Id. (quoting Enron bankruptcy examiner’s Third Report, which quoted a Citigroup
interoffice memorandum of Sept. 24, 2001).
80. Id. at 20 (quoting Enron bankruptcy examiner’s Third Report, which quoted an email
from Steve Wagman dated Dec. 27, 2000).
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(“SEC”) related to Citigroup’s transactions with Enron.81  Citigroup also entered
into consent agreements with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (“New
York Fed”) and the OCC, under which Citigroup agreed to take corrective
measures designed to prevent similarly abusive structured financial transactions
in the future.82  However, the New York Fed, the OCC, and the SEC did not file
Enron-related charges against any of Citigroup’s officers or employees, and
Citigroup neither admitted nor denied any of the agencies’ charges.83  Citigroup
subsequently paid $3.7 billion to settle claims by Enron’s investors and Enron’s
bankruptcy estate.84
Like Enron, WorldCom proved to be a very expensive client for Citigroup. 
Citigroup was a lead underwriter for several of WorldCom’s public offerings of
equity and debt securities.85  For example, Citigroup acted as co-lead underwriter
for an $11.9 billion public offering of bonds that WorldCom issued in May 2001,
even though Citigroup and other lead underwriters had serious concerns about
WorldCom’s long-term viability.86  Citigroup, together with its
predecessors—Salomon Brothers and Salomon Smith Barney (collectively as
“Salomon”)—also provided extensive personal benefits to WorldCom’s CEO,
Bernie Ebbers, to solidify its status as WorldCom’s most highly-paid bank.87 
From 1996 to 2002, Salomon and Citigroup received more than $140 million in
fees from WorldCom. 88  During the same period, Salomon and Citigroup made
preferential allocations of stock to Ebbers (a practice known as “spinning”) in
81. SEC Citigroup-Enron Order, supra note 68, at 28-30.
82. Citigroup Inc. & Fed. Res. Bank N.Y., Bd. of Governors of Fed. Res. Sys. (Jul. 28, 2003)
[hereinafter New York Fed written agreement] (written agreement) (written agreement with the
New York Fed that did not require Citigroup to pay any penalties), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/enforcement/2003/20030728/attachment.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/WL5J-NMKV; Citibank, N.A. & Off. Comptroller of Currency, Dep’t
of Treas. Comptroller of Currency (July 28, 2003) [hereinafter OCC written agreement] (written
agreement with the OCC that similarly did not require Citigroup to pay any penalties), available
at http://www.occ.gov/static/enforcement-actions/ea2003-77.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/A29R-HWY9.
83. New York Fed written agreement, supra note 82; OCC written agreement, supra note 82;
SEC Citigroup-Enron Order, supra note 68, at 1-2.  
84. Mitchell Pacelle & Robin Sidel, Citigroup Accord to End Enron Suit May Pressure
Others, WALL ST. J., June 13, 2005, at C1 (reporting that Citigroup “agreed to pay $2 billion to
settle a class-action lawsuit brought by investors in Enron”); Kristen Hays, Citigroup settles in
Enron case: Accord Results in Largest Total Recovered in Bankruptcy, HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 27,
2008, 2008 WLNR 5799282 (reporting that Citigroup agreed to pay $1.7 billion to settle claims
filed by Enron’s bankruptcy estate).
85. Wilmarth, Conflicts of Interest, supra note 67, at 30-31, 34-35.
86. Id. at 34-35; CHARLES GASPARINO, BLOOD ON THE STREET: THE SENSATIONAL INSIDE
STORY OF HOW WALL STREET ANALYSTS DUPED A GENERATION OF INVESTORS 175-77 (2005)
[hereinafter GASPARINO, BLOOD ON THE STREET].  
87. Wilmarth, Conflicts of Interest, supra note 67, at 32.
88. Id.
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more than twenty initial public offerings (IPOs) and secondary offerings of stock
by clients of Salomon and Citigroup. 89  Ebbers received almost $13 million of
trading profits from those preferential stock allocations.90  Citigroup also arranged
more than $500 million of loans to Ebbers and one of his personally controlled
companies.91   
Citigroup cemented its strong relationship with WorldCom by encouraging
Jack Grubman—Citigroup’s top research analyst for telecommunications
(“telecom”) firms—to serve as an advisor to Ebbers and WorldCom’s board while
also touting WorldCom’s stock in his research reports.92  Grubman promoted
WorldCom more aggressively than any other telecom firm, and he continued to
maintain a “buy” rating on WorldCom’s stock until a few months before
WorldCom filed for bankruptcy in mid-2002.93  Citigroup subsequently paid $2.6
billion to settle a class-action lawsuit filed by WorldCom investors.94  In addition,
as described in the following section, Citigroup paid $400 million to settle the
SEC’s allegations of securities law violations arising out of Citigroup’s biased
research advice and “spinning.”95
2.  Citigroup’s Tainted Research Advice and “Spinning.”—Citigroup
promoted Enron, WorldCom, and other investment banking clients by pressuring
its research analysts to issue bullish reports that urged investors to buy the stock
of those clients.96  In 1999 Citigroup fired Don Dufresne, a well-known research
analyst, after he angered Enron’s executives by publishing reports that criticized
Enron.97  In contrast, Citigroup paid more than $48 million to Grubman between
1999 and 2001 after he helped Citigroup to generate almost $800 million in fees
from WorldCom and other telecom firms.98  
Citigroup told its research analysts that they would be compensated based on
their ability to help Citigroup’s investment bankers attract business from existing
and new clients.99  Citigroup also told analysts that investment bankers would
participate in determining whether the bank should pay bonuses to analysts for
89. Id.
90. Id. at 32-33.
91. Id. at 33-34.
92. Id. at 39.
93. Id.  at 36-41 (noting, inter alia, that Grubman urged investors to “load up the truck” with
WorldCom stock in August 1999 and also encouraged investors to take advantage of WorldCom’s
“dirt cheap” stock price after WorldCom’s market value declined sharply during 2000 and 2001);
GASPARINO, BLOOD ON THE STREET, supra note 86, at 73-75, 84-95, 173-85. 
94. Wilmarth, Conflicts of Interest, supra note 67, at 42-43.
95. Id. at 24.
96. Id. at 23.
97. Id. at 23, 50 n.85.
98. Complaint, ¶¶ 37-43, SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2003,
03 Civ. 2945 (WHP) [hereinafter SEC-Citigroup Research Analyst Complaint], available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp18111.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/8PRP-PYR8.
99. Id. ¶¶ 3, 18.  
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supporting the bank’s securities activities.100  Thus, Citigroup’s compensation
system exerted great pressure on research analysts to compromise their
objectivity by issuing overly optimistic research reports that boosted Citigroup’s
clients.101 
In a notable example of such pressure, Sandy Weill persuaded Jack Grubman
to raise Grubman’s rating for AT&T’s stock from neutral to “buy” in November
1999.102  Weill urged Grubman to upgrade AT&T in order to improve Citigroup’s
chances of winning a lucrative underwriting mandate for AT&T’s $10.6 billion
offering of wireless tracking stock.103  Grubman’s upgrade also helped Weill to
convince AT&T’s CEO—C. Martin Armstrong—who was also a director of
Citigroup, to support Weill’s ouster of John Reed as Citigroup’s co-CEO in early
2000.104  In return for Grubman’s assistance, Weill facilitated the admission of
Grubman’s children into the highly selective 92nd Street Y preschool.105  To
ensure that outcome, Weill interceded on Grubman’s behalf with a Y board
member and also arranged for the Citigroup Foundation to make a $1 million
donation to the Y.106 
The SEC charged Citigroup with securities law violations for having
pressured Grubman to boost AT&T’s research rating.107  The SEC also alleged
that Grubman published fraudulent research reports in 2001 on two telecom firms
(Focal Communications and Metromedia), and that Grubman refrained from
downgrading Focal and five other telecom providers in April 2001 because of
pressure from Citigroup’s investment bankers.108  The SEC’s complaint quoted
100. Id.
101. Id. ¶¶ 16-36.  In January 2001, Citigroup’s head of Global Equity Research attended an
equities management meeting that reviewed stock recommendations by Citigroup’s research
analysts.  His presentation at that meeting showed that, out of 1179 stock ratings, Citigroup’s
analysts had no “Sell” ratings and only one “Underperform” rating.  In handwritten notes attached
to the presentation, the officer described Citigroup’s research ratings as “ridiculous on face” and
observed that there was a “rising issue of research integrity” and a “basic inherent conflict between
IB [investment banking] and retail [investment sales].”  Id. ¶ 32.  Notwithstanding that presentation
and similar complaints voiced by the head of Citigroup’s private client (retail) division, Citigroup’s
research analysts maintained no “Sell” ratings and only 15 “Underperform” ratings among their
ratings for more than 1000 U.S. stocks at the end of 2001.  Id. ¶¶ 33-34.
102. Id. ¶¶ 7-8.
103. Id. ¶¶ 7-8, 103-29 (noting that AT&T named Citigroup as the lead underwriter for
AT&T’s public offering of wireless tracking stock in early 2000 after Grubman raised his rating
for AT&T).
104. GASPARINO, BLOOD ON THE STREET, supra note 86, at 168-69, 286-87; Charles
Gasparino, Grubman Boast: AT&T Upgrade Had an Altogether Different Goal, WALL ST. J., Nov.
13, 2002, at A1.
105. GASPARINO, BLOOD ON THE STREET, supra note 86, at 154-60.
106. SEC-Citigroup Research Analyst Complaint, supra note 98, ¶¶ 123-25; GASPARINO,
BLOOD ON THE STREET, supra note 86, at 154-60.
107. SEC-Citigroup Research Analyst Complaint, supra note 98, ¶¶126-29.
108. Id. ¶¶ 63-102.
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internal emails sent by Grubman to colleagues in which he called Focal a “pig”
and acknowledged that “most of our banking clients are going to zero and you
know I wanted to downgrade them months ago but got huge pushback from
banking.”109  
From 1996 to 2002, due in large part to Grubman’s bullish research reports,
Citigroup earned $1.2 billion in fees from telecom firms and underwrote $190
billion of their debt and equity securities, representing a quarter of all telecom
stocks and bonds issued during that period.110  Grubman’s view that customer
demand for broadband capacity would continue to grow exponentially proved to
be badly mistaken.  The frenzied installation of broadband networks by
Grubman’s clients and their rivals produced a massive glut of transmission
capacity by 2001.111  By August 2002, when Grubman resigned from his position
at Citigroup, WorldCom and several of his other major telecom
clients—including Global Crossing, Metromedia Fiber Networks, Rhythms
Netconnections, Winstar, and XO Communications—had all filed for
bankruptcy.112
In addition to the SEC’s allegations of biased research advice, the SEC
charged Citigroup with unlawful “spinning” by making preferential allocations
of shares in “hot” IPOs to Ebbers and other individuals affiliated with existing or
potential clients of Citigroup.113  The SEC alleged that Citigroup’s spinning
practices provided $40 million of trading profits to executives of WorldCom
(including Ebbers) and four other telecom firms.114  
In April 2003, Citigroup paid $400 million to settle the SEC’s charges.115 
Grubman entered into a separate settlement with the SEC under which he paid a
$15 million penalty and agreed to a lifetime ban from the securities industry.116 
Citigroup did not admit or deny the SEC’s allegations, and the SEC did not file
charges against Weill or any other top Citigroup executive.117  
3.  Citigroup’s Subprime Lending Abuses during the Early 2000s.—
Citigroup’s origins and its subsequent expansion were closely linked to subprime
lending.  In 1986, Sandy Weill acquired Commercial Credit, a subprime
109. Id. ¶¶ 61, 68.  
110. Wilmarth, Conflicts of Interest, supra note 67, at 38-39.
111. Id. at 39.
112. Id. at 38-39; Gretchen Morgenson, Bullish Analyst of Tech Stocks Quits Salomon, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 16, 2002, at A1.
113. SEC-Citigroup Research Analyst Complaint, supra note 98, ¶¶ 142-58 (quote at ¶ 148).
114. Id.¶ 158.
115. Wilmarth, Conflict of Interest, supra note 67, at 24.
116. Id. at 42.
117. SEC Litigation Rel. No. 18111 (Apr. 18, 2003), available at
www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18111.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/NS3G-UDVH.  The
settlement required Weill to issue a public apology in which he stated, “certain of our activities did
not reflect the way we believe business should be done.  That should never have been the case, and
I am sorry for that.”  Randall Smith & Susanne Craig, Wall Street’s Payout: Too Little and Late?,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 29, 2003, at C1. 
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consumer finance company.118  Weill subsequently used Commercial Credit as
the springboard to build his financial empire.119  After Travelers acquired
Citigroup, Citigroup established CitiFinancial as a separate subsidiary to conduct
its subprime lending activities.120  In 2000, Citigroup significantly expanded its
subprime operations by acquiring Associates First Capital, a large subprime
consumer finance company that was under investigation for predatory lending by
federal and state agencies.121  By 2002, CitiFinancial’s activities (including
Associates) accounted for 8% of Citigroup’s total profits.122  
When it acquired Associates, Citigroup promised to reform its subprime
lending practices to avoid the abuses allegedly committed by Associates.123 
However, consumer advocates criticized Citigroup’s promised reforms as
“cosmetic” and inadequate.124  The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and
consumer plaintiffs subsequently filed lawsuits against Citigroup and Associates
alleging predatory conduct.125  Citigroup settled those suits in 2002 by paying
$240 million in penalties and restitution.126  
Citigroup’s subprime problems did not end with its settlement of the claims
against Associates.  Federal investigators found evidence that Citigroup did not
carry out the subprime lending reforms it had agreed to make in 2000 and 2001.127 
Citigroup promised to use “mystery shoppers” to monitor performance by
CitiFinancial’s employees, but Citigroup undermined the effectiveness of that
monitoring by giving advance warning to CitiFinancial’s regional managers about
upcoming visits by “mystery shoppers.”128  In addition, despite its pledge to the
contrary, CitiFinancial continued to include high-cost, single-premium credit
insurance in the closing costs it charged to subprime borrowers.129  
In 2004, the FRB issued a cease-and-desist order and imposed a $70 million
118. Marc Hochstein, Associates Deal Another Subprime Stroke for Citi, AM. BANKER, Sept.
7, 2000, at 9.
119. Id.; Timothy L. O’Brien & Julie Creswell, Laughing All the Way From the Bank, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 11, 2005, at 31; Richard A. Oppel Jr. & Patrick McGeehan, Along With a Lender, Is
Citigroup Buying Trouble?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2000, at 31.
120. Hochstein, supra note 118.
121. Id.; Oppel & McGeehan, supra note 119.
122. Paul Beckett, Efforts by Citigroup to Reform Subprime Unit Raise Questions, WALL ST.
J., July 18, 2002, at C1.
123. Richard A. Oppel Jr. & Patrick McGeehan, Citigroup Revamps Lending Unit to Avoid
Abusive Practices, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2000, at C1.
124. Id.
125. See Laura Mandaro, In Focus: Citi Moving Fast to Put Associates Suits to Rest, AM.
BANKER, Dec. 13, 2002, at 1.
126. Id.; FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at 92; Rob Blackwell, Citi Exec on FTC Settlement: It’s
Not About Golden State, AM. BANKER, Sept. 20, 2002, at 1. 
127. Beckett, supra note 122.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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civil penalty against Citigroup and CitiFinancial.130  The FRB alleged that (i)
CitiFinancial forced spouses or other persons to co-sign loans for which the
applicants alone were qualified, because CitiFinancial wanted to sell credit
insurance to multiple borrowers, (ii) CitiFinancial converted unsecured personal
loans into home equity loans without adequately evaluating the borrowers’ ability
to repay those loans, and (iii) CitiFinancial’s employees tried to mislead the
FRB’s examiners during their investigation of abusive practices.131  Citigroup did
not admit or deny the FRB’s allegations, and the FRB did not take action against
any of Citigroup’s officers or employees.132   
4.  Citigroup’s Scandals Involving European Bond Trading and Japanese
Private Banking.—In 2004, Citigroup became embroiled in two additional
scandals.  On August 2, 2004, Citigroup’s bond traders in London executed a
bond-trading strategy called “Dr. Evil,” in which they (i) made large sales of
European government bonds, causing bond prices to fall, (ii) purchased bonds 30
minutes later, at substantially lower prices, and (iii) profited when prices returned
to normal.133  Citigroup sold more than 12.4 billion euros of bonds, bought back
3.8 billion euros of bonds, and reaped trading profits of more than $17 million.134 
Citigroup’s bond traders concocted their trading scheme after “a senior Citigroup
Inc. executive in London told traders on the European government-bond desk
they weren’t making enough money for the firm and ordered them to come up
with new trading strategies.”135  Citigroup subsequently paid $25 million to settle
allegations by the U.K. Financial Services Authority (“UKFSA”) that Citigroup
failed to supervise its traders and also failed to conduct its business with “due
skill, care and diligence.”136
In September 2004, the Japanese Financial Services Authority (“JFSA”)
ordered Citibank to shut down its private banking operations at four Japanese
branches after finding numerous violations of Japanese law.137  The JFSA’s order
130. Citigroup Inc., Bd. of Governors of Fed. Res. Sys. (May 27, 2004) (order), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/enforcement/2004/20040527/attachment.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/A7FW-U8JY.
131. Id.
132. Id.; Erick Bergquist, Citi-Fed Pact On Subprime: Opening Act?, AM. BANKER, May 28,
2004, at 1; Timothy L. O’Brien, Fed Assesses Citigroup Unit $70 Million in Loan Abuse, N.Y.
TIMES, May 28, 2004, at C1.
133. Adam Bradbery, Moving the Market: Citigroup Faces a Fine in Britain For Lapses
Linked to Bond Trade, WALL ST. J., May 31, 2005, at C3.
134. Id.; Eric J. Lyman, Citigroup Bond Trades Probed by Italian, Other European
Regulators, 37 SEC. REGULATION & L. REPORT (BNA) 273 (Feb. 14, 2005).
135. Silvia Ascarelli, Bond Trading Strategy Haunts Citigroup, WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 2005, at
C1.
136. David Reilly, Moving the Market: Citigroup to Take $25 Million Hit in ‘Dr. Evil’ Case,
WALL ST. J., June 29, 2005, at C3 (noting that the UKFSA decided not to charge Citigroup with
“market manipulation, a more serious offense”).
137. Toshio Aritake, International Developments: Japan Orders Citibank to Close Private
Banking Operations, 36 SEC. REGULATION & L. REPORT (BNA) 1722 (Sept. 27, 2004).
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represented “the most severe administrative punishment of a foreign financial
institution” operating in Japan.138  The JFSA alleged that Citibank (i) provided
loans that were used by clients to manipulate stock prices, (ii) made a “bogus”
one-day loan that enabled a customer to receive an improper government grant,
(iii) allowed a client to engage in money laundering, (iv) failed to perform
background checks on new clients to ensure that they were not criminals, (v)
misrepresented the risks of complex structured investments sold to clients, (vi)
overcharged clients for publicly-traded derivatives, and (vii) failed to safeguard
the confidentiality of client information.139  An internal investigation
commissioned by Citigroup found that “many private bankers” in Citibank’s
Japanese offices were “not candid” with the JFSA during its probe of Citibank’s
operations.140 
A senior JFSA official noted that “one of the main reasons” for Citibank’s
misconduct was that “salaries and performance evaluations were closely linked
to sales targets” for Citibank’s private banking employees in Japan.141  Similarly,
Citigroup’s internal investigation found that senior Citibank officers set
“successively higher net-income goals for the [Japanese private banking] unit,”
and the unit’s managers “pressed to bring in more revenue.”142
5.  Inadequate Responses by Citigroup’s Managers and Regulators to the
Scandals Occurring from 2000 to 2004.—Citigroup’s senior management and
board of directors took a number of actions in response to the scandals that
occurred between 2000 and 2004.143  However, those measures failed to change
Citigroup’s entrenched culture of aggressive risk-taking.144  Although Citigroup’s
executives repeatedly stated their intention to create a culture of compliance,
those statements were undermined by management’s primary focus on achieving
rapid growth in Citigroup’s revenues and profits.145
Sandy Weill faced increasing demands from investors, analysts, and
138. Id.
139. Id.; see also Mayumi Negishi, Citibank Japan Ordered to Close Four Offices over Legal
Breaches, JAPAN TIMES, Sept. 18, 2004 (available on Lexis); Mitchell Pacelle et al., Mission
Control: For Citigroup, Scandal in Japan Shows Dangers of Global Sprawl, WALL ST. J., Dec. 22,
2004, at A1; Mikayo Takebe, Moving the Market: Citigroup Unit Faces Discipline by Japanese
Watchdog Agency, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 2004, at C3; Todd Zaun, Japan Shuts Unit of Citibank,
Citing Violations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2004, at C1.
140. Pacelle et al., supra note 139 (quoting findings from an internal investigation by
Promontory Financial Group, led by former Comptroller of the Currency Eugene Ludwig).
141. Zaun, supra note 139 (quoting Toshihide Endo, director of JFSA’s supervisory bureau).
142. Pacelle et al., supra note 139 (reporting on findings from Promontory’s internal
investigation).
143. Pacelle, supra note 66 (noting Citigroup’s adoption of a “five-point” plan to “beef up the
company’s ethics”).
144. See infra Part II.A (describing Citigroup’s continued pursuit of high-risk strategies after
2005).
145. See infra Part II.A (describing Citigroup’s continued pursuit of high-risk strategies after
2005).
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Citigroup’s directors to establish a succession plan following the Enron,
WorldCom, and research analyst scandals.146  He agreed to step down as CEO in
2003 but continued to serve as chairman of Citigroup until 2006.147  Weill’s
successor as CEO was Charles “Chuck” Prince.148  Prince had led Citigroup’s
efforts to resolve its legal problems in his prior roles as general counsel and head
of Citigroup’s corporate and investment bank.149  In February 2005, following the
additional scandals involving European bond trading and Japanese private
banking, Prince “unveiled to [Citigroup’s] employees a ‘five-point plan’ for
beefing up the company’s ethics,” including annual “ethics and code-of-conduct
[sic] training” programs for all employees as well as stronger internal controls
and enhanced compliance training and review procedures for managers.150  
Prince continued to emphasize his compliance reform program throughout
2005.151
At the same time, Citigroup’s senior management made clear that the new
legal compliance program would not interfere with Citigroup’s primary goal of
achieving higher growth in its revenues and profits.152  Prince assured investors
(as he had done since late 2003) that he would produce “organic growth” by
transforming Citigroup into a “distribution company” that would “push more
146. Heather Timmons, Citi: Time for a Succession Plan, BUS. WK., Dec. 2, 2002, at 48.
147. Anthony Bianco et al., Citi’s New Act, BUS. WK., July 28, 2003, at 31; see also
GASPARINO, supra note 54, at 187-88 (reporting that New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer may
have secured Weill’s agreement to step down as Citigroup’s CEO in exchange for not naming Weill
as a defendant in Spitzer’s enforcement actions against Citigroup and Grubman for tainted research
advice and IPO spinning).  Weill retained substantial influence within Citigroup’s senior
management during the first year after he stepped down as CEO.  However, by August 2005 Chuck
Prince (Weill’s successor as CEO) was firmly in control of Citigroup’s management, and several
senior executives who were close associates of Weill had left Citigroup.  Todd Davenport, Strategy
and Tactics: The Book on a New Citi, AM. BANKER, Aug. 26, 2005, at 1.
148. Monica Langley, Course Correction—Behind Citigroup Departures: A Culture Shift by
CEO Prince, WALL ST. J., Aug. 24, 2005, at 1.
149. GASPARINO, supra note 54, at 187-89; Bianco et al., supra note 147; Langley, supra note
148.
150. Pacelle, supra note 66; see also Pacelle et al., supra note 139 (discussing Prince’s
decision to institute new compliance and training programs after the Japanese private banking
scandal).
151. Davenport, supra note 147 (quoting Mr. Prince’s statement that “there is no way given
our size that we can really hope to have substantial growth if we basically have a tarnished
reputation”); Langley, supra note 148 (quoting Mr. Prince’s remark that “[y]ou can never sacrifice
your long-term growth, your long-term reputation, to the short term”).
152. Lee, supra note 64 (quoting comment by Robert Druskin, head of Citigroup’s corporate
and investment bank, that “[r]evenues have to grow . . . [w]e don’t believe a greater focus on
reputational risk issues should have any impact on revenues”); Todd Davenport, Risk Concerns
Dominate Citi Meeting, AM. BANKER, May 27, 2005, at 20 (reporting on Mr. Druskin’s statement
that “concerns about reputation would not reduce [Citigroup’s] revenue goals” or prevent Citigroup
from being “willing, ready, and able to take intelligent risk”).
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financial products and advice” to customers within Citigroup’s domestic and
international consumer operations, as well as its global corporate and investment
bank.153  Prince’s five-point compliance and ethics plan was also conveniently
timed, since he issued his plan shortly before the FRB imposed a moratorium on
further large acquisitions by Citigroup until the bank corrected its “deficiencies
in compliance risk management.”154
Until the financial crisis broke out in mid-2007, Prince continued to push
“organic growth” in Citigroup’s consumer, corporate, and investment banking
operations as his primary strategy for producing higher revenues.155  However,
investors and analysts repeatedly criticized Prince’s leadership between 2005 and
2007 because Citigroup’s expenses grew at a faster rate than its revenues and
Citigroup’s stock price lagged behind the stock market values of its big-bank
peers.156  As a result, Prince and his management team were under intense
pressure to generate significantly higher profits.157  As discussed below, Prince
and Rubin decided to produce higher profits by taking greater risks in Citigroup’s
consumer, corporate and investment banking operations.158  Citigroup’s pursuit
of high-risk activities proved to be disastrous and led to Citigroup’s collapse and
153. Mara Der Hovanesian, Rewiring Chuck Prince, BUS. WK., Feb. 20, 2006, at 75, 78
[hereinafter “Rewiring Chuck Prince”]; see also Mara Der Hovanesian, Chuck Prince’s Citi
Planning, BUS. WK., Sept. 5, 2005, at 88; Lee, supra note 65; infra note 167 and accompanying text
(discussing Prince’s decision to adopt an “organic growth” strategy when he succeeded Weill as
CEO in late 2003).
154. Prince announced his compliance and ethics plan in February 2005, and the FRB cited
Citigroup’s new plan when it issued its moratorium the following month.  Pacelle, supra note 66;
Lee, supra note 64 (quoting Citigroup Inc., FRB Citigroup-FAB Order, supra note 18, at 11; see
also Lee, supra note 64, at 9-10 (noting that Citigroup “is in the process of implementing enhanced
compliance policies and procedures” and “has introduced an enhanced corporate-wide ethics
awareness program with an expanded orientation program and annual training sessions”); see also
infra notes 408-11 and accompanying text (discussing the FRB’s decision in April 2006 to lift its
moratorium on additional large acquisitions by Citigroup). 
155. Rewiring Chuck Prince, supra note 153; Tim Mazzucca, Prince Puts ‘Virtual’ Growth
on Citi Agenda: Post-deal Ban, CEO Still Emphasizing Organic Expansion, AM. BANKER, Apr. 5,
2006, at 1; see also Mara Der Hovanesian, Leadership: Cleaned Up but Falling Behind, BUS. WK.,
Oct. 16, 2006, at 39 (reporting on Prince’s desire to expand Citigroup’s consumer banking
operations); Clint Riley, Citigroup to Focus on Investment Bank, WALL ST. J., Jan. 20, 2007, at A2
(reporting on Prince’s decision to invest additional resources in Citigroup’s investment bank). 
156. Todd Davenport, Is Citi Rep-Damage Control Turning into a Distraction?, AM. BANKER,
July 19, 2005, at 2; Der Hovanesian, supra note 155; Clint Riley et al., Shake-Up Puts Citigroup’s
CEO on the Hot Seat: Challenge for Prince is to Revitalize Big Bank, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2007,
at A1; Robin Sidel & David Enrich, For Citi, Cost-Cutting is only Half the Battle: Investors,
Analysts Want Higher Rate of Revenue Growth, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 2007, at C3.
157. See sources cited supra note 156; see also Clint Riley, Citigroup Investors Agitate for
Improvement, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 2006, at C1.
158. See infra Part II.A.
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multiple bailouts in 2008 and early 2009.159
Thus, Citigroup’s managers failed to heed the lessons from the repeated
mistakes and scandals that plagued the company from 2000 to 2004.  A single-
minded pursuit of higher earnings remained the overriding business strategy for
Citigroup’s leaders, regardless of the disasters that strategy had created in the
past.  The compliance and ethics training programs that Prince instituted in 2005
had no discernible impact on Citigroup’s culture of aggressive risk-taking.160  In
response to pressure from financial industry analysts and Citigroup’s investors,
senior management kept pushing employees to find new ways to increase
earnings without regard to the potential hazards of those methods.161  As
explained in Part II.B., the reckless actions of Citigroup’s employees between
2004 and 2007 were similar to the conduct that damaged Citigroup and tarnished
its reputation between 2000 and 2004.
Like Citigroup’s management, the bank’s regulators failed to respond
adequately to Citigroup’s repeated misconduct between 2000 and 2004. 
Regulators imposed about $800 million of penalties on Citigroup between 2002
and 2004 for its involvement in scandals related to Enron, WorldCom, tainted
research analysis, IPO spinning, and predatory lending.162  However, Jack
Grubman was the only Citigroup employee who was the subject of an official
enforcement action, and the regulatory penalties assessed against Citigroup paled
in comparison to the $33 billion of profits that Citigroup amassed in 2002 and
2003.163  In March 2005, as noted above, the FRB imposed a moratorium on
further acquisitions until Citigroup improved its “deficiencies in compliance risk
management.”164  However, the FRB removed that moratorium in April 2006, a
misguided step that allowed Citigroup to expand its balance sheet and the
magnitude of its risk-taking during the final and most frenzied period of the credit
boom.165
159. See infra Part II.B.
160. See authorities cited supra notes 150-55.
161. See infra Part II.A. 
162. See supra notes 81, 95, 126, 130, 136 and accompanying text.
163. Bianco et al., supra note 147, at 31 (reporting that Citigroup earned $15.3 billion of
profits in 2002); Robert Julavits & David Boraks, Records at Citi, Wells; U.S. Bank Falls Short,
AM. BANKER, Jan. 21, 2004, at 2 (reporting that Citigroup had $17.85 billion of net income in
2003).
164. FRB Citigroup-FAB Order, supra note 18, at 11.
165. See infra notes 408-24 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of the FRB’s lifting
of its moratorium in April 2006).
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II.  CITIGROUP’S HIGH-RISK STRATEGY LED TO THE COMPANY’S COLLAPSE
AND MULTIPLE BAILOUTS
A.  Prince and Rubin Followed a Fatally Flawed Strategy That Sought to
Generate Higher Profits by Assuming Greater Risks
In October 2003, when Chuck Prince succeeded Sandy Weill as CEO of
Citigroup, Prince and his management team decided that Citigroup could no
longer rely on large acquisitions to produce higher profits.166  Instead, Prince
adopted a new strategy of “growing organic revenues” by improving the
efficiency and productivity of the universal banking “platform” that Weill had
created.167  Prince and Robert Rubin sought to increase Citigroup’s earnings by
expanding its involvement in “proprietary trading”— an area that Weill had
sharply reduced after Salomon suffered large losses during the Russian debt
default crisis in 1998.168  Prince also enlarged Citigroup’s subprime mortgage and
home equity lending operations by purchasing Washington Mutual’s consumer
finance unit in November 2003.169 
As discussed below, Citigroup pursued high-risk strategies in three major
areas between 2003 and 2007—(i) originating and securitizing subprime loans,
(ii) creating and marketing collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), and (iii)
originating and securitizing leveraged corporate loans.170  Citigroup’s activities
in all three areas produced huge losses that crippled Citigroup and forced it to
accept a series of government bailouts in 2008 and 2009.171
1.  Citigroup Pursued a Risky Strategy of Originating and Securitizing of
Subprime Loans.—During the housing boom of the 2000s, Citigroup was a
leading participant in the origination and securitization markets for subprime
mortgages.   CitiFinancial became a major subprime lender when it acquired
Associates First Capital in 2000.172  CitiFinancial ranked among the top twelve
166. Robert Julavits, Big Deals Out, Growing Organically In at Citi, AM. BANKER, Nov. 5,
2003, at 2 (reporting that Prince replaced Weill as CEO in October 2003, and quoting Prince’s
statement that “[t]he era of the transformational merger . . . is over. . . . The platform we have is
a terrific one, and we need to grow organic revenues off that platform.”).
167. Id.
168. Jason Singer & Mitchell Pacelle, Heard on the Street: Citigroup to Expand Its Trading,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 2003, at C1; see also supra notes 60, 61 and accompanying text (discussing
Weill’s and Dimon’s decision to shut down Salomon’s bond arbitrage trading unit in 1998).
169. Mitchell Pacelle, Citigroup Spends $1.25 Billion To Enlarge Subprime Presence, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 25, 2003, at C12 (reporting that the acquisition would “add 409 [storefront] locations
in 25 states to the approximately 1,600 existing branches of CitiFinancial”).
170. See infra Parts II.A.1., II.A.2., II.A.5.
171. See infra Part II.B.
172. KATHLEEN ENGEL & PATRICIA MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS:  RECKLESS CREDIT,
REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS 202 (2011); see also supra notes 121, 122 and
accompanying text (discussing Citigroup’s acquisition of Associates).
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subprime lenders in the U.S. from 2004 to 2007.173  CitiFinancial pushed for even
higher subprime lending volumes after 2006, when the FRB lifted the cease-and-
desist order it had issued against CitiFinancial in 2004 for predatory lending
abuses.174  Citigroup nearly doubled the share of its mortgage business devoted
to subprime loans from 10% in 2005 to 19% in 2007, and it also increased the
percentage of subprime loans it originated with high-risk features such as low
down payments, “piggyback” second mortgages, “stated income” mortgages with
little or no documentation of the borrowers’ income, and loans made to investors
who intended to “flip” the houses they purchased.175 
In addition to its origination business, Citigroup was deeply involved in the
securitization market for subprime mortgages.176  Citigroup provided warehouse
lines of credit to leading nonbank subprime lenders, including Ameriquest and
New Century.177  Citigroup purchased large volumes of subprime and Alt-A loans
originated by those and other nonbank lenders, and Citigroup packaged those
loans into nonprime residential mortgage-backed securities (“RMBS”) that were
sold to investors.178  
In September 2007, when the subprime mortgage market was already in
turmoil, Citigroup decided to expand its subprime securitization business by
purchasing the wholesale lending and servicing businesses of ACC Capital
Holdings (Argent), the parent company of Ameriquest.179  When the Argent deal
was announced, a Citigroup executive declared, “We’re big believers in the whole
173. Paul Muolo, Top Subprime Lenders & Their Owners, NAT’L MORTGAGE NEWS, May 16,
2005, at 1 (table showing that CitiFinancial was the eighth-ranked subprime lender in 2004); Paul
Muolo, Top Subprime Lenders in 2005, NAT’L MORTGAGE NEWS, May 15, 2006, at 1 (table
showing that CitiFinancial was the twelfth-ranked subprime lender in 2005); ENGEL & MCCOY,
supra note 172, at 202 (stating that CitiFinancial was “the eleventh largest subprime lender in
2006”); Paul Muolo, Top Subprime Lenders in 2007, NAT’L MORTGAGE NEWS, May 12, 2008, at
1 (table showing that CitFinancial was the seventh largest subprime lender in 2007).   
174. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 172, at 202-03; see also supra notes 130-32 and
accompanying text (discussing the 2004 order issued by the FRB against CitiFinancial). 
175. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 172, at 203; FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at 110-11; see
also 2ds Weaken at Citigroup, NAT’L MORTGAGE NEWS, July 30, 2007, at 1 (reporting that “15%
of [Citigroup’s] $147 billion first mortgage portfolio consists of loans to borrowers with FICO
scores below 620, and another 13% have scores between 620 and 660”; and also stating that
Citigroup held $69 billion of second mortgages of which none were made to borrowers with FICO
scores below 620); see also infra note 212 (stating that subprime borrowers typically had FICO
scores below 640).
176. See infra notes 178-83 and accompanying text. 
177. FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at 113. 
178. GASPARINO, BLOOD ON THE STREET, supra note 86, at 191-92; FCIC REPORT, supra note
4, at 113, 115, and 168; see also FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at 71-72, 110-11 (describing an 
RMBS deal underwritten by Citigroup in 2006 that was backed by a pool of subprime mortgages
of very poor quality, which Citigroup had purchased from New Century).
179. Harry Terris, Citi-ACC: A Bet Vertical Integration Still Has Legs, AM. BANKER, Sept.
13, 2007, at 1.
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vertical integration of this part of the capital markets,” and he emphasized that the
deal would give Citigroup a new conduit for subprime securitization.180  The deal
soon proved to be disastrous, and Citigroup shut down the acquired unit in early
2008.181
In an interview with the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (“FCIC”), in March
2010, Prince admitted that the subprime securitization process “could be seen as
a factory line,” and he further acknowledged: 
As more and more of these subprime mortgages were created as raw
material for the securitization process, not surprisingly in hindsight, more
and more of it was of lower and lower quality.  And at the end of that
process, the raw material going into it was actually bad quality, it was
toxic quality, and this is what ended up coming out the other end of the
pipeline.  Wall Street obviously participated in that flow of activity.182
Citigroup was a leading participant in the subprime securitization market
during the mid-2000s.183  Citigroup steadily lowered its standards for originating
and purchasing subprime mortgages as the housing bubble stopped expanding in
late 2005 and began to deflate soon thereafter.184  The decline in Citigroup’s
underwriting standards was confirmed by its dealings with Clayton Holdings, a
leading provider of third-party due diligence services to Wall Street firms that
purchased subprime mortgages for securitization.185  Clayton rejected 42% of the
subprime mortgages that it reviewed for Citigroup between January 2006 and
June 2007 because those loans did not meet Citigroup’s underwriting
guidelines.186  However, Citigroup “waived in” nearly a third of the mortgages
that Clayton had rejected.187
Richard Bowen was a senior CitiFinancial officer who was responsible for
overseeing the reviews of mortgage loans that CitiFinancial purchased from third-
180. Id. (quoting Jeffrey A. Perlowitz, head of global securitized markets in Citigroup’s fixed-
income, currencies and commodities unit); ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 172, at 170.
181. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 172, at 170.
182. FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at 102-03 (quoting interview with Mr. Prince on Mar. 17,
2010).
183. Id. at 71-72, 111, 113-18; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking:
Financial Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963,
990 n.100 (2009) [hereinafter Wilmarth, Dark Side] (stating that Citigroup was one of the top
twelve underwriters of private–label RMBS in 2007); see also id. at 1019 n.280 (reporting that
Citigroup ranked among the top ten underwriters of RMBS in both 2003 and 2004).  
184. FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at 165-69, 172; see also id. at 111 (quoting testimony by
Richard Bowen, a senior officer in CitiFinancial’s consumer lending group, who said that Citigroup
decided in 2005 that “[w]e’re going to have to hold our nose and start buying the stated income
[mortgage] product if we want to stay in business” in underwriting subprime RMBS).
185. Id. at 166.
186. Id. at 167.
187. Id.
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party originators through its correspondent lending channel.188  Bowen told the
FCIC that he repeatedly warned senior management in 2006 and 2007 that
CitiFinancial was ignoring Citigroup’s stated criteria for buying subprime loans
that would be packaged into RMBS.189  Citigroup’s chief risk officer for
securitizations of mortgage loans overturned many of the decisions made by
Bowen’s team, and the same officer changed “large numbers of underwriting
decisions on mortgage loans from ‘turned down’ to ‘approved.’”190  
Bowen also testified that most of the “prime” mortgages that CitiFinancial
purchased from correspondent lenders and sold to Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and
other investors in 2006 and 2007 did not conform to the representations and
warranties that Citigroup provided to those investors.191  According to Bowen,
Citigroup’s management placed “significant corporate emphasis  . . . upon the
need for growth and market share” in originating, selling and securitizing
mortgages.192  Citigroup also “dramatically reduced the number of employees”
who reviewed mortgages for conformity with quality standards.193
Bowen’s supervisors disregarded his repeated warnings.194  Finally, on
November 3, 2007, Bowen sent an email to Robert Rubin, David Bushnell
(Citigroup’s chief risk officer), Gary Crittenden (Citigroup’s chief financial
officer) and Bonnie Howard (Citigroup’s chief auditor).195   Bowen warned the
four senior executives about breakdowns in internal controls and “resulting
significant but possibly unrecognized financial losses existing within
Citigroup.”196  He provided a detailed description of Citigroup’s systematic
failures to follow its quality control standards while purchasing huge volumes of
prime and subprime loans for sale to investors.197  After Bowen sent his email, his
responsibilities were reduced from supervising 220 employees to supervising
only two, his bonus was cut, and he received a downgrade on his next
188. Id. at 168.
189. Id. at 19. 
190. Hearing on Subprime Lending and Securitization and Government Sponsored
Enterprises: Before Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 111th Cong. (2010) (written testimony
of Richard M. Bowen, III) [hereinafter Bowen Testimony], at 1-2, 4, 7-9, available at http://fcic-
static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-docs/2010-04-07%20Richard%20Bowen%
20Written%20Testimony.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/8EXG-67U8; see also FCIC REPORT,
supra note 4, at 168 (citing Mr. Bowen’s testimony).
191. Bowen Testimony, supra note 190, at 1-2, 7-8 (stating that “over 60%” of the “prime”
mortgages purchased and sold by Citigroup in 2006 did not conform to Citigroup’s representations
and warranties to Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and other investors, and the percentage of “defective
mortgages” rose to “over 80%” in 2007). 
192. Id. at 3.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1-2, 7-8, 13-17.
195. Id. at 2.  
196. Id. (quotation omitted).
197. Id. at 2, 13-14, 19-20 (Exhibit I) (text of email message).
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performance review.198  He left Citigroup in early 2009.199
Sherry Hunt was a member of Bowen’s team, and she received comparable
treatment when she raised similar warning flags.200  Hunt supervised 65 mortgage
underwriters at CitiMortgage’s headquarters in Missouri.201  Beginning in 2006,
she told her supervisors that Citigroup was buying large volumes of defective
mortgages from third-party lenders that included “doctored tax forms, phony
appraisals and missing signatures.”202  Hunt eventually shared her concerns with
Bowen, and Bowen relied in part on Hunt’s information when he sent his email
message to Rubin and the other senior Citigroup officers.203  Citigroup’s lawyers
subsequently interviewed Hunt, but CitiMortgage did not change its business
methods.204  Instead, CitiMortgage removed Hunt as a supervisor and sent her to
work as an ordinary employee in the “quality-control unit.”205
In her new position, Hunt identified large numbers of defective mortgages
“with issues such as obviously forged signatures, whited-out income lines on tax
forms or misspelled bank names on borrower bank statements.”206  CitiMortgage
responded by creating a team “whose mission was to challenge the findings of
Hunt’s quality-control group,” and a CitiMortgage executive ordered Hunt’s
group to reduce its percentage of rejected loans “by brute force.”207  After another
CitiMortgage executive threatened in early 2011 to fire Hunt and one of her
colleagues if they did not reduce their rejection rates, Hunt filed a whistleblower
lawsuit against Citigroup.208  The federal government joined Hunt’s suit, and
Citigroup agreed in 2012 to pay $158 million to settle charges that it sold
thousands of nonconforming mortgages to the Federal Housing Administration.209 
198. FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at 19.
199. Id.
200. Bob Ivry, Woman Who Couldn’t Be Intimidated by Citigroup Wins $31 Million,
BLOOMBERG MARKETS MAG., May 31, 2012, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-
05-31/woman-who-couldn-t-be-intimidated-by-citigroup-wins-31-million.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/V3MR-DGAU.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. 
207. Id. (quoting email in November 2010 from Ross Leckie); see also Bob Ivry et al.,
Citigroup Whistle-Blower Says Bank’s ‘Brute Force’ Hid Bad Loans from U.S., BLOOMBERG, Feb.
16, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-16/citigroup-whistle-blower-says-bank-s-
brute-force-hid-bad-loans.html, archived at http://perma.cc/F5DE-XPT3 (reporting that
CitiMortgage issued “Star Player Awards” in January 2011 to “workers who had successfully
challenged negative reviews during meetings with quality-assurance workers and others”). 
208. Ivry et al., supra note 200.
209. Id. (reporting that Jeffery Polkinghorne allegedly told Hunt and her colleague in March
2011 that the number of loans they classified as defective must fall or it would be “your asses on
the line”); Ivry et al., supra note 207 (reporting on Citigroup’s agreement to settle lawsuit filed by
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Citigroup subsequently agreed to pay more than $1.3 billion to settle similar
claims that it sold 3.7 million defective mortgages to Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac between 2000 and 2012.210
Thus, Citigroup disregarded repeated warnings from both external and
internal quality control monitors and continued to pursue unsound mortgage
lending practices long after the financial crisis broke out in the summer of 2007. 
After suffering heavy losses in the second half of 2007, Citigroup reduced, but
did not terminate, its involvement in making and securitizing subprime and Alt-A
mortgages.211  In early 2008, Citigroup stopped buying mortgages from brokers
and also stopped funding the most risky types of subprime mortgages, including
adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) with low introductory “teaser” rates.212 
Citigroup continued, however, to originate and securitize subprime mortgages for
borrowers with FICO scores as low as 580.213  
In 2008, Citigroup merged CitiFinancial into CitiMortgage, thereby
consolidating its prime and nonprime operations.214  The head of CitiMortgage
explained that the new combined organization would work closely with
Citigroup’s investment bank to create “an end-to-end U.S. residential mortgage
business that includes origination, servicing, and capital markets
securitization.”215  In view of Citigroup’s decision, in the midst of the mortgage
crisis, to generate additional fee income by continuing to securitize risky
mortgages, it is not surprising that Citigroup originated and sold many defective
mortgages that did not meet its stated underwriting criteria.
2.  Citigroup Recklessly Packaged and Marketed CDOs.—Along with Merrill
Lynch (“Merrill”), Citigroup dominated the market for CDOs during the peak of
Hunt and joined by the federal government).
210. Dakin Campbell, Citigroup to Pay Freddie Mac $395 Million to End Mortgage Claims,
BLOOMBERG, Sept. 25, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-25/citigroup-to-pay-
freddie-mac-395-million-tied-to-mortgages-1-.html, archived at http://perma.cc/SQ8X-F6L8; Hugh
Son & Donal Griffin, Citigroup Will Pay Fannie Mae $968 Million on Faulty Loans, BLOOMBERG,
July 1, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-01/citigroup-to-pay-968-million-to-fannie-
mae-on-faulty-mortgages.html, archived at http://perma.cc/WM3M-2GBS.
211. Paul Muolo, Citi Reducing Holdings 20%, NAT’L MORTGAGE NEWS, Mar. 10, 2008, at
1.
212. Id. (reporting that Citigroup would continue making subprime loans with a “minimum
FICO score” of 580, but would stop funding “higher-risk products” such as “2/28 and 3/27 ARMs”
and “investor properties on three and four-unit rentals”); see also Wilmarth, Dark Side, supra note
183, at 1015-17, 1020-22 (describing subprime and Alt-A mortgages, noting that subprime
borrowers typically had FICO scores below 640, and explaining the heightened risks of subprime
ARMs with 2/28 and 3/27 amortization terms and low introductory “teaser” rates).
213. Id.
214. Matthias Ricker, Citi Shift Means Less Capital for Mortgages: Slashing Origination
Efforts to Primarily “What We Can Sell,” AM. BANKER, Mar. 7, 2008, at 1.
215. Id. (quoting Bill Beckmann, President of CitiMortgage, and reporting that Citigroup
planned to reduce its mortgage portfolio by $45 billion, or 20%, while keeping “just 10% of
[mortgage] originations on its books, down from about 65%”).
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the subprime credit boom between 2005 and 2007.216  CDOs played a crucial role
in promoting higher volumes of subprime lending and securitization, because
they served as the primary purchasers for the “mezzanine” tranches of subprime
RMBS.217  Institutional investors typically wanted to buy the “senior” tranches
of subprime RMBS because they carried “AAA” credit ratings and paid higher
yields than other types of AAA-rated securities.218  The senior tranches usually
accounted for the top 75-80% of the tranches in subprime RMBS deals.219  Either
Wall Street underwriters or hedge funds usually bought the unrated junior or
“equity” tranches, which represented 5% or less of the tranches in typical
subprime RMBS deals.220  Relatively few investors wanted to buy the mezzanine
tranches, which ranked below the senior tranches and carried relatively low credit
ratings of “A” or “BBB.”221  Most investors did not view the yields of mezzanine
tranches as being high enough to justify the additional risk.222  
In response to the lack of investor demand for mezzanine tranches of RMBS,
Citigroup and other Wall Street firms “created the investor” by constructing cash
flow CDOs, also known as ABS CDOs.223  Wall Street underwriters acquired
large pools of unsold mezzanine tranches of subprime RMBS (and other debt
instruments) and re-securitized those pools by creating ABS CDOs.224  About
80% of the tranches of ABS CDOs were assigned “senior” status with AAA
credit ratings.225  ABS CDOs became the dominant buyers of mezzanine tranches
of subprime RMBS after 2003 and thereby provided an essential source of
demand for continued subprime lending and securitization.226  
Thus, Wall Street firms used ABS CDOs to perform a kind of “alchemy” in
which (i) pools of high-risk subprime mortgages were packaged into subprime
RMBS, and (ii) the low-rated and unwanted mezzanine tranches of subprime
RMBS were repackaged and transformed into senior AAA-rated tranches of
216. See infra notes 241-42, 245 and accompanying text.
217. FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at 71-73, 115-17 (describing the structure of a typical
subprime RMBS deal that Citigroup underwrote in 2006); Wilmarth, Dark Side, supra note 183,
at 984-90 (describing the securitization process used by Wall Street firms to create subprime
RMBS).
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. 
223. FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at 130 (quoting statement by Credit Suisse banker Joe
Donovan at a conference for securitization bankers in February 2002); id. at 127 n.* (explaining
that ABS CDOs is a term used to describe “cash CDOs backed by asset-backed securities (such as
mortgage-backed securities)”); Wilmarth, Dark Side, supra note 183, at 990 (providing a similar
description of ABS CDOs). 
224. FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at 127.
225. Id. at 129-33. 
226. Id. at 116, 117, 127-30, 132-33.
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CDOs.227  Two classes of institutions played essential roles in helping Wall Street
to accomplish that alchemy.  First, insurance companies, including American
International Group (AIG), Ambac, and MBIA, issued credit default swaps (CDS)
and other guarantees that protected the senior tranches of CDOs against losses.228 
Second, credit ratings agencies (CRAs) issued AAA ratings for those tranches in
reliance on flawed financial models that overstated both (i) the diversification of
risk within the underlying pools of mezzanine tranches of subprime RMBS and
(ii) the value of protection provided by insurance company guarantees.229  The
financial models used by CRAs proved to be disastrously wrong in calculating the
risks inherent in ABS CDOs.230  
The generous fees paid by Wall Street underwriters to insurance companies
and CRAs helped to persuade both classes of institutions to ignore any doubts
those institutions might have had about participating in Wall Street’s CDO
alchemy.231  A senior official of the Federal Reserve System (Fed) later concluded
that “the whole concept of ABS CDOs had been an abomination” that helped to
produce an unsustainable boom in subprime mortgages.232
As the subprime credit boom reached its peak, ABS CDOs became the
leading buyers not only of mezzanine tranches of RMBS but also of mezzanine
tranches of other CDOs.233  The FCIC found that “[b]y 2005, CDO underwriters
were selling most of the mezzanine tranches [of CDOs] . . . to other CDO
managers, to be packaged into other CDOs.”234  An investigative report by Jake
Bernstein and Jesse Eisinger similarly concluded that
in the last years of the boom, CDOs had become the dominant purchaser
of key, risky parts of other CDOs, largely replacing real investors like
pension funds.  By 2007, 67 percent of those slices were bought by
CDOs, up from 36 percent just three years earlier. . . .
. . . .
. . . Crucially, such deals maintained the value of mortgage bonds at a
227. Id. at 127-29, 148 (quoting Kyle Bass); see also id. at 193 (quoting analyst James Grant’s
description of the “mysterious alchemical processes” by which “Wall Street transforms BBB-
minus-rated mortgages into AAA-rated tranches of mortgage securities” through the production of
CDOs).
228. Id. at 132.
229. Id. at 127-29, 139-42, 146-50, 200-04, 206-12, 265-74, 276-78.
230. Id. at 127-29, 146-50, 206-12.
231. Id. at 139-42, 146-50, 200-02, 206-12; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A
Flawed and Inadequate Response to the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951, 967-71
(2011) [hereinafter Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank] (describing the “CRAs’ pervasive conflicts of interest
[that] encouraged them to issue credit ratings that either misperceived or misrepresented the true
risks embedded in structured-finance securities”).
232. FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at 129 (quoting interview with Patrick Parkinson in March
2010).
233. Id. at 132.
234. Id.
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time when the lack of buyers should have driven their prices down.235
Bernstein and Eisinger reported that Citigroup was one of the three most active
banks (along with Merrill and UBS) in creating networks of CDOs that were used
as dumping grounds for mezzanine tranches of other CDOs those banks
sponsored.236  
Citigroup also underwrote synthetic CDOs, which held portfolios of CDS that
represented bets on the performance of designated tranches of subprime RMBS.237 
Citigroup frequently took “long” positions on those bets by retaining the “super
senior” tranches of synthetic CDOs it underwrote, although it obtained protection
from AIG and monoline insurance companies for some of those exposures.238 
Synthetic CDOs “multiplied the effects” of the collapse in the subprime mortgage
market because they created additional bets on the performance of subprime
RMBS and the underlying mortgages.239
When Prince became CEO of Citigroup in late 2003, he and Rubin pushed
Tom Maheras (the head of Citigroup’s fixed-income trading activities) to produce
more trading profits and larger volumes of CDOs.240  In 2004, Citigroup
underwrote $7 billion of CDOs and ranked fifth among CDO underwriters. 241 
That performance represented a significant rise from Citigroup’s fourteenth-place
ranking in 2003, but the bank’s CDO production was still less than half of the
amount generated by top-ranked Merrill.242  
In early 2005, Prince and Rubin developed a new strategic plan for
235. Jake Bernstein & Jesse Eisinger, The Wall Street Money Machine: Banks’ Self-Dealing
Super-Charged Financial Crisis, PROPUBLICA (Aug. 26, 2010), http://www.propublica.org/
article/banks-self-dealing-super-charged-financial-crisis, archived at http://perma.cc/5USS-JLAW.
236. Id. (quoting a shareholder lawsuit alleging that “Citigroup’s CDO operations during late
2006 and 2007 functioned largely to sell CDOs to yet newer CDOs created by Citi to house them,”
and also citing reciprocal purchases of CDO tranches that were made among three CDOs created
by Citigroup—Octonion, Adams Square Funding II and Class V Funding III).
237. FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at 142-46 (describing synthetic CDOs); id. at 190, 194-96
(describing Citigroup’s significant role in underwriting synthetic CDOs and in retaining the “super
senior” tranches of those CDOs).
238. Id.
239. Id. at 146 (quoting interview with Patrick Parkinson); see also Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank,
supra note 231, at 965-67 (describing how synthetic CDOs and CDS enabled investors to place
“multiple layers of financial bets” on the performance of subprime mortgages, thereby creating an
“inverted pyramid of risk” that inflicted losses on investors that were much larger than the face
amounts of the defaulted mortgages).
240. Schwartz & Dash, supra note 3.
241. Kevin Donovan, Merrill’s CDO Investment Pays Off with No. 1 Ranking, ASSET
SECURITIZATION REP., Jan. 10, 2005.
242. Id. (reporting that Merrill underwrote $15 billion of CDOs in 2004); see also FCIC
REPORT, supra note 4, at 198 (stating that Citigroup ranked fourteenth among CDO underwriters
in 2003). 
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Citigroup.243  That plan called for generating higher profits by expanding
Citigroup’s fixed-income trading operations (including CDOs) and assuming
greater risks in those operations.244   Citigroup implemented the plan by ramping
up its CDO production to $18.5 billion in 2005, $36.6 billion in 2006 and $35.7
billion in 2007, and its ranking as a CDO underwriter rose to third in 2005,
second in 2006 and first in 2007.245  
Citigroup earned large amounts of fees for creating and marketing CDOs.246 
In addition, the Citigroup executives responsible for CDO production received
handsome rewards for their apparent success.  In 2006, Tom Maheras (co-head
of Citigroup’s investment bank) earned $34 million in salary and bonus, while
Randolph Barker (co-head of global fixed-income) was paid $21 million, and
Nestor Dominguez and Janice Warne (co-heads of global CDOs) each received
$7.4 million.247 
3.  Citigroup Used Off-Balance-Sheet Conduits as Dumping Grounds for
Unsold CDO Tranches and Other Risky Securities.—Citigroup assumed ever-
greater risks as it sought to become the top-ranked producer of CDOs.  From
2003 to 2006, Citigroup sold $25 billion of “super senior” AAA-rated CDO
tranches to off-balance-sheet conduits.248  The conduits paid for the tranches by
issuing short-term asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) to investors.249 
Citibank provided “liquidity puts” to support Citigroup’s sale of CDO tranches
243. Schwartz & Dash, supra note 3 (noting that Rubin helped Prince to persuade Citigroup’s
board of directors to approve the plan).
244. GASPARINO, BLOOD ON THE STREET,  supra note 86, at 190-92; Ken Brown & David
Enrich, Rubin, Under Fire, Defends His Role at Citi, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 2008, at A1; Dash &
Creswell, supra note 2; Schwartz & Dash, supra note 3; Notes on Senior Supervisors’ Meetings
with Firms: Confidential Supervisory Information: Citigroup, Office of Comptroller of Currency,
Nov. 19, 2007, at 5 [hereinafter Senior Regulators 2007 Citigroup Meeting Notes] (confidential
notes of meeting among representatives of Citigroup, New York Fed, FRB, OCC and SEC, which
recorded that “Citigroup’s Board of Directors approved the Management plan accepting Citigroup
‘needed to take on more risk.’”), available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-
docs/2007-11-19_OCC_Notes_on_Senior_Supervisors_Meeting_with_Firms.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/6WTR-9LWX.
245. Gabrielle Stein, Market Sees Murky Outlook for U.S. CDOs in 2008, ASSET
SECURITIZATION REP., Jan. 7, 2008 (providing data for CDO underwriters in 2006 and 2007, and
noting that Merrill ranked first in 2006 and second in 2007); Allison Pyburn, U.S. CDO Market
Posts Gains Through 2005, ASSET SECURITIZATION REP., Jan. 9, 2006 (providing data for CDO
underwriters in 2005, and noting that Merrill and Wachovia ranked first and second in that year). 
246. FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at 138 (stating that Citigroup’s CDO desk typically earned
a fee of about $10 million for each $1 billion CDO it created, and Citibank usually charged $1 to
$2 million each year for providing “liquidity puts” to purchasers of AAA-rated tranches of CDOs);
Dash & Creswell, supra note 2 (reporting that Citigroup earned $500 million from its CDO
business in 2005).
247. FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at 198.
248. Id. at 138-39.
249. Id.
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to the conduits.250  The liquidity puts guaranteed that Citibank would buy the
ABCP if investors refused to roll over their holdings of the short-term paper.251 
In 2006, after Citibank’s treasury department refused to allow any more liquidity
puts, Citigroup’s CDO trading desk began to retain large amounts of super senior
CDO tranches that it could not sell to investors because of the relatively low
yields on those tranches.252  By September 2007, Citigroup’s investment bank
held $18 billion of unsold super senior tranches, thereby increasing its total super
senior exposure to $43 billion.253  In addition, Citigroup’s investment bank held
almost $12 billion of subprime mortgages and RMBS in its “warehouse” while
waiting to package those instruments into new CDOs.254  Thus, Citigroup had $55
billion of combined exposures to subprime CDO-related assets in the fall of
2007.255
Citigroup compounded its exposure to CDOs and other illiquid investments
by creating structured investment vehicles (SIVs) as another type of off-balance-
sheet dumping ground for those investments.  SIVs were off-balance-sheet
entities that purchased a variety of investments (including RMBS and CDOs)
from their sponsoring banks and funded those purchases by issuing short-term
ABCP and medium-term notes (MTNs).256  SIVs were somewhat different from
ABCP conduits because SIVs used a longer-term funding model and did not rely
on liquidity puts from their sponsoring banks.257  However, while SIVs did not
have explicit liquidity support from their sponsoring banks, any default by an SIV
would create significant reputational risks for its sponsor.258  
Citigroup was the largest global sponsor of SIVs.259  In December 2007,
250. Id.
251. Id. at 137-39, 195-96; FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y., SUMMARY OF SUPERVISORY ACTIVITY
AND FINDINGS: CITIGROUP, JAN. 1, 2007 – DEC. 31, 2007, at 3, 17 [hereinafter NEW YORK FED 2007
CITIGROUP EXAM REPORT].
252. FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at 138-39, 196-97 (explaining that Citigroup had perverse
incentives to provide liquidity puts and retain super senior tranches in order to complete CDO
deals, because federal bank regulators had adopted capital rules that allowed banks to maintain very
low levels of capital with respect to such commitments).
253. Id. at 196.
254. Carrick Mollenkamp & David Reilly, Why Citi Struggles to Tally Losses, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 5, 2007, at C1.
255. Id. 
256. FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at 252-53 (explaining that MTNs were bonds maturing in
one to five years).
257. Id.
258. Id.; VIRAL V. ACHARYA & PHILIPP SCHNABL, RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY: HOW
TO REPAIR A FAILED SYSTEM 83, 86-94 (Viral V. Acharya & Matthew Richardson eds. 2009); see
also Wilmarth, Dark Side, supra note 183, at 1033 (describing “reputation risk” faced by sponsors
of SIVs despite the sponsors’ lack of explicit contractual commitments to support their SIVs).
259. Shannon D. Harrington & Elizabeth Hester, Citigroup Rescues SIVs With $58 Billion
Debt Bailout (Update 5), BLOOMBERG (Dec. 14, 2007), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=newsarchive&refer=home&sid=aS0Dm.iV5BCI, archived at http://perma.cc/PK8G-
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Citigroup’s seven SIVs collectively held about $50 billion of assets, including a
substantial amount of subprime RMBS and CDOs.260  Despite Citigroup’s lack
of any “contractual obligation” to support its SIVs, Citigroup felt compelled for
reputational reasons to bring the assets of its SIVs back onto its balance sheet in
order to prevent the SIVs from defaulting on $58 billion of debt securities the
SIVs had issued.261
4.  Citigroup’s Executives Disregarded the Risks Created by Its Subprime
RMBS and CDO Activities.—As Citigroup aggressively expanded its business of
packaging RMBS and CDOs, Chuck Prince and Robert Rubin ignored the
growing risks of that business and other aspects of Citigroup’s capital markets
operations.262  Rubin was viewed as Citigroup’s “resident sage” based on his
experience as head of arbitrage trading and as chairman of Goldman Sachs before
serving as Treasury Secretary during the Clinton Administration.263  Rubin
encouraged Prince and Citigroup’s board of directors to assume more risk in
order to keep up with Goldman Sachs and other key Wall Street competitors.264 
He especially “pushed to bulk up [Citigroup’s] high-growth fixed-income trading,
including the C.D.O. business.”265  A Citigroup banker described Rubin as “like
the Wizard of Oz behind Citigroup . . . .  He certainly was the guy deferred to on
key strategic decisions and certain key business decisions vis-à-vis risk.”266 
Rubin “knew what a CDO was,” but he claimed that he and Citigroup’s board
of directors properly relied on the bank’s fixed-income executives and risk
managers to oversee the CDO business.267  Rubin and Prince told the FCIC that
they did not know about Citigroup’s $43 billion exposure to subprime CDOs (via
SVFC (reporting that Citigroup’s SIVs held about 13% of their assets in RMBS and CDOs).
260. Id. (reporting that Citigroup’s SIVs held about 13% of their assets in RMBS and CDOs).
261. Id. (reporting that Citigroup was assuming responsibility to pay $10 billion of ABCP and
$48 billion of MTNs issued by the SIVs.); Robin Sidel et al., Citigroup Alters Course, Bails Out
Affiliated Funds, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2007, at A1; see also NEW YORK FED 2007 CITIGROUP
EXAM REPORT, supra note 251, at 3, 17 (finding that Citigroup failed to consider “the potential
impact of supporting Citi-advised [SIVs] for reputational reasons” until the SIVs were threatened
with default).
262. See supra notes 216-17, 236-61 and accompanying text.
263. Dash & Creswell, supra note 2; see also GASPARINO, BLOOD ON THE STREET, supra note
86, at 145-46, 190-91; Brown & Enrich, supra note 244.  Weill, Prince and other Citigroup
executives sought Rubin’s advice on a regular basis.  Raymond McGuire, a former co-head of
global investment banking at Citigroup, described his meetings with Rubin as “a little like visiting
Yoda . . . You go and get a dose of wisdom.”  Schwartz & Dash, supra note 3.
264. Dash & Creswell, supra note 2.
265. Id.; see also GASPARINO, BLOOD ON THE STREET, supra note 86, at 145-46, 190-91;
Brown & Enrich, supra note 244; Schwartz & Dash, supra note 3.
266. Schwartz & Dash, supra note 3 (quoting unnamed banker).
267. Brown & Enrich, supra note 244 (quoting Mr. Rubin); see also Schwartz & Dash, supra
note 3 (quoting Mr. Rubin’s statement that “[t]here is no way you would know what was going on
with a risk book unless you’re directly involved with the trading arena . . . . We had highly
experienced, highly qualified people running the operation.”).
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liquidity puts and retained super senior tranches) until September 2007.268  Prior
to that time, they relied on assurances provided by Tom Maheras (co-head of
Citigroup’s investment bank) and David Bushnell (Citigroup’s chief risk officer)
that Citigroup did not have significant exposures to losses from subprime
CDOs.269  Maheras told Citigroup’s senior management that “[w]e are never
going to lose a penny on these super seniors,“ while Bushnell said that housing
prices would have to fall 30% nationwide before Citigroup would have any
“problems” with its CDO exposure.270 
Prince and Rubin claimed that they acted reasonably in relying on Maheras
and Bushnell as highly respected professionals.271  However, their reliance was
highly questionable in both cases.  Many Citigroup employees knew that Maheras
pursued extremely aggressive trading strategies with his own funds as well as
Citigroup’s money.272  Some senior bond traders and salesmen questioned
Maheras’ high-risk strategies, but they eventually left Citigroup because senior
management supported Maheras and eventually made him co-head of Citigroup’s
investment bank.273
Bushnell’s reliability should also have been suspect.  He was a longstanding
friend of Maheras and Randy Barker, one of Maheras’ top deputies.274  Maheras
and Barker frequently persuaded Bushnell to loosen or remove risk limits on
Citigroup’s trading operations.275  Risk managers in Citigroup’s fixed-income
trading division reported to both Maheras and Bushnell, thereby undermining the
independence of those managers.276  Bushnell admitted to the FCIC that his risk
management division “did approve higher risk limits when a business line was
growing . . . [due to] a ‘firm-wide initiative’ to increase Citigroup’s structured-
products business.”277  According to some reports, the “close” friendship among
268. FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at 262-65.
269. Id.; Dash & Creswell, supra note 2.
270. FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at 262 and 264 (quoting Mr. Prince’s recollection of
statements made by Maheras and Bushnell).
271. Id. at 261-64; GASPARINO, BLOOD ON THE STREET, supra note 86, at 191, 282-83 (noting
that in 2007 Maheras had “become the odds-on favorite to replace Prince” as CEO of Citigroup).
272. See GASPARINO, BLOOD ON THE STREET, supra note 86, at 88, 137-38, 146-50, 238-39,
282-83, 305-06 (discussing Maheras’ well-known reputation for speculative trading).
273. Id. at 142-43, 146-50, 282-82, 358 (stating that William Heinzerling, a senior bond trader,
left Citigroup in 2005 and Citigroup’s top three bond salesmen left between 2004 and 2007, due
to their disagreements with Maheras’ trading strategies). 
274. Dash & Creswell, supra note 2. 
275. GASPARINO, supra note 86, at 285, 305 (“Maheras had a built-in advantage when it came
to risk-taking—his chief risk manager, Dave Bushnell, was a close friend, and his other close
friend, Randy Baker, the co-head of all of fixed income, had consistently leaned on Bushnell to
approve increasingly complex trades.”).
276. Dash & Creswell, supra note 2.
277. FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at 261 (summarizing and quoting from an interview with Mr.
Bushnell, and also noting that Citigroup’s risk officers increased the authority of the CDO desk to
retain subprime RMBS and CDO tranches in the first half of 2007).
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Maheras, Barker and Bushnell—and Bushnell’s resulting lack of
independence—was widely known within Citigroup.278 
A careful analysis should have led Citigroup’s management to question
Bushnell’s view that super senior tranches of CDOs were protected against any
outcome less severe than a 30% drop in nationwide housing prices.  Many CDO
portfolios were stuffed with mezzanine tranches of subprime RMBS, and some
analysts and investors had determined by 2006 that AAA-rated tranches in those
CDOs would begin to suffer losses if national home prices fell by just 4%.279 
Nevertheless, Citigroup put “blind faith” in the seniority and AAA ratings of its
super senior tranches and failed to perceive the risks embedded in the subprime
collateral underlying the CDO tranches.280  
In June 2007, Citigroup told SEC examiners that it was excluding the $43
billion of CDO liquidity puts and super senior tranches from its publicly disclosed
subprime exposures because it viewed the “risk of default” on those AAA-rated
obligations as “extremely unlikely.”281  Citigroup omitted the liquidity puts and
super senior tranches from its disclosures of subprime holdings in several
earnings reports and calls with investors between July and October 2007.282 
Citigroup finally disclosed its liquidity puts and super senior tranches to the
public in November 2007.283  The bank subsequently paid $665 million to settle
an SEC enforcement action and a shareholder lawsuit alleging that Citigroup’s
278. GASPARINO, BLOOD ON THE STREET, supra note 86, at 285, 305 (indicating that Prince
was aware of the “close” relationship among the three men); Dash & Creswell, supra note 2
(reporting that the friendship between Bushnell and Barker “raised eyebrows inside the company
among those concerned about its [risk] controls,” and quoting a former senior Citigroup executive
who stated, “Because [Bushnell] has such trust and faith in [Maheras and Barker], he didn’t ask the
right questions”).
279. FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at 194-95 (quoting a newsletter article by James Grant in
October 2006, and describing similar views held by several hedge fund managers).  Mezzanine
tranches of a subprime RMBS deal were exposed to losses after the junior or equity tranches
(typically representing 3% or less of the total tranches) were wiped out.  As a result, after defaults
occurred on more than 3% of the pooled subprime mortgages in an RMBS deal, those losses were
likely to impair the value of mezzanine tranches of the deal.  As the value of mezzanine tranches
of RBMS declined, so would the value of any CDOs that either held those tranches or contained
CDS representing “long” positions on those tranches.  Id. at 127-33, 193-95.
280. Dash & Creswell, supra note 2; see also FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at 260 (noting that
Mr. Prince cited the AAA ratings of CDO tranches as a reason for his initial lack of concern about
Citigroup’s exposure to those tranches); id. at 262 (quoting Citigroup risk officer Ellen Duke, who
admitted that she was “seduced by structuring [that justified high credit ratings] and failed to look
at the underlying collateral”). 
281. FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at 262 (quoting Citigroup presentation to the SEC in June
2007, and noting that national housing prices had fallen by 4.5% and 16% of subprime ARMs were
delinquent by that date); see also Dash & Creswell, supra note 2 (describing Citigroup’s
explanation to the SEC’s examiners as to why the bank did not disclose its CDO positions).
282. FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at 263.
283. Id. at 265.
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failure to disclose the liquidity puts and super senior tranches violated federal
securities laws.284    
Citigroup’s misplaced reliance on credit ratings gave the bank’s traders a
convenient rationale to keep running their CDO machine.  Meanwhile, as
indicated above, “Citigroup’s risk models never accounted for the possibility of
a national housing downturn.”285  Both mistakes seem glaring in retrospect, but
the mistakes are more understandable when one considers the enormous financial
incentives that spurred Citigroup’s executives to continue creating CDOs and
engaging in other high-risk capital markets activities.286  As one banker explained,
“senior managers got addicted to the revenues and arrogant about the risks they
were running . . . .  As long as you could grow revenues, you could keep your
bonus growing.”287    
Prince and Rubin were also strongly inclined to overlook the risks incurred
by Citigroup’s capital markets activities because they relied so heavily on those
operations to produce the earnings growth they kept promising to Wall Street.288 
For example, Citigroup’s corporate and investment bank was praised as “the
284. Id.; SEC Litigation Release No. 21605, July 29, 2010 (announcing that Citigroup had
agreed to pay $75 million to settle the SEC’s enforcement action, and alleging that Citigroup’s
“senior management” was aware of the liquidity puts and super senior tranches “as early as April
2007”), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/lr21605.htm, archived at
http://perma.cc/Q2MR-4LVA; Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Citigroup in $590 Million Settlement of
Subprime Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2012, at B4 (reporting on Citigroup’s payment of $590
million to settle the shareholder lawsuit).  Citigroup’s chief financial officer, Gary Crittenden, and
its head of investor relations, Arthur Tildesley, paid a total of $180,000 to settle SEC charges
arising out of the same alleged disclosure violations.  However, the SEC did not file charges against
Prince, Rubin or other senior executives of Citigroup.  SEC Administrative Release No. 34-62593,
July 29, 2010 (announcing settlement of SEC charges against Crittenden and Tildesley), available
at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2010/34-62593.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/7PVM-
94SA.
285. Dash & Creswell, supra note 2.
286. FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at 138-39, 196-97.  
287. Id.; Dash & Creswell, supra note 2 (quoting unnamed banker who with Citigroup’s CDO
group); see also supra note 247 and accompanying text (describing the very high compensation
paid to Maheras, Barker and the co-heads of Citigroup’s global CDO business); infra notes 382-83
and accompanying text (discussing the very high compensation received by Prince and Rubin).
288. GASPARINO, BLOOD ON THE STREET, supra note 86, at 190-91 (suggesting that Rubin saw
risk-taking in Citigroup’s capital markets operations as “Citi’s sole savior” and “a tool to grow
profits”); Riley, supra note 155, at A2 (reporting that Prince “expected to boost competitiveness
at [Citigroup’s] investment bank this year,” and “[s]ince 2004, Citigroup’s corporate and
investment bank has served as a revenue growth engine for the company”); Der Hovanesian, supra
note 155, at 41 (reporting on Prince’s claim in October 2006 that “investments he made three years
ago in Citi’s capital markets business are now paying off nicely”); see also supra notes 152-53,
155-57 (discussing Prince’s repeated pledges to produce larger earnings through “organic growth,”
especially in Citigroup’s capital markets operations, to satisfy Wall Street’s demands for higher
profits).
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company’s main profit engine” in the second quarter of 2007, when the unit
reported what appeared to be record results for revenues and net income.289 
Similarly, Citigroup’s capital markets and investment banking operations
reported strong revenues and earnings during the first quarter of 2007, and Prince
publicly expressed his “thanks and gratitude” to Citigroup’s traders.290  Thus,
Citigroup’s top executives tolerated aggressive risk-taking by Maheras and his
subordinates because they viewed the investment bank as “the key to Citigroup
meeting Wall Street’s quarterly profit expectations.”291
5.  Citigroup Assumed Major Risks in Syndicating Corporate Loans for
Leveraged Buyouts.—Citigroup was a leading provider of loans for corporate
leveraged buyouts (LBOs).292  Large commercial and investment banks
underwrote about $5 trillion of leveraged loans between 2003 and 2007, and
many of those loans were used to help finance $1.8 trillion of LBOs that were
completed in global markets between 2004 and 2007.293  More than a tenth of
those leveraged loans were pooled to create collateralized loan obligations
(CLOs), which sold CLO securities to investors around the world.294
As the LBO boom reached its peak between 2004 and mid-2007, the quality
of leveraged loans declined and their risks increased sharply.295  Only 10% of
leveraged loans that were issued between 2000 and 2003 carried the most risky
credit rating (“CCC”).296  However, the percentage of CCC-rated leveraged loans
rose above 40% in 2004 and reached 50% in 2006.297  During the height of the
LBO boom, Citigroup and other banks underwrote large amounts of leveraged
loans that contained interest-only, “covenant lite,” and “payment in kind”
features, all of which imposed greater risks on the lenders.298  
289. David Enrich, Citigroup Shows Its Strength: Investment Bank Powers 18% Jump in
Earnings, Easing Pressure on CEO, WALL ST. J., July 21, 2007, at A3.
290. Tim Mazzucca, 1Q Earnings: Upbeat Sign: Citi’s Revenue Outgains Costs, AM. BANKER,
Apr. 17, 2007, at 19.
291. Robin Sidel & David Enrich, Citigroup CEO Shakes Up Ranks: Prince Taps Pandit to
Run Merged Investments Unit; Veteran Maheras Departs, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 2007, at A3
(reporting on the departure of Thomas Maheras, co-head of the investment bank, after Citigroup
reported significant trading losses, and noting that Maheras had “spearheaded Citigroup’s push to
trade a broader array of products” and “had been considered a potential successor to Mr. Prince”). 
292. DEALBOOK, Citi Chief on Buyouts: ‘We’re Still Dancing,’ N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 10, 2007),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2007/07/10/citi-chief-on-buyout-loans-were-still-dancing/, archived
at http://perma.cc/USR4-92BS.
293. Wilmarth, Dark Side, supra note 183, at 1039-40.
294. Id. at 990-91 (describing CLOs as a type of CDO backed by syndicated leveraged
corporate loans); id. at 1039 (stating that between $500 billion and $700 billion of leveraged loans
were packaged into CLOs between 2002 and 2007).
295. FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at 174-75.
296. Wilmarth, Dark Side, supra note 183, at 1040.
297. Id. 
298. Id. at 1040-41 (explaining that (i) interest-only loans allowed borrowers to defer
repayments of principal, (ii) “covenant-lite” loans exempted borrowers from standard covenants
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As I noted in a previous article, “[t]he risky features of leveraged loans during
the LBO boom resembled the interest-only, negative amortization and low- or no-
documentation provisions of nonprime residential mortgages that [large financial
institutions] issued during the simultaneous housing boom.”299  The “spread”
between interest rates for leveraged loans and interest rates for low-risk debt like
Treasury bonds or interbank loans fell to record low levels in early 2007, thereby
indicating that lenders were underestimating the inherent risks of leveraged
loans.300
Demand by investors for leveraged loans began to decline during the second
quarter of 2007.301  Citigroup and other major banks tried to offset weak investor
demand by making “bridge loans” that provided “temporary financing for LBOs
until investors could be found to purchase the requisite number of leveraged loans
and junk bonds” to complete the deals.302  Bridge loans helped Citigroup and
other lenders to generate fees by completing additional LBO deals.  However,
bridge loans created the same type of retention risks that Citigroup assumed when
it provided liquidity puts and kept super senior tranches on its balance sheet in
order to complete CDO deals.303 
Citigroup ranked third among underwriters of leveraged loans in 2007, a very
significant rise from its thirteenth place ranking in 1999.304  In early 2007,
Citigroup’s senior management decided to double the bank’s portfolio limits for
leveraged loans “in pursuit of earnings” and also to defend Citigroup’s leading
position in the leveraged-loan market.305  Citigroup’s regulators subsequently
determined that “Citigroup’s risk appetite was to maintain its 15-20% market
share  . . . As far as leveraged lending was concerned, Citigroup believed it had
to be in all the roughly 6-7 mega deals that were put together in 2007, to maintain
that typically would have limited the amount of their outstanding debt and mandated minimum
levels of cash flow coverage and interest payment coverage, and (iii) payment-in-kind loans
allowed borrowers to defer paying interest by issuing new debt to cover accrued interest).  
299. Id. at 1041.  Thus, “[a]s a practical matter, the LBO financing packages underwritten by
[large financial institutions] represented the same kind of ‘Ponzi finance’ as nonprime residential
mortgages, because many LBO firms and homeowners with nonprime mortgages could not satisfy
their debts unless they were able to refinance those debts on more favorable terms.”  Id.
300. FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at 174-75; Henny Sender & Serena Ng, Market Pressures
Test Resilience of Buyout Boom, WALL ST. J., June 8, 2007, at A1.
301. Robin Sidel et al., Banks on a Bridge Too Far? As Risk Rises in LBOs, Investors Start
to Balk, WALL ST. J., June 28, 2007, at C1; Sender & Ng, supra note 300.
302. Wilmarth, Dark Side, supra note 183, at 1042; Sidel et al., supra note 301.
303. Wilmarth, Dark Side, supra note 183, at 1042.
304. Bradley Keoun, Citigroup Slips After 10 Years as Biggest U.S. Bank (Update 2),
BLOOMBERG, Mar. 24, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a0w.
04p3qtyY&refer=finance, archived at http://perma.cc/8ZGJ-HND2; see also Sidel et al., supra note
301 (reporting that JPMorgan Chase, Citigroup and Bank of America were “the biggest players in
the leveraged-loan business”).
305. Senior Regulators 2007 Citigroup Meeting Notes, supra note 244, at 2, 4.
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its market leadership.”306
At the end of June 2007, the credit markets were unsettled by the threatened
collapse of two hedge funds managed by Bear Stearns (“Bear”).307  Both hedge
funds had invested heavily in subprime mortgage-related securities, including
CDOs underwritten by Citigroup.308  Analysts saw the problems at Bear’s hedge
funds as “emblematic of the widening fallout from the nation’s housing
downturn,”309 and reporters noted that “investors were wondering how much
longer the era of easy corporate credit can last.”310  
Notwithstanding growing concerns about the viability of LBO deals, Chuck
Prince denied rumors that Citigroup was “pulling back” from those deals in an
interview published in the Financial Times on July 9, 2007.311  In that interview,
Prince gave his now-famous explanation of why Citigroup remained fully
committed to providing LBO loans: “When the music stops, in terms of liquidity,
things will be complicated.  But as long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get
up and dance.  We’re still dancing.”312
Prince also declared that “[t]he depth of the pools of liquidity is so much
larger than it used to be that a disruptive event now needs to be much more
disruptive than it used to be.”313  He pointed out that “big Wall Street banks” were
acquiring “troubled subprime mortgage lenders,” thereby providing “an example
of how ‘liquidity rushes in’ to fill the gap as others spot a buying opportunity.”314 
Prince’s comments indicated that Citigroup viewed its continued commitment to
leveraged lending as a risk-taking “opportunity” that was similar to Citigroup’s
misguided decision to acquire Argent (the parent company of subprime lender
306. Id. at 6.
307. Michael Hudson, Stock Market Quarterly Review: Is Corporate-Credit Party Almost
Over?, WALL ST. J., July 2, 2007, at C5, available at http://search.proquest.com/docview/
399080199/C40C4FAA2BF942B3PQ/75?accountid=11243.
308. Kate Kelly et al., Two Big Funds At Bear Stearns Face Shutdown: As Rescue Plan
Falters Amid Subprime Woes, Merrill Asserts Claims, WALL ST. J., June 20, 2007, at A1, available
at http://search.proquest.com/docview/399090137/A53B6F6CEA1541C6PQ/9?accountid=11243.
309. Id.
310. Hudson, supra note 307.  
311. Michiyo Nakamoto & David Wighton, Citigroup Chief Stays Bullish on Buy-outs,
FT.COM, July 9, 2007.
312. Id.
313. Id. (reporting that Prince acknowledged that “[a]t some point, the disruptive event will
be so significant that instead of liquidity filling in, the liquidity will go other way”; however, Prince
added, “I don’t think we’re at that point.”).
314. Id.; see also Wilmarth, Dark Side, supra note 183, at 1018, 1018 n.273 (describing how
large commercial and investment banks purchased “nonbank subprime lenders in 2006 and 2007,
as nonbank lenders encountered increasing problems with delinquencies and defaults,” including
Bear Stearns’ acquisition of Encore Credit, Morgan Stanley’s purchase of Saxon Mortgage,
Deutsche Bank’s acquisition of Mortgage IT, Merrill Lynch’s purchase of First Franklin, and
Citigroup’s acquisition of Argent).
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Ameriquest) in September 2007.315
Prince reaffirmed Citigroup’s confidence and its commitment to leveraged
lending in another interview published in the New York Times in early August.316 
Prince acknowledged that “[w]e see a lot of people on the Street who are scared,”
but he insisted, “We are not scared.  We are not panicked.  We are not rattled. 
Our team has been through this before.”317  Despite the “disruption” that many
perceived in the credit markets, Prince maintained that “[w]hat we are seeing now
is a pullback into a range of more normal kinds of credit experiences.”318  He
added—in a comment that ranks alongside his “still dancing” statement of the
previous month—“I think our performance is going to last much longer than the
market turbulence does.”319
At the time Prince made his bullish statements about leveraged lending, he
recognized the dangers created by the overheated LBO market and declining
standards for leveraged loans.320  Prince attended a dinner with then-Treasury
Secretary Hank Paulson on June 26, 2007.321  Prince asked Paulson “whether
given the competitive pressures there wasn’t a role for regulators to tamp down
some of the riskier practices,” and “isn’t there something you can do to order us
not to take all these risks?”322  Thus, Prince clearly understood the grave risks
lurking in the LBO market, but Citigroup did not pull back from leveraged
lending until the LBO market collapsed.323  
Prince was not alone in having misgivings about leveraged lending or in
failing to act on them.  In a May 2007 speech, Bank of America (“BofA”) CEO
Kenneth Lewis admitted that “[w]e are close to a time when we’ll look back and
say we did some stupid things. . . . We need a little more sanity in a period in
which everyone feels invincible and thinks this is different.”324  However, in the
same speech Lewis boasted that BofA had participated in seven of the fifteen
largest LBO deals during 2006, and he also declared, “There is tremendous value
in being able to provide a strong balance sheet to arrange large, complex financial
transactions.”325   
Thus, Prince and Lewis were both willing to keep dancing as long as the LBO
band kept playing.  Given their decisions to continue financing LBO deals despite
315. See supra notes 179-81 and accompanying text (discussing Citigroup’s disastrous
acquisition of Argent).
316. Eric Dash, Is the Dance Over? Citigroup Is Upbeat, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2007, at C1.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. THOMAS G. STANTON, WHY SOME FIRMS THRIVE WHILE OTHERS FAIL: GOVERNANCE
AND MANAGEMENT LESSONS FROM THE CRISIS 116 (2012).
321. Id.
322. Id. at 166 (quoting Mr. Prince).
323. Id.
324. Greg Ip, Fed, Other Regulators Turn Attention to Risk in Banks’ LBO Lending, WALL
ST. J., May 18, 2007, at C1.
325. Id.
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their clear appreciation of the risks, it is not surprising that Citigroup and BofA
were both forced to accept massive bailouts from the Troubled Asset Relief
Program (“TARP”), and to rely on extensive liquidity support from the Federal
Reserve.326   
By September 2007, the markets for LBO funding had largely shut down.327 
At that point, Citigroup was left holding commitments to provide $69 billion of
leveraged loans for LBO transactions.328  Citigroup’s LBO pledges represented
a very significant share of the $300 to $400 billion in outstanding commitments
by leveraged lenders in late 2007.329  Through write-offs and sales to hedge funds
and private equity funds, Citigroup reduced its leveraged-lending commitments
to $43 billion at the end of 2007 and $26 billion at the end of April 2008.330  Even
so, as discussed below, Citigroup’s leveraged-lending spree contributed to the
326. See infra notes 336-49 and accompanying text (noting that Citigroup received $45 billion
of TARP capital infusions and more than $300 billion of asset guarantees from the federal
government); OFF. SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. TARP (“SIGTARP”), EMERGENCY CAPITAL
INJECTIONS PROVIDED TO SUPPORT THE VIABILITY OF BANK OF AMERICA, OTHER MAJOR BANKS,
AND THE U.S. FINANCIAL SYSTEM, SIGTARP-10-001 (Oct. 5, 2009) 1-2, 26-29 (explaining that
BofA received $45 billion of TARP capital infusions, and federal regulators agreed to provide
almost $120 billion in asset guarantees to BofA) [hereinafter “SIGTARP BofA Assistance Report”],
available at http://www.sigtarp.gov/Audit%20Reports/Emergency_Capital_Injections_Provided_
to_Support_the_Viability_of_Bank_of_America.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/K82F-WN44. 
Citigroup and BofA also ranked second and third among financial institutions that received the
largest amounts of emergency liquidity assistance from the Federal Reserve.  Citigroup and BofA
obtained $99.5 billion and $91.4 billion of emergency loans, respectively, and those amounts were
exceeded only by the $107.3 billion that the Federal Reserve provided to Morgan Stanley.  Bradley
Keoun & Phil Kuntz, Wall Street Aristocracy Got $1.2 Billion in Secret Fed Loans,
BLOOMBERG.COM, Aug. 22, 2011).  
327. Dana Cimilluca & David Enrich, Deal-Making Ties Unravel: Underwriters Retreating
from Backing Buyouts, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2007, at C1; Dennis K. Berman, Mood Swing: Deal
Boom Fizzles as Cheap Credit Fades; Wall Street Mulls End of Golden M&A Era, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 6, 2007, at A1; Tom Lauricella, Credit Crunch: Investors Flee Bank-Loan Funds, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 24, 2007, at C2; Shawn Tully, Why the Private Equity Bubble Is Bursting, FORTUNE, Aug.
20, 2007, at 30; see also FCIC REPORT, supra note  4, at 175 (explaining that the leveraged-lending
market shut down soon after the subprime CDO market collapsed in the summer of 2007).
328. Pierre Paulden & Cecile Gutscher, Pandit’s “Closer to End” Means No Escaping LBO
Loans (Update 4), BLOOMBERG.COM, Apr. 29, 2008 (providing figure for Citigroup in the fall of
2007), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a73YZLrx84jQ&refer=bond,
archived at http://perma.cc/7X9G-ZT63.
329. Id.; FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at 175 (indicating that about $300 billion of
commitments for LBO loans were outstanding in the fall of 2007); compare Wilmarth, Dark Side,
supra note 183, at 1042 (stating that “nearly $400 billion of commitments to provide bridge
financing for pending LBOs” were outstanding in the fall of 2007).
330. David Reilly, Banks Use Quirk as Leverage Over Brokers in Loan Fallout, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 27, 2008, at C1 (providing figure for end of 2007); Paulden & Gutscher, supra note 328
(providing figure for end of April 2008).  
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very large losses that the bank reported between the fourth quarter of 2007 and
the end of 2008.331
B.  Prince’s and Rubin’s Aggressive Strategy Inflicted Huge Losses on
Citigroup and Forced Citigroup to Accept Three Bailouts
from the Federal Government
Citigroup’s high-risk lending and capital markets activities produced massive
losses between the summer of 2007 and the spring of 2010.332  During that period,
Citigroup recorded more than $130 billion in credit losses and write-downs on
investments, a lamentable record that was exceeded only by Fannie Mae.333 
Chuck Prince resigned as CEO at the end of October 2007, after Citigroup
publicly disclosed losses of about $10 billion on its subprime and CDO assets.334 
From the fourth quarter of 2007 through the end of 2009, Citigroup reported total
net losses of almost $40 billion.335
Citigroup received its first government bailout on October 14, 2008.336  On
that date, the Treasury Department announced that it would buy $25 billion of
Citigroup’s preferred stock as part of Treasury’s first round of TARP capital
infusions into nine major banks.337  Vikram Pandit, Citigroup’s new CEO, eagerly
welcomed Treasury’s assistance because it provided “very cheap capital” to
Citigroup.338
The federal government’s first bailout was not sufficient to persuade the
331. See infra notes 350-51 and accompanying text.
332. See infra Part II.A. 
333. VIRAL V. ACHARYA ET AL., REGULATING WALL STREET: THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND THE
NEW ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL FINANCE 147 (Tbl. 6.1) (Viral V. Acharya et al., eds. 2011)
(showing that Citigroup recorded “Write-Downs and Credit Losses” of $130.4 billion between June
2007 and March 2010, a total that was exceeded only by Fannie Mae).
334. FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at 265; Robin Sidel et al., Two Weeks That Shook the Titans
of Wall Street, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 2007, at A1; Bradley Keoun & Edgar Ortega, Weill’s Profit
Machine Breaks Down on Citi Writedowns (Update 6), BLOOMBERG.COM, Nov. 5, 2007,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=ausU0j47QGsE&refer=home,
archived at http://perma.cc/NEV8-XE8D.
335. Collins & Peters, supra note 11 (reporting that Citigroup incurred a net loss of $9.8
billion during the fourth quarter of 2007); Keoun, supra note 10 (reporting that Citigroup incurred
a net loss of $27.7 billion during 2008 and a further net loss of $1.6 billion during 2009). 
336. DAVID WESSEL, IN FED WE TRUST: BEN BERNANKE’S WAR ON THE GREAT PANIC 236-40
(2009).
337. Id.; SIGTARP, EXTRAORDINARY FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE PROVIDED TO CITIGROUP, INC.
5 (2011) [hereinafter SIGTARP Citigroup Assistance Report], available at http://www.sigtarp.
gov/Audit%20Reports/Extraordinary%20Financial%20Assistance%20Provided%20to%20Citig
roup,%20Inc.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/EFJ9-JHNY.
338. WESSEL, supra note 336, at 238-39 (quoting Mr. Pandit and noting that Treasury’s terms
for TARP preferred stock were “generous,” including a dividend rate of only 5% for the first five
years).
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financial markets that Citigroup could survive the financial crisis.339  On October
16, 2008, Citigroup reported a fourth consecutive net quarterly loss after
incurring $13 billion of loan losses and write-downs on investments, bringing its
total credit losses and write-downs to more than $70 billion since the summer of
2007.340  In November 2008, Citigroup’s stock price was undercut by significant
short selling, and its “share price fell from around $13.99 at the market’s close on
November 3, 2008, to $3.05 per share on November 21, 2008, before closing that
day at $3.77.”341  The cost of buying CDS protection against a default on
Citigroup’s outstanding debt rose sharply during the same period, indicating that
“the market was increasingly concerned that Citigroup would not be able to make
good on its debts.”342  In mid-November, depositors, investors, lenders, and other
counterparties began to “‘pull back from Citigroup’ [sic] because of perceived
decline in the bank’s creditworthiness.”343
From November 20 to 23, 2008, federal regulators reviewed Citigroup’s
rapidly deteriorating financial health.344  Citigroup’s management submitted a
proposal for “additional Government assistance” on November 22.345  The Fed,
FDIC, and Treasury concluded that Citigroup would collapse without further
help, and such a collapse would have “implications that reached beyond the bank
itself, including serious adverse effects on domestic and international economic
conditions and financial stability.”346  Based on those findings, Treasury Secretary
Paulson issued a “Systemic Risk Determination,”347 which authorized the federal
government to provide extraordinary assistance to prevent Citigroup’s failure and
thereby protect all of its depositors and other creditors.348  
The second bailout of Citigroup included (i) the Treasury’s use of TARP
funds to purchase an additional $20 billion of preferred stock from Citigroup and
(ii) an agreement by the Treasury, FDIC, and New York Fed to protect Citigroup
against catastrophic losses from a pool of more than $300 billion of the bank’s
troubled assets.349  As originally proposed, Citigroup’s troubled asset pool would
339. See infra notes 340-43 and accompanying text.
340. Bradley Keoun & Josh Fineman, Citigroup Posts Fourth Consecutive Loss on
Writedowns (Update 2), BLOOMBERG.COM, Oct. 16, 2008. 
341. SIGTARP Citigroup Assistance Report, supra note 337, at 8.
342. Id. at 9.
343. Id. at 11.
344. Id. at 13-14.
345. Id. at 13-16.
346. Id. 
347. Id. at 15 (stating that Mr. Paulson consulted with President Bush before making his
Systemic Risk Determination, and that Mr. Paulson concluded, “If Citi isn’t systemic, I don’t know
what is.”).
348. Id.; see also Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank, supra note 231, at 1001 (describing the “systemic
risk exception” contained in 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G) (2012), under which “the Treasury
Secretary can authorize the FDIC to provide full protection to uninsured creditors of a bank in order
to avoid or mitigate ‘serious effects on economic conditions or financial stability’.”).
349. SIGTARP Citigroup Assistance Report, supra note 337, at 17-22 (explaining that
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have included $85 billion of second-lien mortgages (including unfunded loan
commitments), $57 billion of subprime and Alt-A mortgages held by Citigroup’s
retail mortgage business, $17.1 billion of subprime and Alt-A mortgages held in
Citigroup’s securitization warehouse, $12.2 billion of CDO assets, $8.6 billion
of assets from SIVs, and $16.3 billion of leveraged loans.350  Thus, Citigroup
remained exposed in November 2008 to massive losses from its high-risk
activities, including nonprime lending, CDOs, and leveraged lending, even
though Citigroup had already recorded more than $70 billion of write-downs and
losses on those assets.351 
The second bailout of Citigroup also proved to be inadequate to stabilize the
company.  On January 16, 2009, Citigroup announced a fifth consecutive
quarterly net loss after recording “a staggering $25.2 billion in write-offs and
losses in both its consumer and investment bank.”352  The new write-offs and
losses more than offset the $20 billion capital infusion that Citigroup received
from Treasury in the second bailout.  Citigroup’s tangible common equity
(“TCE”) declined to 1.5% of its total assets, and its share price fell to a 16-year
low of $3.50 per share as Citigroup’s losses “wiped out any margin for error that
Citigroup agreed to assume a “first loss position” of $39.5 billion on the $300 billion pool of
troubled assets and “to absorb 10% of any losses in excess of $39.5 billion,” while the Treasury,
FDIC and New York Fed provided various protections to guarantee Citigroup against further losses
on those assets); see also SHEILA BAIR, BULL BY THE HORNS: FIGHTING TO SAVE MAIN STREET
FROM WALL STREET AND WALL STREET FROM ITSELF 122-26 (2012) (describing the FDIC’s
participation in the second bailout of Citigroup).   
350. As shown by the FDIC’s summary of the original proposal for Citigroup’s troubled asset
pool, the subprime and Alt-A mortgages held as “mark-to-market” assets in Citigroup’s
securitization warehouse had been written down from their original value of $29.2 billion, while
Citigroup’s CDO assets, SIV assets and leveraged loans had been written down from their original
values of $23.4 billion, $12.4 billion and $22.1 billion, respectively.  In addition, the originally
proposed troubled asset pool included $37 billion of commercial real estate loans, $29.1 billion of
loans to the “Big 3” automakers, $19.7 billion of retail auto loans, $11 billion of “prime” mortgages
for securitization, $9.5 billion of auction-rate securities, and $4.5 billion of exposures to monoline
insurance companies.  See Memorandum from James R. Wigand and Herbert J. Held to the FDIC
Board of Directors regarding Citibank and Citigroup 3 (“Ring Fenced Portfolio” Tbl.) (Nov. 23,
2008) available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-docs/2008-11-23%20Memo
%20to%20the%20FDIC%20Board%20fromJames%20R.%20Wigand%20and%20Herbert%20J.
%20Held%20re%20recommendation%20for%20systemic%20risk%20determination%20for%2
0Citigroup.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/FA5H-YX4S. 
351. See Keoun & Fineman, supra note 340 and accompanying text (reporting that Citigroup
incurred more than $70 billion of write-downs and loan losses between the summer of 2007 and
October 2008).  Federal regulators and Citigroup subsequently revised the composition of the
troubled asset pool by eliminating CDOs, reducing the amount of commercial real estate loans and
loans to automakers, and increasing the amount of residential mortgage loans.  SIGTARP Citigroup
Assistance Report, supra note 337, at 27-29.
352. Eric Dash, Citigroup’s Big Losses and Breakup Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2009, at B8
(stating that Citigroup reported a net loss of $8.29 billion for the fourth quarter of 2008).
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Citi might have to . . . weather the storm.”353
Treasury announced in February 2009 that it would provide a third bailout to
boost Citigroup’s TCE and reassure investors.354  In that transaction (which was
completed in June 2009), the Treasury converted $25 billion of its preferred stock
into common stock at a price of $3.25 per share, while other Citigroup
shareholders converted $33 billion of their preferred stock into common stock on
the same terms.355  As a result, Citigroup’s TCE increased significantly, and the
federal government became the owner of 33.6% of Citigroup’s common stock.356
Citigroup’s condition stabilized after the third bailout, and it agreed with
federal regulators on a two-part plan to remove the government’s ownership stake
in the bank.357   First, in December 2009, Citigroup repurchased $20 billion of
preferred stock held by the Treasury.358  Second, from April through December
2010, the Treasury sold its holdings of Citigroup common stock in a series of
transactions.359 
In addition to its three TARP-financed bailouts, Citigroup received large
amounts of additional help from the federal government.  The Fed provided
353. Bradley Keoun & Josh Fineman, Citigroup’s Pandit Tries to Save the Little That’s Left
to Lose, BLOOMBERG.COM, Jan. 17, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive
&sid=aN81uQ4nU4e8, archived at http://perma.cc/TBR2-TCL7 (quoting James Ellman, president
of money manager Seacliff Capital LLC).
354. SIGTARP Citigroup Assistance Report, supra note 337, at 30-31; SIGTARP, EXITING
TARP: REPAYMENTS BY THE LARGEST FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 36-37 (2011) [hereinafter
SIGTARP Exit Report], available at http://www.sigtarp.gov/Audit%20Reports/Exiting_TARP_
Repayments_by_the_Largest_Financial_Institutions.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/X76S-P4AC;
David Enrich & Deborah Solomon, Citi, U.S. Reach Accord on a Third Bailout—Government Puts
Itself on Hook for More Losses, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 2009, at B1; Bradley Keoun & Rebecca
Christie, Citi Gets Third Rescue as U.S. Plans to Raise Stake (Update 2), BLOOMBERG.COM, Feb.
27, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=as8R7HbWch.o&refer=
home, archived at http://perma.cc/D53K-LM58.
355. SIGTARP Citigroup Assistance Report, supra note 337, at 30.
356. SIGTARP Exit Report, supra note 354, at 37; David Enrich et al., Citi Deal Clears Way
for Greater U.S. Sway, WALL ST. J., June 10, 2009, at C1; Josh Fineman, Asia Day Ahead:
Citigroup Begins $58 Billion Share Conversion, BLOOMBERG.COM, June 11, 2009, http://www.
bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aOe5cAa0zTGI, archived at
http://perma.cc/J24B-Q3YV; see also BAIR, supra note 349, at 165-73 (describing the FDIC’s
involvement in negotiations for the third bailout of Citigroup).
357. SIGTARP Exit Report, supra note 354, at 34.
358. Id. at 37.
359. Id. at 42-43; Bradley Keoun, Citigroup to Repay $20 Billion of Government Bailout
(Update 2), BLOOMBERG.COM, Dec. 14, 2009, http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/
content/dec2009/db20091214_757347.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/54C-2FSY; Aaron Lorenzo,
Capital Purchase Program: Treasury Completes Common Citigroup Stock Divestiture; Bailout
Profit Rises to $12 Billion, 95 BANKING REP. (BNA) 1069 (2010); see also BAIR, supra note 349,
at 205-06 (describing the FDIC’s involvement in negotiations related to Citigroup’s repurchase in
December 2009 of $20 billion of preferred stock held by the Treasury).
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emergency loans to Citigroup that peaked at $99.5 billion in January 2009 (an
amount exceeded only by Morgan Stanley).360  Citigroup also issued $64.6 billion
of debt that was guaranteed by the FDIC under the Temporary Liquidity
Guarantee Program (“TLGP”).361  Citigroup was the largest issuer of FDIC-
guaranteed debt and therefore received the greatest subsidy under that program.362 
Moreover, Citigroup sold $32.7 billion of commercial paper (short-term debt) to
the Fed’s Commercial Paper Funding Facility (“CPFF”), which placed Citigroup
among the top ten participants in the CPFF.363  The fact that Citigroup was
compelled to draw on such massive amounts of assistance from multiple federal
programs demonstrated the drastic nature of Citigroup’s predicament in 2008 and
2009.
III.  CITIGROUP’S COLLAPSE REVEALED FAR-REACHING FAILURES BY ITS
MANAGERS AND REGULATORS
A.  Managerial Failures Were a Fundamental Cause of Citigroup’s
Devastating Problems
As described above, Citigroup experienced repeated problems and reported
enormous losses during the first decade of its existence.  Sandy Weill stepped
down as CEO in 2003 after presiding over a long series of scandals that included
Enron and WorldCom.364  After taking the reins from Weill, Chuck Prince and
Robert Rubin pursued a high-risk growth strategy that produced catastrophic
losses and forced Citigroup to accept three bailouts from the federal
government.365  As shown below, federal regulators and outside analysts
identified two major shortcomings by Citigroup’s senior executives and business
unit managers during the period leading up to the financial crisis: (1) a single-
minded focus on revenue growth that ignored the risks created by Citigroup’s
aggressive expansion into speculative activities, and (2) a failure to establish and
implement an effective risk management system. 
1.  Citigroup’s Obsession with Revenue and Profit Growth.—As noted above,
Prince and his management team were under constant pressure from Wall Street
360. Keoun & Kuntz, supra note 326.
361. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, NOVEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT: GUARANTEES AND
CONTINGENT PAYMENTS IN TARP AND RELATED PROGRAMS 6-9, 35-39, 58-63, 74-75, 76 (Fig. 10)
(2009), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-111JPRT53348/pdf/CPRT-111JPRT
53348.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/X3D5-34U6 (describing the TLGP).
362. Id. at 76 (fig. 11) (showing that Citigroup issued the largest amount—$64.6 billion—of
FDIC-guaranteed debt under the TLGP, followed by BofA with $44 billion of such debt).
363. Linus Wilson & Yan Wendy Wu, Does Receiving TARP Funds Make it Easier to Roll
Your Commercial Paper onto the Fed?, J. ECON. LIT., Aug. 22, 2011, at 3-4, 29 (Tbl. 7, Panel A)
(showing that Citigroup sold the tenth-largest amount of commercial paper to the Fed under the
CPFF).
364. See supra Part I.B.
365. See supra Part II.
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analysts and investors to produce consistent improvement in Citigroup’s
profitability.366  In response to that pressure, Citigroup’s executives gave top
priority to increasing revenues and earnings and ignored the risks created by the
bank’s strategy of rapid growth.367  The OCC determined that Citigroup’s
management “was focused on short-term performance and profitability along with
achieving top industry rankings across many major products rather than on risk
or potential loss.”368  In the OCC’s view, Citigroup’s CDO problems resulted
from “a fundamental strong push for generating income.  The apparent need to
generate quarterly income triggered a ramping up in [CDO] risk exposure.”369 
Similarly, the New York Fed observed that “[m]anagement’s focus was primarily
on revenue generation until it became clear that the credit market conditions had
changed so significantly that the ability of the business to operate in a ‘business
as usual’ mode was being seriously disrupted.”370  Thus, Citigroup’s regulators
agreed that the bank’s senior management consciously adopted a policy of taking
greater risks in order to produce “earnings growth.” 371  
The Fed and the OCC determined that Citigroup’s executives focused on
expanding its leveraged lending and CDO businesses while overlooking the
potential hazards of both activities.  For example, Citigroup’s managers approved
increases in “pipeline limits” for leveraged loans (i.e., risk ceilings on loan
commitments that Citigroup had not yet sold to investors) from $35 billion in
June 2005 to $100 billion in March 2007.372  Management allowed the leveraged
366. See supra notes 152-53, 155-57 and accompanying text.
367. See infra Part II.A.
368. Letter from John C. Lyons, Examiner-in-Charge, to Vikram Pandit, Citigroup CEO,
Comptroller of the Currency 2 (Feb. 14, 2008) [hereinafter OCC 2008 Citigroup Exam Report],
available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-docs/2008-02-14_OCC_Letter_
from_John_C_Lyons_to_Vikram_Pandit_Serious_Problems_at_Citibank.pdf, archived at http://
perma.cc/EPE8-D3FT.
369. Memorandum from Michael Sullivan and Ron Frake to John Lyons, OCC Examiner-in-
Charge, Subprime CDO Valuation and Oversight Review – Conclusion Memorandum (Jan. 17,
2008) at 3 [hereinafter OCC 2008 Citigroup CDO Memo], available at http://fcic-
s ta t ic . law.s tan fo rd . ed u / cd n _ med i a / fc ic-docs/2008-01-17_OCC_Let ter_from_
Michael_Sullivan_and_Ron_Frake_to_John_Lyons_Re_Subprime_CDO_Valuation_and_Overs
ight_Review_Conculsion_Memorandum.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/4WBJ-6B38.
370. NEW YORK FED 2007 CITIGROUP EXAM REPORT, supra note 251, at 8; see also Senior
Regulators 2007 Citigroup Meeting Notes, supra note 244, at 7 (stating that “Citigroup focus had
been on earnings growth and not balance sheet utilization.  This focus on earnings growth was also
not risk adjusted.”).
371. Senior Regulators 2007 Citigroup Meeting Notes, supra note 244, at 5 (“Citigroup’s
Board of Directors approved the Management plan accepting [that] Citigroup ‘needed to take on
more risk.’ . . . [M]anagement acknowledged that internal incentives focused too much on earnings
growth and not enough on balance sheet usage.”); see also BAIR, supra note 349, at 122 (“Citi had
essentially bought into all the gimmicks to generate short-term profits: poorly underwritten loans,
high-risk securities investments, and short-term, unstable liquidity.”).
372. OCC 2008 Citigroup Exam Report, supra note 368, at 2-3.
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loan “pipeline” to grow rapidly in order “to maintain league leadership
positions.”373  Meanwhile, “underwriting standards [for leveraged loans] were
allowed to be diluted with senior management’s acquiescence in an effort to
remain a leader within the industry.”374 
Based on a similar desire to boost profits, Citigroup’s executives decided to
retain the “super senior” tranches of CDOs because these CDOs were “hard to
sell in the primary issuance market[s] . . . and the bank was reluctant to give up
some of the [deal] inception profits.”375  Regulators confirmed that Citigroup
relied on an “originate to distribute” strategy for both CDO tranches and
leveraged loans, and management ignored the risks that Citigroup would face if
it could not sell its loan commitments or CDO tranches at prices close to their
face values.376  Regulators concluded that Citigroup “did not have meaningful
hedges.  Risk management believed that the leverage lending exposures would
be syndicated and the CDO exposures would be sold.”377
Citigroup’s compensation policies encouraged excessive risk-taking by top
executives, business unit managers, and traders.378  In his testimony before the
FCIC, Prince acknowledged that “[t]he compensation structure on Wall Street is
one that many people have criticized over the years.  It is for traders, for bankers
and so forth, a compensation model that is based on revenue growth, not even
profit growth.”379  Citigroup evidently followed a similar compensation model
despite the flaws recognized by Prince.  According to one news report, “[b]onuses
doubled and tripled for CDO traders” as Citigroup’s CDO business expanded, and
one Citigroup banker said that “[a]s long as you could grow revenues, you could
keep your bonus growing.”380
Senior executives were the largest beneficiaries of Citigroup’s policy of
paying for growth.  Sandy Weill received almost $1 billion in compensation from
Travelers and Citigroup before he stepped down as Citigroup’s chairman in April
2006.381  Chuck Prince was awarded $158 million of cash and stock between 2003
and 2007, 382 while Robert Rubin received $126 million of cash and stock
373. New York Fed 2007 Citigroup Exam Report, supra 251, at 6, 9.
374. Id at 3, 6.
375.  OCC 2008 Citigroup CDO Memo, supra note 369, at 5; see also Senior Regulators 2007
Citigroup Meeting Notes, supra note 244, at 6 (“[M]anagement found that it was unable to
distribute the super-senior tranches at favorable prices.  As management felt comfortable with the
credit risk of these tranches, it began to retain large positions on balance sheet.”).
376. NEW YORK FED 2007 CITIGROUP EXAM REPORT, supra note 251, at 3, 6-7, 8-9.
377. Senior Regulators 2007 Citigroup Meeting Notes, supra note 244, at 4.
378. See supra notes 247, 286-87 and accompanying text.
379. STANTON, supra note 320, at 85 (quoting Prince’s testimony on April 8, 2010).
380. Dash & Creswell, supra note 2.
381. Roddy Boyd, Sandy’s Goodbye: Praise and Poems at Citi Giant’s Farewell, N.Y. POST,
Apr. 19, 2006, at 33; see also O’Brien & Creswell, supra note 1 (reporting in September 2005 that
“[o]ver the last decade, [Weill] has hauled in $953 million in compensation from the companies
he has run”).
382. Eric Dash, Fixing Citigroup Will Test Rubin, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2007, at A1. 
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between 1999 and 2009.383  
Business unit managers prospered as well.  In 2006, Tom Maheras and Randy
Barker (senior executives in Citigroup’s investment bank) received combined pay
of $55 million, while Nestor Dominguez and Janice Warne (co-heads of
Citigroup’s CDO unit) received total compensation of almost $15 million.384 
Several scholars have concluded that the very large cash and stock awards given
by Citigroup and other large financial firms during the 2000s encouraged senior
executives to take aggressive risks without adequate concern for the long-term
viability of their companies.385  In addition, anthropologist Karen Ho has
suggested that Wall Street executives and traders focused on short-term, high-
risk, high-return activities to compensate for the likelihood that they might have
relatively short tenures in their positions.386  
2.  Citigroup’s Failures in Risk Management.—Regulators found that
Citigroup’s risk management system was inadequate and ineffective for three
main reasons.  First, risk management “had insufficient authority or failed to
exercise its authority to constrain business activities.”387  Citigroup’s individual
business units “possessed too much power, and independent risk management
383. Eric Dash & Louise Story, Rubin Leaving Citigroup; Smith Barney for Sale, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 9, 2009, at B1.
384. See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
385. See, e.g., STANTON, supra note 320, at 84-87; Lucian Bebchuk et al., The Wages of
Failure: Executive Compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000-2008, 27 YALE J. ON REG.
257, 259-61, 273-77 (2010) (finding that the bonuses and stock awards given to the top executives
of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers between 2000 and 2008 encouraged them to take excessive
risks, because they received $1.4 and $1 billion of such compensation, and those amounts
substantially exceeded the $300 million and $600 million of company stock they already held in
2000); Sanjai Bhagat & Brian J. Bolton, Misaligned Bank Executive Incentive Compensation 1-4,
17-21 (June 11, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2277917 (similarly concluding that the bonuses and stock awards given
to CEOs of Citigroup and 13 other very large U.S. financial institutions between 2000 and 2008
encouraged them to pursue high-risk strategies, and noting that those CEOs collectively received
net cash flow benefits that were $650 million higher than the losses they incurred from stock price
declines during 2008); see also FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at xix (“Compensation systems—. .
. too often rewarded the quick deal, the short-term gain—without proper consideration of long-term
consequences. . . . This was the case up and down the line—from the corporate boardroom to the
mortgage broker on the street.”). 
386. STANTON, supra note 320, at 87 (quoting analysis by Ms. Ho, who pointed to the
“rampant insecurity” resulting from “Wall Street’s pay-for-performance bonus system” and argued
that “bonuses are also seen [by bankers and traders] as symbols of coming to terms with the
riskiness of their jobs”); see also FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at 8 (“On Wall Street, where many
of these [subprime] loans were packaged into securities and sold to investors around the globe, a
new term was coined: IBGYBG, ‘I’ll be gone, you’ll be gone.’  It referred to deals that brought in
big fees up front while risking large losses in the future.”). 
387. OCC 2008 Citigroup Exam Report, supra note 368, at 2.
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was marginalized.”388  As a result, “risk management played the role more of
enabling management to incur what proved to be untenable risks for the sake of
profitability.”389  Thus, a crucial flaw was that “Independent Risk Management
did not have sufficient stature . . . to be an effective control mechanism in limiting
risk taking by the business lines.”390  In fact, Citigroup’s senior risk officer did
not report directly to the CEO until after the bank publicly disclosed major losses
in November 2007.391
Second, Citigroup’s risk managers relied on highly optimistic assumptions
that ignored “tail risks” (i.e., the likelihood of extremely adverse outcomes).392 
For example, Citigroup’s managers placed great weight on the “AAA” credit
ratings assigned to super senior tranches of CDOs, and they did not consider the
possibility that Citigroup (i) might be unable to sell its CDO tranches or
leveraged loan commitments to investors, or (ii) might be forced to honor its
liquidity puts or to bring SIV-held assets back onto its balance sheet.393 
Citigroup’s risk limits for individual business units “did not address extreme
scenarios that hit the tails,” and Citigroup’s risk managers admitted that they
needed a “better understanding of tail events.”394  Similarly, “Citigroup did not
perform comprehensive, firm-wide consolidated stress tests” in order to evaluate
the impact of extreme outcomes on the entire bank.395  All of these shortcomings
were consistent with the regulators’ finding that risk managers repeatedly granted
388. OCC 2008 Citigroup CDO Memo, supra note 369, at 3; see also OCC 2008 Citigroup
Exam Report, supra note 368, at 4 (stating that “decisions on risk . . . routinely deferred to the
senior business unit management’s wishes” because risk management did not have “the same level
of authority and influence as the business units”). 
389. OCC 2008 Citigroup Exam Report, supra note 368, at 2; see also id. at 3 (“In none of the
major problem areas (subprime, leveraged lending, trading) did independent risk management play
a discernible role in tamping down risk appetite or risk levels.”).
390. NEW YORK FED 2007 CITIGROUP EXAM REPORT, supra note 251, at 7; see also supra
notes 274-78 and accompanying text (discussing evidence that the independence of David Bushnell,
Citigroup’s chief risk officer, was compromised by his close friendship with Tom Maheras and
Randy Barker, who were top executives in Citigroup’s investment bank).
391. Senior Regulators 2007 Citigroup Meeting Notes, supra note 244, at 8 (noting that
Citigroup’s new senior risk officer “will report directly to the CEO.  This is a higher stature than
previously.”).
392. See infra notes 393-95 and accompanying text. 
393. Senior Regulators 2007 Citigroup Meeting Notes, supra note 244, at 6 (“Citigroup
‘bought into the credit agency ratings’” and “saw holding Super Senior AAA tranches as remote
disaster insurance”); id. at 4 (“Risk management believed that the leveraged lending exposures
would be syndicated and CDO exposures would be sold”); id. at 10 (“management had no
expectation that exposures could come back on balance sheet, nor was this captured in its funding
or liquidity plans”).
394. Id. at 13, 15.  See supra notes 270, 279-80 and accompanying text (discussing chief risk
officer David Bushnell’s mistaken assumption that housing prices would have to fall by 30%
nationwide before Citigroup would be exposed to losses on its super senior CDO tranches.).
395. Senior Regulators 2007 Citigroup Meeting Notes, supra note 244, at 14.
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higher risk limits to accommodate the desire of senior executives and business
unit managers for faster revenue growth.396
Third, due to Citigroup’s highly fragmented structure, the bank “did not have
an adequate, firm-wide consolidated understanding of its risk factor
sensitivities.”397  By 2008, Citigroup was a sprawling financial conglomerate that
held more than $2 trillion in assets, owned more than 2000 subsidiaries, operated
in more than 100 countries, and employed more than 300,000 people.398  Sandy
Weill and Chuck Prince failed to integrate their many acquisitions into a coherent
whole.  Consequently, Citigroup’s business units and foreign subsidiaries
operated on a decentralized, quasi-independent basis, and those entities used
multiple data processing systems that were not compatible and did not
communicate with each other.399  As banking analyst Meredith Whitney observed,
“[Prince] inherited a gobbledygook of companies that were never integrated, and
it was never a priority of the company to invest.  The businesses didn’t
communicate with each other.  There were dozens of technology systems and
dozens of financial ledgers.”400   
Regulators found that the “decentralized nature of [Citigroup] created silos”
and resulted in “[p]oor communication across businesses.”401  For example, the
various business lines dealing with subprime mortgage-related assets–including
consumer mortgage lending, securitization, CDO underwriting and CDO
trading–did not share information effectively.402  As a result, Prince and Rubin did
not receive detailed information about Citigroup’s total subprime-related
exposures until September 2007.403  Given those conditions, it was not surprising
396. Id. at 2-6, 16; OCC 2008 Citigroup Exam Report, supra note 368, at 2-4. 
397. Senior Regulators 2007 Citigroup Meeting Notes, supra note 244, at 3; see also id. at 7
(“Risk management did not adequately bring together total risk of [the] firm by risk factor.”). 
398. Josh Fineman, Citigroup Falls to Lowest Since Bank Formed in 1998 (Update 1),
BLOOMBERG.COM, July 15, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=
aDV0R9M9Edu4, archived at http://perma.cc/FX9X-U6G8 (providing data regarding assets,
employees and foreign operations in 2008); see also STANTON, supra note 320, at 126 (tbl. 6.2)
(showing that Citigroup had more than 2,400 subsidiaries at the end of 2006). 
399. STANTON, supra note 320, at 125, 127; Lisa Kassenaar, Citi Unravels as Reed Regrets
Universal Model (Update 2), BLOOMBERG.COM, (July 21, 2008), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aVwxSMeM0MnA, archived at http://perma.cc/M4TM-32PP;
Bradley Keoun & Lisa Kassenaar, Pandit Dismantles Weill Empire to Salvage Citigroup,
BLOOMBERG.COM, Jan. 14, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=
aPe0BmS_BI_w, archived at http://perma.cc/WAF3-BNME.
400. Dash & Creswell, supra note 2 (quoting Ms. Whitney); see also BAIR, supra note 349,
at 124 (stating that, in November 2008, “Citigroup’s management information systems were so
poor that [the FDIC] really couldn’t be certain which operations were in [Citibank], and thus
subject to the FDIC’s powers, and which were outside the bank, and thus beyond our reach.”).
401. Senior Regulators 2007 Citigroup Meeting Notes, supra note 244, at 2.
402. Id. at 2, 4.
403. FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at 260-65; Senior Regulators 2007 Citigroup Meeting Notes,
supra note 244, at 2-7, 17 (explaining that Citigroup “missed the “mortgage correlation”” among
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that Citigroup lacked “a comprehensive view [of the] credit, market, liquidity and
financial/accounting risks of its various businesses.”404     
B.  Federal Regulators Failed to Stop Citigroup from Taking Excessive Risks
In previous articles, I have described numerous regulatory failures that
contributed to the severity of the financial crisis and the resulting harm to the U.S.
economy.405  I will not repeat the findings of those articles here.  However, I will
comment on supervisory failures by Citigroup’s three most important
regulators—the Fed (including the FRB and the New York Fed), the OCC and the
SEC—and suggest possible reasons for those failures.406
1.  The Fed, OCC and SEC Failed to Restrain Excessive Risk-Taking by
Citigroup Despite Their Awareness of the Bank’s Rapid Growth and the
Inadequacy of the Bank’s Risk Management Systems.—In response to a series of
scandals involving Citigroup between 2000 and 2004, federal regulators imposed
relatively modest penalties and brought an enforcement action against only one
Citigroup employee (Jack Grubman).407  In March 2005, the Fed imposed a
moratorium on Citigroup’s ability to make additional large acquisitions.408 
However, the Fed lifted that moratorium only one year later.409  In an internal
memorandum recommending that action, Fed staff members stated that Citigroup
had made “substantial improvements in its compliance and control
infrastructure.”410  Because staff members believed that Citigroup had made
its various business units that originated, securitized, and traded subprime assets and observing that
the bank “historically ran its business on a decentralized basis” and there was no dialogue across
businesses) (quotations at 7, 17). 
404. Senior Regulators 2007 Citigroup Meeting Notes, supra note 244, at 2. 
405. See, e.g., Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Turning a Blind Eye: Why Washington Keeps Giving
In to Washington, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283, 1328-59 (2013) [hereinafter Wilmarth, Blind Eye];
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Financial Services Industry’s Misguided Quest to Undermine the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. LAW 881, 926-40 (2012)
[hereinafter Wilmarth, Misguided Quest]; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank’s Expansion
of State Authority to Protect Consumers of Financial Services, 36 J. CORP. L. 893, 897-919 (2011)
[hereinafter Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank’s Expansion].
406. See RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL, JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE LAW
OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 60-61, 136, 600-01 (5th ed. 2013) (explaining that the OCC is the
primary regulator for national banks, the Fed is the primary regulator for bank holding companies
and financial holding companies, and the SEC is the primary regulator for securities broker-dealers,
including those that are affiliates of banks); see also FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at 198 (describing
the same division of responsibilities among the OCC, the Fed, and the SEC with regard to their
respective roles in supervising Citibank, Citigroup, and Citigroup Global Markets).
407. See supra notes 162-63 and accompanying text.
408. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
409. FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at 199 (discussing the lifting of the Fed’s moratorium in
April 2006); Mazzucca, supra note 155, at 1 (same).
410. Memorandum from the Bd. of Governors, Fed. Reserve Sys., Div. of Banking
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“substantial progress in strengthening its internal control structure”—a view
concurred in by the OCC’s examiners—the Fed staff proposed that Citigroup
should be “free to pursue expansionary activity in the normal course of
business.”411
The wisdom of the Fed staff’s recommendation seems very doubtful, in view
of Citigroup’s repeated scandals between 2000 and 2004 and the staff’s
acknowledgment that “many aspects of [Citigroup’s] compliance risk
management processes are new and that it will take time to fully demonstrate
their effectiveness.”412  The OCC’s decision to concur with the Fed staff’s
recommendation was similarly questionable.  In January 2005, the OCC reviewed
Citigroup’s CDO business and concluded that “[e]arnings and profitability
growth have taken precedence over risk management and internal control.”413 
Similarly, in December 2005—only two months before the Fed staff issued its
recommendation to lift the moratorium—the OCC issued a report that sharply
criticized Citigroup’s “Credit Derivatives Trading” operation.414  That report
stated:
The findings of this examination are disappointing, in that the business
grew far in excess of management’s underlying infrastructure and control
processes.  Furthering our concerns is that underlying management
processes in the middle office were not capturing relevant metrics to
determine whether the pace of growth was sustainable and sufficient. 
Additionally, control functions raised questions as to the business’s
capacity to accommodate future growth, but warnings went unheeded. .
. . Management oversight is considered less than satisfactory.415
The OCC’s reports in 2005 clearly identified both the aggressive growth and
the inadequate risk controls that were primary causes of Citigroup’s near-failure
two years later.416  Indeed, the December 2005 report warned that, “[g]iven
[Citigroup’s] oversight failure, we are considering options that would limit the
bank’s ability to perform future business.”417  However, the OCC did not take
Supervision & Regulation, to Governor Susan Bies (Feb. 17, 2006), at 1, available at http://fcic-
static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-docs/2006-02-17_FRB_Memo_from_Division_
of_Banking_Supervision_and_Regulation_to_Governor_Bies_Re_Upgrade_of_Citigroups_Risk
_Management_Rating.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/5NEN-2M42.
411. Id. at 2.
412. Id.
413. FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at 199 (quoting OCC memorandum dated Jan. 13, 2005).
414. Letter from Ronald H. Frake, OCC Examiner, to Geoffrey O. Coley, co-head, Citigroup
Global Fixed Income Div. (Dec. 22, 2005) [hereinafter OCC Frake 2005 Letter], available at
http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-docs/2005-12-22_OCC_Letter_from_
Ronald_H_Frake_to_Geoffrey_O_Coley_Re_Citibank_Derivatives_Examination_Findings.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/7574-W42M.
415. Id. at 1.
416. See supra notes 413-15 and accompanying text.
417. OCC Frake 2005 Letter, supra note 414, at 2.
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effective action to restrain Citigroup’s growth or to insist on meaningful
improvements to Citigroup’s risk management systems.418  Instead, the OCC
concurred with the Fed’s decision to end the moratorium on large acquisitions by
Citigroup.419
The OCC subsequently determined that the lifting of the moratorium in April
2006 contributed to Citigroup’s collapse.420  The OCC’s 2008 examination report
found that “after regulatory restraints against significant acquisitions were lifted,
Citigroup embarked on an aggressive acquisition program.  Additionally, with the
removal of formal and informal agreements, the previous focus on risk and
compliance gave way to business expansion and profits.”421  Even before the Fed
lifted its moratorium, Citigroup was already generating “organic growth” by
expanding its internal operations.422  After the moratorium expired, Citigroup
completed a rapid series of acquisitions, including purchases of several banks and
securities firms in foreign countries as well as a U.S. electronic trading firm and
a large hedge fund (Old Lane Partners).423  As a result of Citigroup’s accelerated
growth strategy, “[i]n two and a half years, the bank’s balance sheet ballooned by
58 percent to $2.36 trillion as of Sept. 30, 2007, just before Prince was fired.”424
The Fed’s and the OCC’s willingness to tolerate Citigroup’s breakneck
growth was one of many regulatory shortcomings with regard to Citigroup.  The
FCIC determined that “the OCC assessed both the liquidity puts and the [CDO]
super-senior tranches as part of its reviews of [Citigroup’s] compliance with the
post-Enron enforcement action, but it did not examine the risks of those
exposures.”425  Instead, the OCC “relied on management’s assurances in 2006 that
the executives would strive to meet the OCC’s goals for improving risk
management.”426  
418. FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at 198-99, 303.
419. Id. at 199.
420. Id. 
421. OCC 2008 Citigroup Exam Report, supra note 368, at 2.
422. Mazzucca, supra note 155; see also supra notes 153, 155 and accompanying text
(discussing Prince’s adoption of an “organic growth” strategy in 2003).
423. Kate Linebaugh, Citi’s Asia Plan: Look Beyond the Elite, WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 2007,
at C1; Moving the Market: Citigroup to Buy Electronic Trader for $680 Million, WALL ST. J., July
3, 2007, at C2; Aaron Lucchetti & Robin Sidel, Moving the Market: Citigroup Is in Talks to
Purchase Automated Trading Desk, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2007, at C3; see also Mazzucca, supra
note 290, at 19 (“Unleashed almost a year ago from a moratorium imposed by the Federal Reserve
Board that barred major acquisitions, Citi made a number of deals in the first quarter that proved
that it is once again willing to buy growth, particularly in its international businesses.”).
424. Bradley Keoun & Donal Griffin, Citigroup Ignored 2005 CDO Alarm After Shedding
OCC ‘Handcuffs,’ FCIC Says, BLOOMBERG.COM, Jan. 28, 2011, available at http://www.
bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-28/citigroup-ignored-2005-bond-warning-after-shedding-handcuffs-
.html, archived at http://perma.cc/SG72-9BJ4.
425. FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at 303; see also id. at 263 (stating that the OCC “expressed
no apprehensions about [Citigroup’s] liquidity puts in 2003”).
426. Id. at 303; see also id. at 198-99 (stating that the OCC had criticized Citigroup in January
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Similarly, the FRB determined in December 2009 that the New York Fed’s
supervision of Citigroup was “less than effective” during the period leading up
to the financial crisis.427  The FRB’s supervisory review found that the New York
Fed “lacked the appropriate level of focus on [Citigroup’s] risk oversight and
internal audit functions” and also “lacked a disciplined and proactive approach
in assessing and validating actions taken by the firm to address supervisory
issues.”428  Timothy Geithner—who served as President of the New York Fed
from 2004 to 2008 (before President Obama appointed him as Treasury
Secretary)—acknowledged in testimony before the FCIC that “I do not think we
did enough as an institution with the authority we had to help contain the risks
that ultimately emerged in [Citigroup].”429
The SEC was the least active of Citigroup’s regulators, as it examined
Citigroup’s securities broker-dealer subsidiary only once every three years, and
its most recent examination prior to the financial crisis occurred in 2005.430  At
that time, the SEC’s examiners saw nothing “earth shattering,” but they did notice
that Citigroup had “weaknesses in internal prices and valuation controls . . . and
a willingness to allow traders to exceed their risk limits.”431  The SEC evidently
did not take any action in response to those findings.  
In June 2007, as described above, the SEC asked Citigroup to provide details
about its subprime-related exposures.432  In its response, Citigroup told the SEC
that it was omitting $43 billion of liquidity puts and super-senior CDO tranches
from its publicly disclosed subprime positions, because Citigroup viewed the
“risk of default” on those instruments as “extremely unlikely.”433  The SEC did
not order Citigroup to change its disclosures, and Citigroup did not publicly
reveal until November 2007 that its total subprime exposures included those
liquidity puts and CDO tranches.434  The FCIC and other analysts have concluded
that the SEC’s supervision of large securities broker-dealers was generally
ineffective during the period leading up to the financial crisis.435
2.  Explaining the Fed’s and the OCC’s Regulatory Failures.—The SEC did
2005 for weaknesses in “risk management and internal controls” in its CDO business).
427. FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at 303 (quoting FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, FRB NEW YORK
2009 OPERATIONS REVIEW: CLOSE OUT REPORT, at 3, available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.
edu/cdn_media/fcic-testimony/2009_FRBNY_Operations_Review_Report.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/XHQ9-EE7J.
428. Id. 
429. Id. (quoting Mr. Geithner’s testimony on May 6, 2010).
430. Id. at 198.
431. Id. (summarizing and quoting from FCIC interview with SEC staff members on Feb. 9,
2010).
432. Id. at 262.
433. Id.; see also supra note 281 and accompanying text (discussing Citigroup’s meeting with
the SEC’s examiners in June 2007).
434. Id. at 262-265.
435. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 172, at 208-18; STANTON, supra note 320, at 153-54; FCIC
REPORT, supra note 4, at 149-54, 283.
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not maintain a significant regulatory presence at Citigroup, since it examined
Citigroup Global Markets only once every three years.436  In contrast, the Fed and
the OCC maintained continuous on-site teams of examiners at Citigroup.437  As
shown above, the Fed’s and the OCC’s examination reports from 2007 and 2008
provided a detailed and devastating critique of Citigroup’s reckless growth,
highly speculative activities, and shockingly inadequate risk controls.438  Why did
the Fed and the OCC fail to identify and act on any of those shortcomings before
Citigroup disclosed its first set of large subprime losses in November 2007?439 
While a more complete discussion of regulatory errors is contained in my
previous articles,440 three factors appear particularly relevant to the Fed’s and the
OCC’s dealings with Citigroup.
First, the OCC and the Fed have structural flaws that make them vulnerable
to influence from Citigroup and other major banks.441  The OCC’s budget is
funded primarily by assessments paid by the national banks it regulates, and the
largest banks pay the highest assessments.442  The OCC therefore has “powerful
budgetary incentives” to please its regulated constituents.443  The Fed is not
subject to the same budgetary pressures as the OCC, because the Fed
independently finances its operations by “drawing on earnings from [its] portfolio
of Treasury securities and other debt instruments.”444  “However, the banking
industry exerts significant influence over the Fed through the ‘unique governance
structure’ of the Fed’s twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks (Reserve
Banks).”445  As I observed in a recent article:
Boards of directors of Reserve Banks have “typically been dominated by
senior executives of major banks, large [nonbank] financial firms and
leading nonfinancial corporations that are customers of the biggest
banks.” . . . For example, during the peak of the [financial] crisis between
2007 and 2009, the New York Fed’s board of directors included
436. FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at 198.
437. Id. at 198-99.
438. See supra Part III.B.1.
439. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at 265, 302 (noting that Citigroup publicly disclosed $55
billion of subprime exposures and up to $11 billion of subprime-related losses on November 4,
2007, while the Fed and the OCC “finally downgraded the company and its main bank to “less than
satisfactory” in April 2008 – five months after” Citigroup’s public disclosures). 
440. See supra note 405 (citing articles).
441. See infra notes 442-47 and accompanying text.
442. Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank’s Expansion, supra note 405, at 915-16.
443. Id.; see also Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV.
1, 93-94 (2008) (discussing the OCC’s “direct financial stake in keeping its bank clients happy”).
444. Wilmarth, Misguided Quest, supra note 405, at 941.
445. Wilmarth, Blind Eye, supra note 405, at 1401 (explaining that “[m]ember banks in each
Fed district elect six of the nine directors of that district’s Reserve Bank, and three of those bank-
elected directors vote (along with three additional directors appointed by the FRB) to select the
Reserve Bank’s president”).
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JPMorgan chairman Jamie Dimon, Lehman chairman Richard Fuld,
General Electric chairman Jeffrey Immelt, and Goldman director and
former chairman Stephen Friedman.446
Financial journalists have described the New York Fed as an institution that
“is, by custom and design, clubby and opaque,” with “a board dominated by the
chief executives of some [major] banks.”447  During his tenure as President of the
New York Fed, Timothy Geithner frequently met with top executives of major
New York financial institutions for professional and private discussions.448  He
was “particularly close to executives of Citigroup,” including Robert Rubin, his
former mentor at the Treasury Department, and Sanford Weill.449  Weill tried to
persuade Geithner to become Citigroup’s new CEO when Chuck Prince stepped
down in November 2007, but Geithner declined.450 
Second, during the 1990s and 2000s, federal banking agencies adhered to a
general philosophy that “regulators should seek to minimize any interference with
innovation and competition in the financial markets . . . [because] market
discipline and private risk management produced better results than government
regulation over the longer term.”451  FRB chairman Alan Greenspan was the best-
known advocate for that view,452 but he was hardly alone.  Treasury Secretary
446. Id. at 1402 (quoting Wilmarth, Misguided Quest, supra note 405, at 943).
447. Jo Becker & Gretchen Morgenson, Geithner, as Member and Overseer, Forged Ties to
Finance Club, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2009, at A1 (“At the New York Fed, top executives of global
financial giants fill many seats on the board.”). 
448. Id.  According to one published report, Geithner frequently held “one-on-one meetings”
with senior executives of Citigroup, JPMorgan and other banks regulated by the New York Fed. 
Id.  A former New York Fed general counsel stated that such meetings were “not the general
practice of Mr. Geithner’s recent predecessors” and “[t]ypically, there would be senior staff there
to protect against disputes in the future as to the nature of the conversations” involving the New
York Fed’s president.  Id. (quoting Ernest T. Patrikis). 
449. Id. (explaining that Rubin, as Treasury Secretary during the 1990s, “was Mr. Geithner’s
mentor from his years in the Clinton administration”); see also Wilmarth, Blind Eye, supra note
405, at 1410-11 (stating that Rubin helped to arrange Geithner’s appointments as President of the
New York Fed in 2003 and as Treasury Secretary in 2009).
450. Becker & Morgenson, supra note 447.
451. Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank’s Expansion, supra note 405, at 903-04 (discussing views of FRB
chairman Alan Greenspan).
452. Id.; see, e.g., Alan Greenspan, FRB Chairman, Remarks at the Nat’l Ass’n of Bus. Econ.
Ann. Mtg.: Economic Flexibility (Sept. 27, 2005) [hereinafter Greenspan 2005 Speech] (arguing
that the “success of [deregulation] confirmed the earlier views that a loosening of regulatory
restraint on business would improve the flexibility of our economy,” and “[t]he impressive
performance of the U.S. economy over the past couple of decades . . . offers the clearest evidence
of the benefits of increased market flexibility”), available at http://www.federalreserve.
gov/boarddocs/speeches/2005/20050927/default.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/95P-3JTP; see
also SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT
FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 100 (2009) (stating that there was “no truer believer in the ideology of free
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Robert Rubin and his deputy and successor Lawrence Summers actively pursued
a deregulatory agenda that included the enactment of GLBA (which ratified
Citigroup’s universal banking model) and the blocking of efforts by Commodity
Futures Trading Commission chairman Brooksley Born to regulate over-the-
counter derivatives.453  Former Comptroller of the Currency Eugene Ludwig
noted in 2010 that there was a “historic vision, historic approach, that a lighter
hand at regulation was the appropriate way to regulate.”454
Greenspan, Rubin, and Summers set the tone for a general regulatory
“mindset” that favored deregulatory, “light touch” policies during the two
decades leading up to the financial crisis.455  As FRB General Counsel Scott
Alvarez later acknowledged, “The mind-set was that there should be no
regulation; that the market should take care of policing, unless there already is an
identified problem.”456  Richard Spillenkothen, the FRB’s Director of Bank
Supervision from 1991 to 2006, agreed that regulators had “a high degree of faith
that financial markets were largely efficient and self-correcting and, therefore,
that counterparty and market discipline were generally more effective ‘regulators’
of risk-taking and improper practices than government rules and supervisors.”457
A New York Fed self-study in 2009, which examined the reasons for
supervisory failures during the period leading up to the financial crisis, concurred
that regulators had placed too much faith in the assumption that “[m]arkets will
always self-correct.”458  The New York Fed’s self-study echoed a speech by
markets, financial innovation, and deregulation” than Greenspan); ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note
172, at 192 (contending that “Greenspan made it his mission to minimize government oversight by
outsourcing risk management to banks”). 
453. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 452, at 8-10, 98-100, 104, 133-37; Wilmarth, Blind Eye,
supra note 405, at 1422.
454. STANTON, supra note 320, at 149-50 (quoting from an FCIC interview with Mr. Ludwig
on Sept. 2, 2010).
455. FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at 96, 170-73, 307-08; Wilmarth, Blind Eye, supra note 405,
at 1421-26.
456. FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at 96 (quoting from an FCIC interview with Mr. Alvarez).
457. Memorandum from Richard Spillenkothen, on the performance of prudential supervision
in the years preceding the financial crisis by a former director of banking supervision and regulation
at the Federal Reserve Board (1991 to 2006) (May 31, 2010), at 12 [hereinafter Spillenkothen FCIC
Memo]; see also id. at 27 (stating that “the culture of the Federal Reserve—an agency dominated
by professional economists whose mindset and intellectual biases were to enhance the workings
of free markets, not to design regulations—was reinforced by a Chairman who had a strong, deep,
and abiding philosophical belief that market and counterparty discipline were more effective in
controlling risks than governmental regulation and oversight”), available at http://fcic-
stat ic. law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-docs/2010-05-31%20FRB%20Richard%
20Spi l lenkothen%20Paper-%20Observat ions%20on%20the%20Performance%
20of%20Prudential%20Supervision.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/9Y57-G22N.
458. FED. RES. BANK N.Y., REP. ON SYSTEMIC RISK & BANK SUPERVISION (“Discussion Draft”
of Aug. 18, 2009) 2; see also id. at 6 (describing “the common expectation that market forces
would efficiently price risks and prompt banks to control exposures in a more effective way than
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Chairman Greenspan in September 2005, when he declared,
We appear to be revisiting Adam Smith’s notion that the more flexible
an economy, the greater its ability to self-correct after inevitable, often
unanticipated disturbances.  That greater tendency toward self-correction
has made the cyclical stability of the economy less dependent on the
actions of macroeconomic policymakers, whose responses often have
come too late or have been misguided.459
The prevailing deregulatory “mindset” encouraged regulators to view bankers
as “customers” who were entitled to helpful and sympathetic “customer
service.”460  For example, the New York Fed called its on-site examination teams
“relationship management teams,”461 a term that suggested a very close and
symbiotic connection between on-site examiners and the large banks they
regulated.  Not surprisingly, the New York Fed’s 2009 self-study concluded that
on-site examiners frequently lacked sufficient independence from the banks they
regulated.462  The study found that “relationship managers were too deferential to
bank management and too dependent on the bank’s goodwill and [management
information systems] to gain information.”463  Bank examiners described the
importance of receiving “support from senior management [at the New York Fed]
when banks complain about supervisory intrusion, and how demoralizing it can
be when [examiners] perceive insufficient support,” and one examiner added,
“Within three weeks on the job, I saw the capture set in.”464
Senior OCC officials expressed a similar attitude of deference to banks and
the financial markets.  For example, Acting Comptroller of the Currency Julie
Williams assured a group of bankers in 2005 that (i) the OCC’s supervisory
approach provided “a spacious framework, designed to accommodate change,”
regulators. . . . Regulators faced and often shared skepticism that regulators could push for more
effective practices than those required by the market for controlling firm risk.”) [hereinafter NEW
YORK FED 2009 SELF-STUDY], available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-
docs/2009-09-10%20FRBNY%20Repor t%20on%20Systemic%20Risk%20and%
20Bank%20Supervision%20draft.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/CL6-8H27.
459. Greenspan 2005 Speech, supra note 452.
460. Wilmarth, Blind Eye, supra note 405, at 1419.
461. Caroline Salas & Bradley Keoun, New York Fed’s Dahlgren Overhauls Bank Supervision
to Beef Up Oversight, BLOOMBERG.COM, Mar. 21, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-
03-21/new-york-fed-s-dahlgren-overhauls-bank-supervision-to-beef-up-oversight.html, archived
at http://perma.cc/BQ88-542U.
462. NEW YORK FED 2009 SELF-STUDY, supra note 458, at 8.
463. Id. at 19; see also id. at 8 (“Banks inherently have an information advantage over the
supervisors. . . . Getting good, timely information is therefore dependent on the willingness and
enthusiasm of bank staff in providing that information.  Supervisors . . . believe that a non-
confrontational style will enhance that process.”).
464. Id. at 8, 8 n.2; see also STANTON, supra note 320, at 163 (observing that the New York
Fed’s 2009 self-study “found that supervisory staff often feared to speak up” and “were deferential
to the banks they regulated”).  
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and (ii) the agency’s personnel were “advocates on the national stage [for]
measures designed to make regulation more efficient, and less costly, less
intrusive, less complex, and less demanding on [bankers] and [their]
resources.”465  Comptroller of the Currency John Dugan testified at a
congressional hearing in 2007 that the OCC strongly opposed any prohibitions
against financial “innovations” because “there are many different kinds of
innovations that have led to positive things and sorting out which ones are the
most positive and somewhat less positive is generally not something that the
Federal Government is good at doing.”466
Timothy Geithner expressed a similar philosophy during his leadership of the
New York Fed.  During a meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee
(“FOMC”) in January 2006, he praised retiring Chairman Greenspan as “pretty
terrific,” and he added, “I think the risk that we decide in the future that you’re
even better than we think is higher than the alternative.”467  In a May 2007
speech, Geithner stated positions that were remarkably similar to those voiced by
Greenspan two years earlier.468  Like Greenspan, Geithner applauded “[c]hanges
in financial markets . . . [that] have improved the efficiency of financial
intermediation and improved our confidence in the ability of markets to absorb
stress.”469  Geithner maintained that “[f]inancial innovation has improved the
capacity to measure and manage risk” and to enable risk to be “spread more
broadly across countries and institutions.”470  Geithner cautioned, as Greenspan
465. Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank’s Expansion, supra note 405, at 905 (quoting speech by Ms.
Williams on May 27, 2005) (italics added).  
466. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 172, at 173 (quoting Mr. Dugan’s testimony in Sept. 2007).
467. Binyamin Appelbaum, Inside the Fed in ’06: Coming Crisis, and Banter, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 13, 2012), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/13/business/transcripts-show-an-
unfazed-fed-in-2006.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/997Y-BBBK
(quoting Mr. Geithner).  At two FOMC meetings in late 2006, Geithner expressed little concern
about emerging problems in the housing market and stated that the “fundamentals of the
[economic] expansion going forward still look good.”  Id. (quoting Mr. Geithner’s remarks in
December 2006, and also quoting Mr. Geithner’s comment in September 2006 that “[w]e just don’t
see troubling signs yet of collateral damage [from the housing market], and we are not expecting
much”).
468. Compare Timothy Geithner, Pres. Fed. Res. Bank N.Y., Remarks at the Fed. Res. Bank
of Atlanta’s 2007 Financial Markets Conference: Liquidity Risk and the Global Economy (May 15,
2007), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2007/gei070515.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/B9LM-FAAD [hereinafter Geithner 2007 Speech], with Greenspan
2005 Speech, supra note 452.
469. Geithner 2007 Speech, supra note 468; see also Greenspan Speech, supra note 452
(“Deregulation and the newer information technologies have joined, in the United States and
elsewhere, to advance flexibility in the financial sector” as well as “[f]inancial stability.”).
470. Geithner 2007 Speech, supra note 468; see also Greenspan 2005 Speech, supra note 452
(acclaiming “[c]onceptual advances in pricing options and other complex financial products” that
“lowered the costs of, and expanded the opportunities for, hedging risks that were not readily
deflected in earlier decades”).
2014] CITIGROUP:  A CASE STUDY 129
had in 2005, that financial markets remained vulnerable to unexpected “shocks,”
particularly after an extended period of low interest rates and comparative
stability in the global economy.471  However, Geithner, like Greenspan, remained
optimistic about the strength and resilience of the banking system:
The dramatic changes we’ve seen in the structure of financial markets
over the past decade and more seem likely to have reduced this
vulnerability [to financial shocks].  The larger global financial
institutions are generally stronger in terms of capital relative to risk. 
Technology and innovation in financial institutions has made it easier to
manage risk.  Risk is less concentrated within the banking system.472
Geithner contended, as Greenspan had, that federal regulators “do not have
the capacity to eliminate the risk of excess leverage or asset price misalignments,
nor do we have the ability to act preemptively to defuse them.”473  Geithner also
opposed, as did Greenspan, the use of strong regulatory measures to deal with the
potential risks of financial shocks.474  For example, Geithner saw “little prospect
that supervision will have the capacity to identify and address potential
concentrations in exposure to individual risk factors, whether through changes to
capital charges or other means.”475  Geithner also argued that regulators “do not
have the capacity to put in place a transparency regime over markets that would
give people a real-time picture of the incidence and magnitude of potential
risks.”476
Instead, Geithner advocated market-friendly supervisory policies that would
encourage financial institutions to maintain larger “financial cushions” and to
471. Compare Geithner 2007 Speech, supra note 468 (”Financial innovation and global
financial integration do not offer the prospect of eliminating the risk of asset price and credit cycles,
of manias and panics, or of shocks that could have systemic consequences.”), with Greenspan 2005
Speech, supra note 452 (”History cautions that extended periods of low concern about credit risk
have invariably been followed by reversal, with an attendant fall in the prices of risky assets,” due
to the “all-too-evident alternating and infectious bouts of human euphoria and distress and the
instability they engender.”).
472. Geithner 2007 Speech, supra note 468; see also Greenspan 2005 Speech, supra note 452
(”New instruments of risk dispersal have enabled the largest and most sophisticated banks . . . to
divest themselves of much credit risk” and have produced a “far more flexible, efficient, and hence
resilient financial system than the one that existed just a quarter-century ago.”).
473. Geithner 2007 Speech, supra note 468; see also Greenspan 2005 Speech, supra note 452
(“Relying on policymakers to perceive when asset bubbles have developed and then to implement
timely policies to address successfully these misalignments in asset prices is simply not realistic.”).
474. See Greenspan 2005 Speech, supra note 452 (advocating a reliance on “self-correction”
by market forces and arguing that responses by financial policymakers to “unanticipated
disturbances . . . often have come too late or have been misguided”). 
475. Geithner 2007 Speech, supra note 468.
476. Id. (”The pace of change is too rapid, the number of positions, funds, and institutions too
great, and the analytical challenge too complex to offer the promise of that type of early warning
system.”).
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adopt other “market-led initiatives” (such as improving industry standards for
reporting derivatives trades and managing counterparty credit risk) that would be
“reinforced rather than imposed by supervision.”477  Geithner’s adherence to
Greenspan’s deregulatory philosophy and Geithner’s emphasis on “market-led
initiatives” help to explain why the New York Fed failed to take timely or
effective action to prevent Citigroup’s excessive risk-taking.  
In sharp contrast to Geithner’s distrust of the efficacy of preventive
regulation, his aversion to vigorous government action disappeared when
Citigroup and other major banks faced serious threats to their survival in 2008
and 2009.478  Geithner became the earliest and the most outspoken advocate
inside the federal government for aggressive bailouts of large banks.479  He
pushed hard to secure full protection for all of the creditors of Citigroup and other
major banks.480  He strongly—and largely successfully—opposed efforts by other
regulators (including FDIC chairman Sheila Bair and TARP Special Inspector
General Neil Barofsky) to attach strong conditions to those rescues.481  A leading
Wall Street lawyer described Geithner as “the federal regulator who was most
willing to ‘push the envelope’” to prevent major bank failures.482
The Greenspan-Rubin-Geithner consensus, which favored regulatory
deference to internal risk management systems at big banks, contributed to a third
major regulatory error.  During the past three decades, federal regulators
increasingly focused on evaluating the risk management policies and procedures
of large banks as well as the banks’ “internal models” and “credit risk metrics,”
and regulators stopped doing traditional “full scope” examinations for major
banks.483  Traditional examinations would have required “transaction testing,”
including “sufficiently robust testing to determine how well in reality [internal
bank control] processes did work or would work in a prolonged period of high
stress.”484  
477. Id.; see also Becker & Morgenson, supra note 447 (reporting that Geithner “pushed the
[financial] industry to keep better records of derivatives deals . . . . But he stopped short of pressing
for comprehensive regulation and disclosure of derivatives trading and even publicly endorsed their
potential to damp risk.”).
478. Becker & Morgenson, supra note 447.
479. Id.
480. Id.
481. BAIR, supra note 349, at 99-100, 105, 117-19, 122-26, 165-73, 201-07; NEIL BAROFSKY,
BAILOUT: AN INSIDE ACCOUNT OF HOW WASHINGTON ABANDONED MAIN STREET WHILE
RESCUING WALL STREET 71-78, 98-101, 151-57, 170-74, 192-200, 226-29 (2012); ONARAN, supra
note 14, at 81-87, 105, 117-18 (explaining that ”[t]he idea for a blanket guarantee [of bank
liabilities] was first brought up by Timothy Geithner . . . during the summer of 2008,” at 81, and
contending that Geithner worked “to save the big banks at any cost,” at 105); Becker & Morgenson,
supra note 447 ( “Mr. Geithner has been a leading architect of [bank] bailouts, the activist at the
head of the pack.”).
482. Becker & Morgenson, supra note 447 (quoting H. Rodgin Cohen).
483. Spillenkothen FCIC Memo, supra note 457, at 10-11.
484. Id at 11; see also id. at 12, 15-16 (contending that the Basel II capital accord encouraged
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Fed chairman Greenspan addressed this issue at a congressional hearing in
May 1997.485  At that hearing, he declared that the Fed was seeking to avoid
“unduly intrusive” supervision by focusing on “risk management and control
systems” within bank holding companies.486  Greenspan explained that the Fed
had discarded its “traditional approach” for supervising bank holding companies
and was instead following “a more risk-focused/less transaction-testing approach
to inspections” that placed “greater reliance on internal and external auditors.”487
In a November 2012 speech, FDIC Vice Chairman Thomas Hoenig
questioned the wisdom of the current regulatory focus on internal risk
management systems at major banks.488  He criticized the fact that “full-scope
examinations have been de-emphasized in favor of targeted reviews” and “model
validations.”489  He argued that the current preference for limited-scope reviews
is based on the mistaken assumption that the largest banks are “too large and
complex for full scope examinations.”490  In Hoenig’s view, “full exams are
doable” for big banks, because regulators can use reliable statistical “sampling
methodologies for auditing and examining large bank asset portfolios and other
operations . . . at an affordable cost.”491  In a subsequent interview, Hoenig
contended that bank examiners should “spend more time studying individual files
to verify the quality of a bank’s internal reports about its risk management
capability.”492 
The “skeptical” views expressed by banking industry consultants in response
to Hoenig’s comments indicate that his proposal for renewed transaction testing
would threaten the current ability of big banks to conduct “business as usual”
without strong regulatory oversight.493  In my opinion, to expect bank examiners
to evaluate a major bank by checking the bank’s internal risk models and
procedures, but without testing reliable samples of the bank’s actual transactions,
is as futile as asking a car mechanic to check “the computer codes that run the
car” without “looking at the tires or the fluid levels or the gaskets to see if they
“an excessive faith in internal bank risk models [and] an infatuation with the specious accuracy of
complex quantitative risk measurement techniques”).
485. Statement by Fed. Res. Bd. Chairman Alan Greenspan before the House Comm. on
Banking & Financial Services, 83 Fed. Res. Bulletin 578 (May 22, 1997).
486. Id. at 582.  
487. Id.
488. Thomas M. Hoenig, FDIC Vice Chairman, Remarks at AICPA/SIFMA FSA Nat’l
Conference: Financial Oversight: It’s Time to Improve Outcomes (Nov. 20, 2012), available at
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/chairman/spnov3012.html, archived at http://perma.
cc/7DGG-YHBA. 
489. Id. 
490. Id.
491. Id.
492. Joe Adler, FDIC’s Hoenig Proposes ‘Full Scope’ Big Bank Exams, AM. BANKER, Feb.
12, 2013, at 1 (summarizing Mr. Hoenig’s comments).
493. Id. (reporting that some “D.C. policy watchers” were “skeptical” about Hoenig’s proposal
for full-scope examinations for big banks).
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were deteriorating.”494  It is difficult to believe that regulators would have failed
to identify the enormous risks at Citigroup between 2004 and 2007 if regulators
had rigorously analyzed and tested reliable samples of actual transactions within
Citigroup’s subprime mortgage origination and securitization units, its CDO
trading unit, and its leveraged lending business.  
CONCLUSION
Citigroup’s tarnished history of repeated scandals and bailouts presents a
serious challenge for those who continue to defend the virtues of universal
banking.  For example, supporters of big diversified banks have claimed that
financial conglomerates weathered the crisis better than standalone investment
banks like Bear Stearns, Lehman and Merrill.495  In fact, however, the survival of
Citigroup and BofA depended on the federal government’s willingness to give
them enormous bailout packages, which in turn reflected the broader policy
decision that “no [financial] supermarket could possibly be allowed to fail.”496 
Citigroup’s many missteps have inflicted heavy losses on its shareholders. 
Citigroup’s stock price fell by 17% under Chuck Prince (who resigned in
November 2007)497 and by a further 89% under Vikram Pandit (who stepped
down in October 2012).498  Citigroup’s board of directors appointed Michael
494. Id. (quoting my comments in support of Hoenig’s proposal).
495. See, e.g., Donna Borak, The Case Against Restoring Glass-Steagall, AM. BANKER (Aug.
8, 2012), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/177_152/the-case-against-restoring-glass-steagall-
1051651-1.html, archived at http://perma.cc/F9BY-VU8L (citing arguments made by supporters
of universal banks against reinstatement of Glass-Steagall-type barriers between commercial banks
and securities firms).
496. John Authers, Markets Make Best Case for Glass-Steagall, FIN. TIMES (July 14, 2012),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/14e08822-eb04-11e2-9fcc-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2jyfEAidD,
archived at http://perma.cc/H38Q-V6ST; see also Devin Leonard, Company on Fire? Light a
Cigar: Why Troubled Companies Like Citigroup Keep Hiring Dick Parsons, BLOOMBERG BUS.
WK., Mar. 28-Apr. 3, 2011, at 85, 90 (reporting that Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner told
Citigroup chairman Dick Parsons that Citigroup was “too important an institution to go down”)
(quoting Mr. Parsons); Matt Taibbi, Ludicrous Times Op-Ed Forgets Entire Year of Wall Street
History, ROLLING STONE (Aug. 1, 2012), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/blogs/taibblog/
ludicrous-times-op-ed-forgets-entire-year-of-wall-street-history-20120801 archived at http://perma.
cc/3J57-9G2H (“[T]he total [government] outlay for Citigroup was $476 billion in cash and
guarantees—they were the biggest single bailout recipient, . . . [with] Bank of America [receiving]
$336 billion in cash and guarantees.”).
497. Rich Miller & Yalman Onaran, Rubin to Draw on Crisis Management Experience at Citi
(Update 2), BLOOMBERG, Nov. 5, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=news
archive&sid=aRqfhs4RlN1g, archived at http://perma.cc/8BMX-7RG9.
498. Suzanne Kapner et al., Pandit Is Forced Out at Citi, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2012, at A1;
see also Donal Griffin & Christine Harper, Former Citigroup CEO Weill Says Banks Should Be
Broken Up, BLOOMBERG, July 25, 2012, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-07-25/weill-
says-banks-should-be-broken-up, archived at http://perma.cc/TE9-WYDR (“Citigroup’s shares,
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Corbat to replace Pandit,499 and Corbat declared, “We’ve got to get to a point
where we stop destroying our shareholders’ capital.”500  Mr. Corbat’s blunt
statement reflected the dismal fact that Citigroup’s shares were trading at only
67% of the company’s declared book value in January 2013.501
By the end of 2008, many financial analysts concluded that Citigroup and its
universal banking peers were not only TBTF but also too big to manage or
regulate, and that view has persisted.502  Regulators pressured Citigroup’s
management to reduce the company’s size by selling or spinning off “noncore”
which traded as high as $564.10 at the end of 2006, when adjusted for a [10:1] reverse stock split,
plummeted to $10.20 during March of 2009 . . . . They closed at $25.79 yesterday.”); Matt Taibbi,
When Did Sandy Weill Change His Mind About Too Big to Fail? And Why?, ROLLING STONE, Aug.
3, 2012, http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/blogs/taibblog/when-did-sandy-weill-change-his-
mind-about-too-big-to-fail-and-why-20120803, archived at http://perma.cc/3W3D-8ZPA
(discussing an assumed decline in value of Sandy Weill’s Citigroup stock from about $792 million
in 2003 to about $42 million in 2012, due in part to Citigroup’s 10:1 reverse stock split in May
2012).
499. Kapner et al., supra note 498; see also Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Susanne Craig, Citi
Chairman Is Said to Have Planned Chief’s Exit Over Months, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2012, at A1.
500. Donal Griffin, Citigroup Goal Is to Stop Shareholder Capital Destruction, BLOOMBERG
(Jan. 17, 2013) http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-17/citi-ceo-says-goal-is-to-stop-
destroying-shareholders-capital.html, archived at http://perma.cc/VYH-2Y4S (quoting Mr. Corbat).
501. Id. (also noting that “Citigroup’s shares have declined 92 percent in the past six years”).
502. See, e.g., Authers, supra note 496 (stating that Citigroup and BofA “proved
unmanageable because of their sheer complexity.  This contributed to awful errors in risk
management”); Simon Johnson, Five Facts About the New Glass-Steagall, BLOOMBERG, July 11,
2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-11/five-facts-about-the-new-glass-steagall.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/8MFH-L45Z (“The biggest U.S. banks have become too big to manage,
too big to regulate, and too big to jail.”); Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Susanne Craig, Citigroup’s
Chief Resigns in Surprise Step, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2012, at A1 (”[Citigroup] is emblematic of
financial institutions that are too large to manage because of labyrinthine bureaucracy and
underperforming divisions.”).  For earlier statements of that perspective, see, e.g., Breaking Up the
Citi, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 2009, at A12 (editorial) (“A bank that consistently has to be rescued by
taxpayers lest it take down the entire financial system is too big to succeed. . . . Citi’s repeated
brushes with death prove that its management has never figured out how to run the business.”);
Kevin Dobbs & Paul Davis, Citi Spinoff: Beginning of Its Endgame, AM. BANKER, Jan. 13, 2009,
at 1 (quoting analyst Karen Shaw Petrou’s statement that “the strategic value of the oligarch bank
model was never proven . . . . Under current market conditions, it clearly does not work.”); Kevin
Dobbs, Even After Infusion Citi Seen Needing Fix, AM. BANKER, Nov. 25, 2008, at 1 (reporting on
analyst Christopher Whalen’s view that the “global model” of Citigroup was “broken” because it
was “too vast to manage all the various parts effectively, . . . forcing Citi in recent years to take big
risks on exotic mortgages and securities to prop up its bottom line”); Annys Shin, Citi’s Relentless
Quest for Growth, WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 2008, at D01 (stating that “Citi was too big to manage
well,” and quoting legal scholar Jerry Markham’s observation that Citigroup’s “business model –
a complete financial services firm – is nothing but trouble. . . . There’s always some unit having
a crisis.”).  
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assets, and Citigroup adopted a plan that reduced its assets from $2.36 trillion in
September 2007503 to $1.94 trillion in September 2012.504  Even so, Citigroup has
retained a “core” group of universal banking operations, including trading in
equity and debt securities, trading in foreign exchange, securities underwriting
and other investment banking activities.505  Thus, notwithstanding Citigroup’s
disastrous experience with capital markets activities, it seems unlikely that the
company will choose voluntarily to divest those activities and return to Citicorp’s
former status as a commercial bank.
The co-founders of Citigroup have admitted that the company’s universal
banking model failed to achieve their bullish projections of success when
Citigroup was formed in 1998.506  Former co-CEO John Reed apologized in 2009
for his role in creating Citigroup and said that Congress made a mistake when it
503. Keoun & Griffin, supra note 424.
504. Kapner et al., supra 498; see also Eric Dash, Citigroup Plans to Split Itself Up Taking
Apart the Financial Supermarket, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2009, at B1 ( “Federal regulators pushed
Mr. Pandit to move faster” in adopting “a strategy that now includes whittling Citigroup’s financial
supermarket into a core operation . . . and a group of noncore, loss-inducing business.”); David
Enrich, Citigroup Takes First Step Toward Breakup, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 2009, at A1 (”In
December [2008], government officials started pressing Mr. Pandit and his deputies to devise and
articulate a new strategy to slim down the financial colossus.”); Monica Langley & David Enrich,
Citigroup Chafes Under U.S. Overseers, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 2009, at A1 (reporting that the
federal government’s “ongoing pressure to slim down the company has forced Citigroup executives
to consider a range of unwanted options,” and Citigroup agreed to “split itself into two parts, with
the goal of selling additional assets and businesses”); Heather Landy, Weighing the Future of Citi
‘Holding’ Pen, AM. BANKER, Sept. 21, 2009, at 1 (describing Citigroup’s decision to move $649
billion of its “noncore” assets into a new “Citi Holdings” division for eventual sale or other
disposition); Michael J. Moore et al., Citigroup Productivity Worst of Big Banks Shows Challenge,
BLOOMBERG, Oct. 25, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-25/citigroup-productivity-
worst-of-big-banks-shows-challenge.html, archived at http://perma.cc/XY3B-TQUQ (reporting that
Citi Holdings had reduced its assets to $174 billion). 
505. Donal Griffin, Citigroup Profit Beats Estimates as Stock Trading Gains, BLOOMBERG,
July 15, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-15/citigroup-42-profit-rise-beats-
estimates-as-stock-trading-gains.html, archived at http://perma.cc/M84Q-Z3Z6; David Henry,
Citigroup Profit Jumps 42 Percent on Stronger Markets, REUTERS, July 16, 2013, http://www.
reuters.com/article/2013/07/15/us-citigroup-results-idUSBRE96E0BZ20130715, archived at
http://perma.cc/V9KU-CJ9V; see also Donal Griffin & Bradley Keoun, Citigroup Earnings Miss
Estimates as Stock and Bond and Bond Trading Revenue Slumps, BLOOMBERG, Jan. 18, 2011,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-18/citigroup-net-misses-estimates-on-charges-tied-to-
tighter-credit-spreads.html, archived at http://perma.cc/EY4Y-L5Y7 (reporting that Citigroup
produced more than $3 billion of quarterly revenue from “equity-trading” and “fixed-income”
trading as well as its “investment-banking operation,” and stating that “investment-banking”
remained one of Citigroup’s “core” businesses). 
506. See supra notes 6-7, 9 and accompanying text (discussing the bold predictions for
Citigroup’s success made by John Reed and Sandy Weill in 1998).
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repealed the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999.507  Reed expanded on those views in
2013, explaining that “the greatest problem [Citigroup encountered] was of
clashing cultures” between traders and commercial bankers.508  As the trading
culture grew within Citigroup, that culture became “infectious” and “a more
dominant part of the organization.”509  In Mr. Reed’s view, the increased
emphasis on trading also undermined the effectiveness of Citigroup’s risk
management system.510  Risk officers were reluctant to challenge high-risk capital
markets transactions because the completion of those transactions was a leading
metric for determining compensation.511  Moreover, universal banking “turned out
not to produce the hoped-for savings for the bank” because Citigroup needed to
hire “highly-paid” investment bankers in order to sell “sophisticated products” to
customers.512  The complexity of Citigroup’s widely dispersed operations also
meant that the company “became harder to manage.”513
At first, Sandy Weill defended Citigroup and the universal banking model
against Reed’s criticisms.514  He acknowledged in January 2010 that he was
mistaken in assuming that Citigroup was “impregnable,” but he blamed
Citigroup’s collapse primarily on Chuck Prince’s poor management.515 
By mid-2012, Weill had evidently changed his mind.  In an interview on
CNBC, he said that policymakers should “split up investment banking from
banking, have banks be deposit takers, have banks make commercial loans and
real estate loans, have banks do something that’s not going to risk the taxpayer
dollars, that’s not too big to fail.”516  He called for universal banks to “be broken
507. Bob Ivry, Reed Says ‘I’m Sorry’ for Role in Creating Citigroup (Update 1), BLOOMBERG,
Nov. 6, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=albMYVE7D578,
archived at http://perma.cc/6WM6-PJYX.
508. John Authers, Culture Clash Means Banks Must Split, Says Former Citi Chief, FIN.
TIMES, Sept. 8, 2013, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/2cfa6f18-1575-11e3-950a-00144feabdc0.
html# axzz32qOGqcmh.
509. Id. (quoting and summarizing Mr. Reed’s comments); see also FCIC REPORT, supra note
4, at 265 (quoting from interview with Mr. Reed on Mar. 24, 2010, in which he said that a “culture
change” occurred after Salomon Brothers combined with Citibank as part of the formation of
Citigroup in 1998.  According to Mr. Reed, the Salomon executives “were used to taking big risks”
and “had a history of . . . [of] making a lot of money . . . but then getting into trouble”); see also
supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text (discussing Salomon’s culture of aggressive risk-taking). 
510. Authers, supra note 508 (summarizing Mr. Reed’s comments). 
511. Id. (quoting Mr. Reed).
512. Id.
513. Id. 
514. Katrina Booker, Citi’s Creator, Alone with His Regrets, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2010, § BU,
at 1 (reporting that Mr. Weill was proud of his role as “[t]he Shatterer of Glass-Steagall” and
rejected Mr. Reed’s criticism of the repeal of Glass-Steagall).
515. Id. (also describing Mr. Weill’s regret that Citigroup had “hurt the dreams of so many
people”).
516. Kevin Wack, Weill Puts Glass-Steagall Back on Washington’s Agenda, AM. BANKER,
July 26, 2012 (available on Lexis) (quoting Mr. Weill’s statements during the CNBC interview).
136 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:69
up so that the taxpayer will never be at risk, the depositors won’t be at risk, the
leverage of the [commercial] banks will be something reasonable,” while
standalone investment banks would be able to “make some mistakes” without
threatening a systemic crisis.517
The statements of Reed and Weill are consistent with Citigroup’s lamentable
record of managerial and regulatory failures.  Citigroup’s history indicates that
the universal banking model is deeply flawed by its excessive organizational
complexity, its vulnerability to culture clashes and conflicts of interest, and its
tendency to permit excessive risk-taking within far-flung, semi-autonomous units
that lack adequate oversight from either senior management or regulatory
agencies.
In contrast to Reed and Weill, Robert Rubin has maintained his longstanding
support for the universal banking model.  During interviews with journalists in
2008, Rubin blamed Citigroup’s problems not on organizational or managerial
shortcomings but instead on a rare confluence of economic events that had
created a “perfect storm,” which nobody had foreseen.518  Rubin strongly
reaffirmed his faith in the value of large universal banks in a subsequent interview
with David Rothkopf.519  When Rothkopf asked Rubin “whether the biggest and
most influential financial organizations ought to be broken up, whether ‘too big
to fail’ was a problem to be addressed,” Rubin’s emphatically disagreed:
“‘No,’ [Rubin] said, ‘don’t you see?  Too big to fail isn’t a problem with
the system.  It is the system.  You can’t be a competitive global financial
institution serving global corporations of scale without having a certain
scale yourself.  The bigger multinationals get, the bigger financial
institutions will have to get.”520
Lobbying organizations for large financial conglomerates have echoed
Rubin’s claim that the U.S. needs megabanks like Citigroup in order to serve
global business corporations and to compete with foreign universal banks.521 
517. Id. 
518. Schwartz & Dash, supra note 3; see also Brown & Enrich, supra note 244 (summarizing
a November 2008 interview, in which Mr. Rubin stated that he had been “a very constructive part
of the Citigroup environment.”  He also claimed that “what came together [in the financial crisis]
was not only a cyclical undervaluing of risk [but also] a housing bubble, and triple-A ratings were
misguided. . . . There was virtually nobody who saw that low-probability event as a possibility.”);
see also Wilmarth, Blind Eye, supra note 405, at 1293 (citing academic studies rejecting the claim
that the financial crisis was a “perfect storm” that bankers and regulators could not have foreseen).
519. DAVID ROTHKOPF, POWER, INC.: THE EPIC RIVALRY BETWEEN BIG BUSINESS AND
GOVERNMENT—AND THE RECKONING THAT LIES AHEAD 266 (2012) (quoting undated recent
interview with Mr. Rubin).
520. Id.
521. See, e.g., Rob Nichols, U.S. Can’t Afford to Break up Big Banks, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Jan. 28, 2013 (op-ed by President and CEO of the Financial Services Forum, contending that
“large banking institutions provide unique and significant value that smaller banks simply cannot
provide—in the sheer size of credits they can deliver, the wide array of products and services they
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However, most big bank advocates do not acknowledge, as Rubin did, that the
TBTF policy is the price that must be paid for the continued existence of global
megabanks.  In my view, that price is simply too great to accept in view of the
massive governmental bailouts that were required to rescue Citigroup, BofA and
other global megabanks during the financial crisis (e.g., ABN Amro,
Commerzbank, Fortis, ING, Lloyds HBOS, Royal Bank of Scotland and UBS),522
as well as the enormous economic costs inflicted by the crisis.523  Moreover, it is
highly doubtful whether the U.S., U.K., and European Union would have the
necessary fiscal and monetary resources to finance similar bailouts of megabanks
should another financial crisis occur during the coming decade.524  
Because the price of the universal banking model is too costly to bear, I have
advocated legal reforms that would remove government subsidies currently
exploited by financial conglomerates.525  Removing those subsidies would subject
universal banks to market forces similar to those that forced the breakup of many
commercial and industrial conglomerates during the 1980s and 1990s.526  Other
scholars and policymakers have advocated more far-reaching measures, including
maximum size caps on financial institutions and a Glass-Steagall type of
separation between banks and capital markets activities.527  While the most
promising reforms are still a matter of debate, it is abundantly clear, given the
unfortunate history of Citigroup and many of its megabank peers, that we cannot
afford to tolerate the status quo.
offer, and in their geographic reach. . . . Breaking up large banking companies would only send the
business of corporations like AT&T, Texas Instruments and Southwest Airlines overseas” to
foreign universal banks), available at http://www.dallasnews.com/opinion/latest-columns/20130
128-rob-nichols-u.s.-cant-afford-to-break-up-big-banks.ece, archived at http://perma.cc/5QP4-
LB9Z; The Clearing House Ass’n, Study Examines Large Banks’ Contributions to the Economy
(Nov. 7, 2011) (announcing release of sponsored study concluding that the twenty-six largest U.S.
banks provide significant benefits to “consumers, companies and governments . . . in the form of
economics of scale, the broad scope of products and services that large banks provide, and the
spread of banking innovation.”), available at https://www.theclearinghouse.org/publications/
2011/economics-of-large-banks, archived at http://perma. cc/G97K-W3JY.
522. Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank, supra note 231, at 958-59, 978-79; see also Wilmarth, Blind Eye,
supra note 405, at 1312-14, 1345-47.
523. Wilmarth, Blind Eye, supra note 405, at 1314-17.
524. ONARAN, supra note 14, at 4-13, 147-56.
525. See, e.g., Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank, supra note 231, at 1034-52, 1056-57. 
526. Id. (describing my “narrow bank” proposal).  
527. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 452, at 208-20 (advocating the imposition of maximum
size caps); Jeff Bater, Systemic Risk: McCain, Warren Push Glass-Steagall Bill to Reduce Risks
from Megabanks, 101 BNA’S BANKING REPORT 95 (July 16, 2013) (discussing the introduction of
a proposed bill, the “21st Century Glass-Steagall Act,” by Senators Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), John
McCain (R-AZ) and Maria Cantwell (D-WA)).  
